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Abstract
We study the interaction of the programming construct “new”, which generates statically
scoped names, with communication via messages on channels. This interaction is crucial in
security protocols, which are the main motivating examples for our work; it also appears in other
programming-language contexts.
We define the applied pi calculus, a simple, general extension of the pi calculus in which values
can be formed from names via the application of built-in functions, subject to equations, and be
sent as messages. (In contrast, the pure pi calculus lacks built-in functions; its only messages are
atomic names.) We develop semantics and proof techniques for this extended language and apply
them in reasoning about security protocols.
This paper essentially subsumes the conference paper that introduced the applied pi calculus
in 2001. It fills gaps, incorporates improvements, and further explains and studies the applied pi
calculus. Since 2001, the applied pi calculus has been the basis for much further work, described in
many research publications and sometimes embodied in useful software, such as the tool ProVerif,
which relies on the applied pi calculus to support the specification and automatic analysis of
security protocols. Although this paper does not aim to be a complete review of the subject, it
benefits from that further work and provides better foundations for some of it. In particular, the
applied pi calculus has evolved through its implementation in ProVerif, and the present definition
reflects that evolution.
1 A Case for Impurity
Purity often comes before convenience and even before faithfulness in the lambda calculus, the pi
calculus, and other foundational programming languages. For example, in the standard pi calculus,
the only messages are atomic names [113]. This simplicity is extremely appealing from a foundational
viewpoint, and helps in developing the theory of the pi calculus. Furthermore, ingenious encodings
demonstrate that it may not entail a loss of generality. In particular, integers, objects, and even
higher-order processes can be represented in the pure pi calculus. Similarly, various encodings of
cryptographic operations in the pi calculus have been considered [11, 57, 23, 107].
On the other hand, this purity has a price. In applications, the encodings can be futile, cumber-
some, and even misleading. For instance, in the study of programming languages based on the pi
calculus (such as Pict [121], JoCaml [66], or occam-pi [135]), there is little point in pretending that
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integers are not primitive. The encodings may also hinder careful reasoning about communication (for
example, because they require extra messages), and they may complicate static analysis and proofs.
These difficulties are often circumvented through on-the-fly extensions. The extensions range from
quick punts (“for the next example, let’s pretend that we have a datatype of integers”) to the laborious
development of new calculi, such as the spi calculus [11] (a calculus with cryptographic operations)
and its variants. Generally, the extensions bring us closer to a realistic programming language or
modeling language—that is not always a bad thing.
Although many of the resulting calculi are ad hoc and poorly understood, others are robust and
uniform enough to have a rich theory and a variety of applications. In particular, impure extensions
of the lambda calculus with function symbols and with equations among terms (“delta rules”) have
been developed systematically, with considerable success. Similarly, impure versions of CCS and CSP
with value-passing are not always deep but often neat and convenient [111].
In this paper, we introduce, study, and use an analogous uniform extension of the pi calculus,
which we call the applied pi calculus (by analogy with “applied lambda calculus”). From the pure
pi calculus, we inherit constructs for communication and concurrency, and for generating statically
scoped new names (“new”). We add functions and equations, much as is done in the lambda calculus.
Messages may then consist not only of atomic names but also of values constructed from names and
functions. This embedding of names into the space of values gives rise to an important interaction
between the “new” construct and value-passing communication, which appears in neither the pure
pi calculus nor value-passing CCS and CSP. Further, we add an auxiliary substitution construct,
roughly similar to a floating “let”; this construct is helpful in programming examples and especially
in semantics and proofs, and serves to capture the partial knowledge that an environment may have
of some values.
The applied pi calculus builds on the pure pi calculus and its substantial theory, but it shifts the
focus away from encodings. In comparison with ad hoc approaches, it permits a general, systematic
development of syntax, operational semantics, equivalences, and proof techniques.
Using the calculus, we can write and reason about programming examples where “new” and value-
passing appear. First, we can easily treat standard datatypes (integers, pairs, arrays, etc.). We can
also model unforgeable capabilities as new names, then model the application of certain functions
to those capabilities. For instance, we may construct a pair of capabilities. More delicately, the
capabilities may be pointers to composite structures, and then adding an offset to a pointer to a pair
may yield a pointer to its second component (e.g., as in [101]). Furthermore, we can study a variety of
security protocols. For this purpose, we represent fresh channels, nonces, and keys as new names, and
primitive cryptographic operations as functions, obtaining a simple but useful programming-language
perspective on security protocols (much as in the spi calculus). A distinguishing characteristic of
the present approach is that we need not craft a special calculus and develop its proof techniques
for each choice of cryptographic operations. Thus, we can express and analyze fairly sophisticated
protocols that combine several cryptographic primitives (encryptions, hashes, signatures, XORs, . . . ).
We can also describe attacks against the protocols that rely on (equational) properties of some of
those primitives. In our work to date, security protocols are our main source of examples.
The next section defines the applied pi calculus. Section 3 introduces some small, informal exam-
ples. Section 4 defines semantic concepts, such as process equivalence, and develops proof techniques.
Sections 5 and 6 treat larger, instructive examples; they concern a Diffie-Hellman key exchange, cryp-
tographic hash functions, and message authentication codes. (The two sections are independent.)
Many other examples now appear in the literature, as explained below. Section 7 discusses related
work, and Section 8 concludes. The body of the paper contains some proofs and outlines others; many
details of the proofs, however, are in appendices.
This paper essentially subsumes the conference paper that introduced the applied pi calculus in
2001. It fills gaps, incorporates various improvements, and further explains and studies the applied
pi calculus. Specifically, it presents a revised language, with a revised semantics, as explained in
Sections 2 and 4. It also includes precise definitions and proofs; these address gaps in the conference
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paper, discussed in further detail in Section 4. Finally, some of the examples in Sections 3, 5, and
especially 6 are polished or entirely new.
Since 2001, the applied pi calculus has been the basis for much further work, described in many
research publications (some of which are cited below) and tutorials [3, 69, 122]. This further work
includes semantics, proof techniques, and applications in diverse contexts (key exchange, electronic
voting, certified email, cryptographic file systems, encrypted Web storage, website authorization,
zero-knowledge proofs, and more). It is sometimes embodied in useful software, such as the tool
ProVerif [43, 44, 48, 47]. This tool, which supports the specification and automatic analysis of security
protocols, relies on the applied pi calculus as input language. Other software that builds on ProVerif
targets protocol implementations, Web-security mechanisms, or stateful systems such as hardware
devices [40, 24, 18]. Finally, the applied pi calculus has also been implemented in other settings, such
as the prover Tamarin [108, 98].
Although this paper does not aim to offer a complete review of the subject and its growth since
2001, it benefits from that further work and provides better foundations for some of it. In particular,
the applied pi calculus has evolved through its implementation in ProVerif, and the present definition
reflects that evolution.
2 The Applied Pi Calculus
In this section we define the applied pi calculus: its syntax and informal semantics (Section 2.1), then
its operational semantics (Section 2.2). We also discuss a few variants and extensions of our definitions
(Section 2.3).
2.1 Syntax and Informal Semantics
A signature Σ consists of a finite set of function symbols, such as f, encrypt, and pair, each with an
arity. A function symbol with arity 0 is a constant symbol.
Given a signature Σ, an infinite set of names, and an infinite set of variables, the set of terms is
defined by the grammar:
L,M,N, T, U, V ::= terms
a, b, c, . . . , k, . . . ,m, n, . . . , s name
x, y, z variable
f(M1, . . . ,Ml) function application
where f ranges over the functions of Σ and l matches the arity of f .
Although names, variables, and constant symbols have similarities, we find it clearer to keep them
separate. A term is ground when it does not contain variables (but it may contain names and constant
symbols). We use meta-variables u, v, w to range over both names and variables. We abbreviate tuples
u1, . . . , ul and M1, . . . ,Ml to u˜ and M˜ , respectively.
The grammar for processes is similar to the one in the pi calculus, but here messages can contain
terms (rather than only names) and names need not be just channel names:
P,Q,R ::= processes (or plain processes)
0 null process
P |Q parallel composition
!P replication
νn.P name restriction (“new”)
if M = N then P else Q conditional
N(x).P message input
N〈M〉.P message output
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The null process 0 does nothing; P | Q is the parallel composition of P and Q; the replication !P
behaves as an infinite number of copies of P running in parallel. The process νn.P makes a new,
private name n then behaves as P . The conditional construct if M = N then P else Q is standard,
but we should stress that M = N represents equality, rather than strict syntactic identity. We
abbreviate it if M = N then P when Q is 0. Finally, N(x).P is ready to input from channel N ,
then to run P with the actual message replaced for the formal parameter x, while N〈M〉.P is ready
to output M on channel N , then to run P . In both of these, we may omit P when it is 0.
Further, we extend processes with active substitutions:
A,B,C ::= extended processes
P plain process
A |B parallel composition
νn.A name restriction
νx.A variable restriction
{M/x} active substitution
We write {M/x} for the substitution that replaces the variable x with the term M . Considered as a
process, {M/x} is like let x = M in . . ., and is similarly useful. However, unlike a “let” definition,
{M/x} floats and applies to any process that comes into contact with it. To control this contact, we
may add a restriction: νx.({M/x} |P ) corresponds exactly to let x =M in P . The substitution {M/x}
typically appears when the term M has been sent to the environment, but the environment may not
have the atomic names that appear in M ; the variable x is just a way to refer to M in this situation.
Although the substitution {M/x} concerns only one variable, we can build bigger substitutions by
parallel composition, and may write
{M1/x1 , . . . ,
Ml/xl} for {
M1/x1} | · · · | {
Ml/xl}
We write σ, {M/x}, {M˜/˜x} for substitutions, xσ for the image of x by σ, and Tσ for the result of
applying σ to the free variables of T . We identify the empty substitution and the null process 0.
As usual, names and variables have scopes, which are delimited by restrictions and by inputs. We
write fv (A) and fn(A) for the sets of free variables and free names of A, respectively. These sets are
inductively defined, as detailed in Figure 1. The domain dom(A) of an extended process A is the set
of variables that A exports (those variables x for which A contains a substitution {M/x} not under a
restriction on x). Figure 1 also defines dom(A) formally. We consider that expressions (processes and
extended processes) are equal modulo renaming of bound names and variables.
We always assume that our substitutions are cycle-free, that is, by reordering, they can be written
{M1/x1, . . . ,
Ml/xl} where xi /∈ fv (Mj) for all i ≤ j ≤ l. For instance, we exclude substitutions such as
{f(y)/x,
f(x)/y}. We also assume that, in an extended process, there is at most one substitution for each
variable, and there is exactly one when the variable is restricted, that is, dom(A) ∩ dom(B) = ∅ in
every extended process A|B, and x ∈ dom(A) in every extended process νx.A. An extended process A
is closed when its free variables are all defined by an active substitution, that is, dom(A) = fv (A). We
use the abbreviation νu˜ for the (possibly empty) series of pairwise distinct restrictions νu1.νu2. . . . νul.
A frame is an extended process built up from 0 and active substitutions of the form {M/x} by
parallel composition and restriction. We let ϕ and ψ range over frames. Every extended process A
can be mapped to a frame ϕ(A) by replacing every plain process embedded in A with 0. The frame
ϕ(A) can be viewed as an approximation of A that accounts for the static knowledge exposed by A
to its environment, but not for A’s dynamic behavior. Assuming that all bound names and variables
are pairwise distinct, and do not clash with free ones, one can ignore all restrictions in a frame,
thus obtaining an underlying substitution; we require that, for each extended process, this resulting
substitution be cycle-free.
We rely on a sort system for terms and processes. It includes a sort Channel for channels. It may
also include other sorts such as Integer, Key, or simply a universal sort for data Data. Each variable
and each name comes with a sort; we write u : τ to mean that u has sort τ . There are an infinite
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fv (x)
def
= {x}
fv(n)
def
= ∅
fv (f(M1, . . . ,Ml))
def
= fv(M1) ∪ · · · ∪ fv(Ml)
fv (0)
def
= ∅
fv (P |Q)
def
= fv(P ) ∪ fv(Q)
fv(!P )
def
= fv(P )
fv(νn.P )
def
= fv(P )
fv (if M = N then P else Q)
def
= fv(M) ∪ fv(N) ∪ fv(P ) ∪ fv (Q)
fv (N(x).P )
def
= fv(N) ∪ (fv (P ) \ {x})
fv(N〈M〉.P )
def
= fv(N) ∪ fv(M) ∪ fv(P )
fv (A |B)
def
= fv(A) ∪ fv (B)
fv (νn.A)
def
= fv(A)
fv(νx.A)
def
= fv(A) \ {x}
fv ({M/x})
def
= fv(M) ∪ {x}
fn(·) is defined as fv (·), except that
fn(x)
def
= ∅
fn(n)
def
= {n}
fn(νn.P )
def
= fn(P ) \ {n}
fn(N(x).P )
def
= fn(N) ∪ fn(P )
fn(νn.A)
def
= fn(A) \ {n}
fn(νx.A)
def
= fn(A)
fn({M/x})
def
= fn(M)
dom(P )
def
= ∅
dom(A | B)
def
= dom(A) ∪ dom(B)
dom(νn.A)
def
= dom(A)
dom(νx.A)
def
= dom(A) \ {x}
dom({M/x})
def
= {x}
Figure 1: Free variables, free names, and domain
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u : τ
⊢ u : τ
f : τ1 × · · · × τl → τ ⊢M1 : τ1 . . . ⊢Ml : τl
⊢ f(M1, . . . ,Ml) : τ
⊢ 0
⊢ P ⊢ Q
⊢ P |Q
⊢ P
⊢ !P
⊢ P
⊢ νn.P
⊢M : τ ⊢ N : τ ⊢ P ⊢ Q
⊢ if M = N then P else Q
⊢ N : Channel ⊢ P
⊢ N(x).P
⊢ N : Channel ⊢M : τ ⊢ P
⊢ N〈M〉.P
⊢ A ⊢ B
⊢ A | B
⊢ A
⊢ νu.A
x : τ ⊢M : τ
⊢ {M/x}
Figure 2: Sort system
number of variables and an infinite number of names of each sort. We typically use a, b, and c as
names of sort Channel, s and k as names of some other sort (e.g., Data), and m and n as names of
any sort. Function symbols also come with the sorts of their arguments and of their result. We write
f : τ1 × · · · × τl → τ to mean that f has arguments of sorts τ1, . . . , τl and a result of sort τ . Figure 2
gives the rules of the sort system. It defines the following judgments: ⊢ M : τ means that M is a
term of sort τ ; ⊢ P means that the process P is well-sorted; ⊢ A means that the extended process A
is well-sorted. This sort system enforces that function applications are well-sorted, that M and N are
of the same sort in conditional expressions, that N has sort Channel in input and output expressions,
that M is well-sorted (with an arbitrary sort τ) in output expressions, and that active substitutions
preserve sorts. We always assume that expressions are well-sorted, and that substitutions preserve
sorts.
2.2 Operational Semantics
We give an operational semantics for the applied pi calculus in the now customary “chemical style” [33,
112]. At the center of this operational semantics is a reduction relation → on extended processes,
which basically models the steps of computations. For example, a〈M〉 | a(x).b〈x〉 → b〈M〉 represents
the transmission of the message M on the channel a to a process that will forward the message on
the channel b; the formal x is replaced with its actual value M in this reduction. The axioms for the
reduction relation→, which are remarkably simple, rely on auxiliary rules for a structural equivalence
relation ≡ that permits the rearrangement of processes, for example the use of commutativity and
associativity of parallel composition. Furthermore, both structural equivalence and reduction depend
on an underlying equational theory. Therefore, this section introduces equational theories, then defines
structural equivalence and reduction.
Given a signature Σ, we equip it with an equational theory, that is, with a congruence relation on
terms that is closed under substitution of terms for variables and names. (See for example Mitchell’s
textbook [115, chapter 3] and its references for background on universal algebra and algebraic data
types from a programming-language perspective.) We further require that this equational theory
respect the sort system, that is, two equal terms are of the same sort, and that it be non-trivial, that
is, there exist two different terms in each sort.
An equational theory may be generated from a finite set of equational axioms, or from rewrite rules,
but this property is not essential for us. We tend to ignore the mechanics of specifying equational
theories, but give several examples in Section 3.
We write Σ ⊢ M = N when the equation M = N is in the theory associated with Σ. Here we
keep the theory implicit, and we may even abbreviate Σ ⊢ M = N to M = N when Σ is clear from
context or unimportant. We write Σ 6⊢M = N for the negation of Σ ⊢M = N .
As usual, a context is an expression with a hole. An evaluation context is a context whose hole is
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not under a replication, a conditional, an input, or an output. A context E[ ] closes A when E[A] is
closed.
Structural equivalence ≡ is the smallest equivalence relation on extended processes that is closed
by application of evaluation contexts, and such that:
Par-0 A ≡ A | 0
Par-A A | (B | C) ≡ (A | B) | C
Par-C A |B ≡ B |A
Repl !P ≡ P | !P
New-0 νn.0 ≡ 0
New-C νu.νv.A ≡ νv.νu.A
New-Par A | νu.B ≡ νu.(A |B) when u 6∈ fv(A) ∪ fn(A)
Alias νx.{M/x} ≡ 0
Subst {M/x} |A ≡ {M/x} |A{M/x}
Rewrite {M/x} ≡ {
N/x} when Σ ⊢M = N
The rules for parallel composition and restriction are standard. Alias enables the introduction of
an arbitrary active substitution. Subst describes the application of an active substitution to a process
that is in contact with it. Rewrite deals with equational rewriting. Subst implicitly requires that
x : τ and ⊢ M : τ for some sort τ . In combination, Alias and Subst yield A{M/x} ≡ νx.({M/x} |A)
for x /∈ fv (M):
A{M/x} ≡ A{M/x} | 0 by Par-0
≡ A{M/x} | νx.{M/x} by Alias
≡ νx.(A{M/x} | {M/x}) by New-Par
≡ νx.({M/x} | A{
M/x}) by Par-C
≡ νx.({M/x} | A) by Subst
Using structural equivalence, every closed extended process A can be rewritten to consist of a
substitution and a closed plain process with some restricted names:
A ≡ νn˜.({M˜/˜x} | P )
where fv (P ) = ∅, fv (M˜) = ∅, and {n˜} ⊆ fn(M˜). In particular, every closed frame ϕ can be rewritten
to consist of a substitution with some restricted names:
ϕ ≡ νn˜.{M˜/˜x}
where fv (M˜) = ∅ and {n˜} ⊆ fn(M˜). The set {x˜} is the domain of ϕ.
Internal reduction → is the smallest relation on extended processes closed by structural equivalence
and application of evaluation contexts such that:
Comm N〈x〉.P |N(x).Q → P |Q
Then if M =M then P else Q → P
Else if M = N then P else Q → Q
for any ground terms M and N such that Σ 6⊢M = N
Communication (Comm) is remarkably simple because the message concerned is a variable; this
simplicity entails no loss of generality because Alias and Subst can introduce a variable to stand for
a term:
N〈M〉.P |N(x).Q ≡ νx.({M/x} |N〈x〉.P |N(x).Q)
→ νx.({M/x} | P |Q) by Comm
≡ P |Q{M/x}
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(This derivation assumes that x /∈ fv(N) ∪ fv(M) ∪ fv (P ), which can be established by renaming as
needed.)
Comparisons (Then and Else) directly depend on the underlying equational theory. Using Else
sometimes requires that active substitutions in the context be applied first, to yield ground terms M
and N . For example, rule Else does not allow us to reduce {n/x} | if x = n then P else Q.
This use of the equational theory may be reminiscent of initial algebras. In an initial algebra,
the principle of “no confusion” dictates that two elements are equal only if this is required by the
corresponding equational theory. Similarly, if M = N then P else Q reduces to P only if this is
required by the equational theory, and reduces to Q otherwise. Initial algebras also obey the principle
of “no junk”, which says that all elements correspond to terms built exclusively from function symbols
of the signature. In contrast, a fresh name need not equal any such term in the applied pi calculus.
2.3 Variants and Extensions
Several variants of the syntax of the applied pi calculus appear in the literature, and further variants
may be considered. We discuss a few:
• In the conference paper, there are several sorts for channels: the sort Channel〈τ〉 is the sort of
channels that convey messages of sort τ . The sort Channel without argument is more general,
in the sense that all processes well-sorted with Channel〈τ〉 are also well-sorted with Channel.
Having a single sort for channels simplifies some models, for instance when all public messages
are sent on the same channel, even if they have different types. Moreover, by using Channel as
only sort, we can encode an untyped version of the applied pi calculus. The tool ProVerif also
uses the sort Channel without argument.
• In a more refined version of the sort system, we could allow names only in a distinguished set of
sorts. For instance, we could consider a sort of booleans, containing as only values the constants
true and false. Such a sort would not contain names. Sorts without names would have to be
treated with special care in proofs, since our proofs often use fresh names.
On the other hand, letting all sorts contain names does not prevent modeling booleans by a sort.
For example, we can treat as false all terms of the sort different from true, including not only
the constant false but also all names. Analogous treatments apply to other common datatypes.
• In the conference paper, channels in inputs and outputs are names or variables rather than
any term. Allowing any term as channel yields a more general calculus and avoids some side
conditions in theorems. It is also useful for some encodings [5]. Finally, it is in line with the
syntax of ProVerif, where this design choice was adopted in order to simplify the untyped version
of the calculus.
Nevertheless, the sort system can restrict the terms that appear as channels: if no function
symbol returns a result of sort Channel, then channels can be only names or variables.
• Function symbols can also be defined by rewrite rules instead of an equational theory. This
approach is taken in ProVerif [46]: a destructor g is a partial function defined by rewrite rules
g(M1, . . . ,Ml)→M ; the destructor application g(N1, . . . , Nl) fails when no rewrite rule applies,
and this failure can be tested in the process calculus.
A destructor g : τ1 × · · · × τl → τ with rewrite rule g(M1, . . . ,Ml)→ M can be encoded in the
applied pi calculus by function symbols g : τ1× · · · × τl → τ and testg : τ1× · · ·× τl → bool with
the equations
g(M1, . . . ,Ml) = M
testg(M1, . . . ,Ml) = true
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The function testg allows one to test whether g(N1, . . . , Nl) is defined, by checking whether
testg(N1, . . . , Nl) = true holds. (See Section 3 for examples of such test functions.) The function
g may be applied even when its arguments are not instances of (M1, . . . ,Ml), thus yielding terms
g(N1, . . . , Nl) that do not exist in the calculus with rewrite rules. These “stuck” terms may be
simulated with distinct fresh names in that variant of the calculus.
Destructors are easy to implement in a tool. They also provide a built-in error-handling con-
struct: the error handling is triggered when no rewrite rule applies. However, they complicate
the semantics because they require a notion of evaluation of terms. Moreover, many useful
functions can be defined by equations but not as destructors (for instance, encryption without
redundancy, XOR, and modular exponentiation, which we use in the rest of this paper). There-
fore, ProVerif supports both destructors and equations [48]. Thus, the language of ProVerif is a
superset of the applied pi calculus as defined in this paper [47, Chapter 4], with the caveat that
ProVerif does not support all equational theories and that it considers only plain processes.
• An extension that combines the applied pi calculus with ambients and with a built-in construct
for evaluating messages as programs has also been studied [49]. This extended calculus mixes
many notions, so the corresponding proofs are complex. Considering a single notion at a time
yields a simpler and more elegant calculus. Furthermore, although the applied pi calculus has
few primitives, it supports various other constructs via encodings; in particular, the message-
evaluation construct could be represented by defining an interpreter in the calculus.
• Our equational theories are closed under substitution of terms for names. This property yields
a simple and uniform treatment of variables and names. An alternative definition, which may
suffice, assumes only that equational theories are closed under one-to-one renaming and do not
equate names. That definition makes it possible to define a function that tests whether a term
is a name.
Some other variations concern the definition of the semantics:
• As in other papers [48, 103], we can handle the replication by a reduction step !P → P | !P
instead of the structural equivalence rule !P ≡ P | !P . This modification prevents transforming
P | !P into !P , and thus simplifies some proofs.
• As Section 2.2 indicates, we can rewrite extended processes by pulling restrictions to the top, so
that every closed extended process A becomes an extended process A◦ such that
A ≡ A◦ = νn˜.({M˜/˜x} | P1 | . . . | Pl)
where fv(P1 |. . .|Pl) = ∅, fv(M˜) = ∅, and P1, . . . , Pl are replication, conditional, input, or output
expressions. We can then modify the definitions of structural equivalence and internal reduction
to act on processes in the form above. Structural equivalence says that the parallel composition
P1 | . . . | Pl is associative and commutative and that the names in n˜ can be reordered. Internal
reduction is the smallest relation on closed extended processes, closed by structural equivalence,
such that:
E[N〈M〉.P |N ′(x).Q] → E[P |Q{M/x}]◦ if Σ ⊢ N = N ′
E[if M = N then P else Q] → E[P ]◦ if Σ ⊢M = N
E[if M = N then P else Q] → E[Q]◦ if Σ 6⊢M = N
E[!P ] → E[P | !P ]◦
for any evaluation context E. A similar idea appears in the intermediate applied pi calculus of
Delaune et al. [78] and Liu et al. [103, 104]. There, all restrictions not under replication are
pulled to the top of processes, over conditionals, inputs, outputs, and parallel compositions; the
processes P1, . . . , Pl may be 0; and channels are names or variables.
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• Pushing the previous idea further, we can represent the extended process
A ≡ νn˜.({M˜/˜x} | P1 | . . . | Pl)
as a configuration (N , σ,P) = ({n˜}, {M˜/˜x}, {P1, . . . , Pl}), where N is a set of names, σ is a
substitution, and P is a multiset of processes. We can then define internal reduction on such
configurations, without any structural equivalence. (Sets and multisets allow us to ignore the
ordering of restrictions and parallel processes.) This idea is used in semantics of the calculus of
ProVerif [5, 15, 46, 47].
Semantics based on global configurations are closer to abstract machines. Such semantics simplify
proofs, because they leave only few choices in reductions. They also make it easier to define further
extensions of the calculus, such as tables and phases in ProVerif [47]. However, our compositional
semantics is more convenient in order to model interactions between a process and a context. It is
also closer to the traditional semantics of the pi calculus. The two kinds of semantics are of course
connected. In particular, Blanchet [47, Chapter 4] formally relates the semantics of ProVerif based
on configurations to our semantics.
3 Brief Examples
This section collects several examples, focusing on signatures, equations, and some simple processes.
We start with pairs; this trivial example serves to introduce some notations and issues. We then
discuss lists, cryptographic hash functions, encryption functions, digital signatures, and the XOR
function [109, 129], as well as a form of multiplexing, which demonstrates the use of channels that
are terms rather than names. Further examples appear in Sections 5 and 6. More examples, such as
blind signatures [99] and zero-knowledge proofs [22], have appeared in the literature since 2001.
Of course, at least some of these functions appear in most formalizations of cryptography and
security protocols. In comparison with the spi calculus, the applied pi calculus permits a more
uniform and versatile treatment of these functions, their variants, and their properties. Like the spi
calculus, however, the applied pi calculus takes advantage of notations, concepts, and techniques from
programming languages.
Pairs Algebraic datatypes such as pairs, tuples, arrays, and lists occur in many examples. Encoding
them in the pure pi calculus is not hard, but neither is representing them as primitive. For instance,
the signature Σ may contain the binary function symbol pair and the unary function symbols fst and
snd, with the abbreviation (M,N) for pair(M,N), and with the evident equations:
fst((x, y)) = x (1)
snd((x, y)) = y (2)
(So the equational theory consists of these equations, and all the equations obtained by reflexivity,
symmetry, transitivity, applications of function symbols, and substitutions of terms for variables.)
These function symbols may for instance be sorted as follows:
pair : Data× Data→ Data
fst : Data→ Data
snd : Data→ Data
We may use the test (fst(M), snd(M)) =M to check thatM is a pair before using the values of fst(M)
and snd(M). Alternatively, we may add a boolean function is pair that recognizes pairs, defined by
the equation:
is pair((x, y)) = true
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With this equation, the conditional if is pair(M) = true then P else Q runs P if M is a pair and Q
otherwise. Using pairs, we may, for instance, define the process:
νs.
(
a〈(M, s)〉 | a(z).if snd(z) = s then b〈fst(z)〉
)
One of its components sends a pair consisting of a term M and a fresh name s on a channel a. The
other receives a message on a and, if its second component is s, it forwards the first component on a
channel b. Thus, we may say that s serves as a capability (or password) for the forwarding. However,
this capability is not protected from eavesdroppers when it travels on a. Any other process can listen
on a and can apply snd to the message received, thus learning s. We can represent such an attacker
within the calculus, for example by the following process:
a(z).a〈(N, snd(z))〉
which may receive (M, s) on a and send (N, s) on a. Composing this attacker in parallel with the
process, we may obtain N instead of M on b.
Such attacks can be thwarted by the use of restricted channel names, as in the process
νa.νs.
(
a〈(M, s)〉 | a(z).if snd(z) = s then b〈fst(z)〉
)
Alternatively, they can be thwarted by the use of cryptography, as discussed below.
Lists We may treat lists similarly, with the following function symbols and corresponding sorts:
nil : List
cons : Data× List→ List
hd : List→ Data
tl : List→ List
The constant nil is the empty list; cons(x, y) represents the concatenation of the element x at the
beginning of the list y, and we write it with infix notation as x :: y, where the symbol :: associates to
the right; and hd and tl are head and tail functions with equations:
hd(x :: y) = x tl(x :: y) = y (3)
Further, we write M ++N for the concatenation of an element N at the end of a list M , where the
function ++ : List× Data→ List associates to the left, and satisfies the equations:
nil++ x = x :: nil (x :: y) ++ z = x :: (y ++ z) (4)
Cryptographic Hash Functions We represent a cryptographic hash function as a unary function
symbol h with no equations. The absence of an inverse for h models the one-wayness of h. The fact
that h(M) = h(N) only when M = N models that h is collision-free.
Modifying our first example, we may now write the process:
νs.
(
a〈(M, h((s,M)))〉 | a(x).if h((s, fst(x))) = snd(x) then b〈fst(x)〉
)
Here the value M is authenticated by pairing it with the fresh name s and then hashing the pair.
Although (M, h((s,M))) travels on the public channel a, no other process can extract s from this
message, or produce (N, h((s,N))) for some other N using the available functions. Therefore, we may
reason that this process will forward only the intended term M on channel b.
This example is a typical cryptographic application of hash functions. In light of the practical
importance of those applications, our treatment of hash functions is attractively straightforward.
Still, we may question whether our formal model of these functions is not too strong and simplistic
in comparison with the properties of actual implementations based on algorithms such as SHA. In
Section 6, we consider a somewhat weaker, subtler model for hash functions.
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Symmetric Encryption In order to model symmetric cryptography (that is, shared-key cryptog-
raphy), we take binary function symbols enc and dec for encryption and decryption, respectively, with
the equation:
dec(enc(x, y), y) = x
Here x represents the plaintext and y the key. We often use fresh names as keys in examples; for
instance, the (useless) process:
νk.a〈enc(M,k)〉
sends the term M encrypted under a fresh key k.
In applications of encryption, it is frequent to assume that each encrypted message comes with
sufficient redundancy so that decryption with the “wrong” key is evident. Accordingly, we can test
whether the decryption of M with the key k succeeds by testing whether enc(dec(M,k), k) = M .
Alternatively, we could also add a test function testdec with the equation
testdec(enc(x, y), y) = true
Provided that we check that decryption succeeds before using the decrypted message, this model of
encryption basically yields the spi calculus [11].
On the other hand, in modern cryptology, such redundancy is not usually viewed as part of
the encryption function proper, but rather an addition. The redundancy can be implemented with
message authentication codes. We can model an encryption scheme without redundancy with the two
equations:
dec(enc(x, y), y) = x
enc(dec(z, y), y) = z
These equations model that decryption is the inverse bijection of encryption, a property that is
typically satisfied by block ciphers.
Asymmetric Encryption It is only slightly harder to model asymmetric (public-key) cryptogra-
phy, where the keys for encryption and decryption are different. We introduce two new unary function
symbols pk and sk for generating public and private keys from a seed, and the equation:
dec(enc(x, pk(y)), sk(y)) = x
We may now write the process:
νs.
(
a〈pk(s)〉 | b(x).c〈dec(x, sk(s))〉
)
The first component publishes the public key pk(s) by sending it on a. The second receives a message
on b, uses the corresponding private key sk(s) to decrypt it, and forwards the resulting plaintext on c.
As this example indicates, we essentially view name restriction (νs) as a generator of unguessable seeds.
In some cases, those seeds may be directly used as passwords or keys; in others, some transformations
are needed.
Some encryption schemes have additional properties. In particular, enc and dec may be the same
function. This property matters in implementations, and sometimes permits attacks. Moreover, cer-
tain encryptions and decryptions commute in some schemes. For example, we have dec(enc(x, y), z) =
enc(dec(x, z), y) if the encryptions and decryptions are performed using RSA with the same modulus.
The treatment of such properties is left open in the spi calculus [11]. In contrast, it is easy to express
the properties in the applied pi calculus, and to study the protocols and attacks that depend on them.
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Non-Deterministic (“Probabilistic”) Encryption Going further, we may add a third argument
to enc, so that the encryption of a plaintext with a key is not unique. This non-determinism is an
essential property of probabilistic encryption [88]. The equation for decryption becomes:
dec(enc(x, pk(y), z), sk(y)) = x
With this variant, we may write the process:
a(x).
(
νm.b〈enc(M,x,m)〉 | νn.c〈enc(N, x, n)〉
)
which receives a message x and uses it as an encryption key for two messages, enc(M,x,m) and
enc(N, x, n). An observer who does not have the corresponding decryption key cannot tell whether
the underlying plaintextsM andN are identical by comparing the ciphertexts, because the ciphertexts
rely on different fresh names m and n. Moreover, even if the observer learns x, M , and N (but not
the decryption key), it cannot verify that the messages contain M and N because it does not know
m and n.
Public-Key Digital Signatures Like public-key encryption schemes, digital signature schemes
rely on pairs of public and private keys. In each pair, the private key serves for computing signatures
and the public key for verifying those signatures. In order to model key generation, we use again
the two unary function symbols pk and sk for generating public and private keys from a seed. For
signatures and their verification, we use a new binary function symbol sign, a ternary function symbol
check, and a constant symbol ok, with the equation:
check(x, sign(x, sk(y)), pk(y)) = ok
(Several variants are possible.)
Modifying once more our first example, we may now write the process:
(
νs.{pk(s)/y} | a〈(M, sign(M, sk(s)))〉
)
|
a(x).if check(fst(x), snd(x), y) = ok then b〈fst(x)〉
Here the value M is signed using the private key sk(s). Although M and its signature travel on the
public channel a, no other process can produce N and its signature for some other N . Therefore,
again, we may reason that only the intended term M will be forwarded on channel b. This property
holds despite the publication of pk(s) (but not sk(s)), which is represented by the active substitution
that maps y to pk(s). Despite the restriction on s, processes outside the restriction can use pk(s)
through y. In particular, y refers to pk(s) in the process that checks the signature on M .
XOR We may model the XOR function, some of its uses in cryptography, and some of the protocol
flaws connected with it. Some of these flaws (e.g., [123]) stem from the intrinsic equational properties
of XOR, such as associativity, commutativity, the existence of a neutral element, and the cancellation
property that we may write:
xor(xor(x, y), z) = xor(x, xor(y, z))
xor(x, y) = xor(y, x)
xor(x, 0) = x
xor(x, x) = 0
Others arise because of the interactions between XOR and other operations (e.g., [130, 67]). For
example, CRCs (cyclic redundancy checks) can be poor proofs of integrity, partly because of the
equation
crc(xor(x, y)) = xor(crc(x), crc(y))
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Multiplexing Finally, we illustrate a possible usage of channels that are not names. Consider for
instance a pairing function for building channels pair : Data × Port → Channel with its associated
projections fst : Channel → Data and snd : Channel → Port, and equations (1) and (2) from our first
example. We may use this function for multiplexing as follows:
νs.(pair(s, port1)〈M1〉 | pair(s, port2)〈M2〉
| pair(s, port1)(x1) | pair(s, port2)(x2))
In this process, the first output can be received only by the first input, and the second output can be
received only by the second input.
4 Equivalences and Proof Techniques
In examples, we frequently argue that two given processes cannot be distinguished by any context,
that is, that the processes are observationally equivalent. The spi calculus developed the idea that the
context represents an active attacker, and equivalences capture authenticity and secrecy properties in
the presence of the attacker. More broadly, a wide variety of security properties can be expressed as
equivalences.
In this section we define observational equivalence for the applied pi calculus. We also introduce a
notion of static equivalence for frames, a labelled semantics for processes, and a labelled equivalence
relation. We prove that labelled equivalence and observational equivalence coincide, obtaining a
convenient proof technique for observational equivalence.
4.1 Observational Equivalence
We write A ⇓ a when A can send a message on name a, that is, when A →∗≡ E[a〈M〉.P ] for some
evaluation context E[ ] that does not bind a.
Definition 4.1 An observational bisimulation is a symmetric relation R between closed extended
processes with the same domain such that A R B implies:
1. if A ⇓a, then B ⇓a;
2. if A→∗ A′ and A′ is closed, then B →∗ B′ and A′ R B′ for some B′;
3. E[A] R E[B] for all closing evaluation contexts E[ ].
Observational equivalence (≈) is the largest such relation.
For example, when h is a unary function symbol with no equations, we obtain that νs.a〈s〉 ≈
νs.a〈h(s)〉.
These definitions are standard in the pi calculus, where ⇓a is called a barb on a, and where ≈ is
one of the two usual notions of weak barbed bisimulation congruence. (See Section 4.5 and [85] for
a detailed discussion.) In the applied pi calculus, one could also define barbs on arbitrary terms, not
just on names; we do not need that generalization for our purposes. The set of closing evaluation
contexts for A depends only on A’s domain; hence, in Definition 4.1, A and B have the same closing
evaluation contexts. In Definition 4.1(2), since R is a relation between closed extended processes,
we require that A′ also be closed. Being closed is not preserved by all reductions, since structural
equivalence may introduce free unused variables. For instance, we have 0 ≡ νx.{y/x} by Alias and
{M/x} ≡ {fst((M,y))/x} by Rewrite using the equation fst((x, y)) = x.
Although observational equivalence is undecidable in general, various tools support certain auto-
matic proofs of observational equivalence and other equivalence relations, in the applied pi calculus
and related languages (e.g., [27, 48, 60, 61]).
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4.2 Static Equivalence
Two substitutions may be seen as equivalent when they behave equivalently when applied to terms.
We write ≈s for this notion of equivalence, and call it static equivalence. In the presence of the “new”
construct, defining ≈s is somewhat delicate and interesting. For instance, consider two functions f
and g with no equations (intuitively, two independent hash functions), and the three frames:
ϕ0
def
= νk.{k/x} | νs.{
s/y}
ϕ1
def
= νk.{f(k)/x,
g(k)/y}
ϕ2
def
= νk.{k/x,
f(k)/y}
In ϕ0, the variables x and y are mapped to two unrelated values that are different from any value
that the context may build (since k and s are new). These properties also hold, but more subtly,
for ϕ1; although f(k) and g(k) are based on the same underlying fresh name, they look unrelated.
(Analogously, it is common to derive apparently unrelated keys by hashing from a single underlying
secret, as in SSL and TLS [86, 80].) Hence, a context that obtains the values for x and y cannot
distinguish ϕ0 and ϕ1. On the other hand, the context can discriminate ϕ2 by testing the predicate
f(x) = y. Therefore, we would like to define static equivalence so that ϕ0 ≈s ϕ1 6≈s ϕ2.
This example relies on a concept of equality of terms in a frame, which the following definition
captures.
Definition 4.2 Two terms M and N are equal in the frame ϕ, written (M = N)ϕ, if and only if
fv (M) ∪ fv(N) ⊆ dom(ϕ), ϕ ≡ νn˜.σ, Mσ = Nσ, and {n˜} ∩ (fn(M) ∪ fn(N)) = ∅ for some names n˜
and substitution σ.
In Definition 4.2, the equality Mσ = Nσ is independent of the representative νn˜.σ chosen for the
frame ϕ such that ϕ ≡ νn˜.σ and {n˜} ∩ (fn(M)∪ fn(N)) = ∅. (Lemma D.1 in Appendix D establishes
this property.)
Definition 4.3 Two closed frames ϕ and ψ are statically equivalent, written ϕ ≈s ψ, when dom(ϕ) =
dom(ψ) and when, for all terms M and N , we have (M = N)ϕ if and only if (M = N)ψ.
Two closed extended processes are statically equivalent, written A ≈s B, when their frames are
statically equivalent.
For instance, in our example, we have (f(x) = y)ϕ2 but not (f(x) = y)ϕ1, hence ϕ1 6≈s ϕ2.
Depending on Σ, static equivalence can be quite hard to check, but at least it does not depend
on the dynamics of processes. Some simplifications are possible in common cases, in particular when
terms can be put in normal forms (for example, in the proof of Theorems 6.1 and 6.2). Decisions
procedures exist for static equivalence in large classes of equational theories [8], some implemented in
tools [29, 64].
The next lemma establishes closure properties of static equivalence: it shows that static equivalence
is invariant by structural equivalence and reduction, and closed by application of closing evaluation
contexts. Its proof appears in Appendix A.
Lemma 4.1 Let A and B be closed extended processes. If A ≡ B or A → B, then A ≈s B. If
A ≈s B, then E[A] ≈s E[B] for all closing evaluation contexts E[ ].
As the next two lemmas demonstrate, static equivalence coincides with observational equivalence
on frames, but is coarser on extended processes.
Lemma 4.2 Observational equivalence and static equivalence coincide on frames.
This lemma is an immediate corollary of Theorem 4.1 below. (See Corollary C.2 in Appendix C.3.)
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Lemma 4.3 Observational equivalence is strictly finer than static equivalence on extended processes:
≈ ⊂ ≈s.
To see that observational equivalence implies static equivalence, note that if A and B are observa-
tionally equivalent then A | C and B | C have the same barbs for every C with fv(C) ⊆ dom(A), and
that they are statically equivalent when A | C and B | C have the same barb ⇓ a for every C of the
special form if M = N then a〈n〉, where a does not occur in A or B and fv (C) ⊆ dom(A). (See
Lemma C.9 in Appendix C.3.) The converse does not hold, as the following counter-example shows:
letting A = a〈n〉 and B = b〈n〉, we have A 6≈ B, but A ≈s B because ϕ(A) = ϕ(B) = 0.
4.3 Labelled Operational Semantics and Equivalence
A labelled operational semantics extends the chemical semantics of Section 2.2, enabling us to reason
about processes that interact with their context while keeping it implicit. The labelled semantics
defines a relation A
α
−→ A′, where α is a label of one of the following forms:
• a label N(M), which corresponds to an input of M on N ;
• a label νx.N 〈x〉, where x is a variable that must not occur in N , which corresponds to an output
of x on N .
The variable x is bound in the label νx.N 〈x〉, so we define the bound variables of labels by bv (N(M))
def
=
∅ and bv (νx.N〈x〉)
def
= {x}. The free variables of labels are defined by fv(N(M))
def
= fv(N) ∪ fv (M)
and fv (νx.N 〈x〉)
def
= fv (N) (since x does not occur in N in the latter label).
In addition to the rules for structural equivalence and reduction of Section 2, we adopt the following
rules:
In N(x).P
N(M)
−−−−→ P{M/x}
Out-Var
x /∈ fv(N〈M〉.P )
N〈M〉.P
νx.N〈x〉
−−−−−→ P | {M/x}
Scope
A
α
−→ A′ u does not occur in α
νu.A
α
−→ νu.A′
Par
A
α
−→ A′ bv (α) ∩ fv(B) = ∅
A |B
α
−→ A′ | B
Struct
A ≡ B B
α
−→ B′ B′ ≡ A′
A
α
−→ A′
According to In, a term M may be input. On the other hand, Out-Var permits output for terms
“by reference”: a fresh variable is associated with the term in question and output.
For example, using the signature and equations for symmetric encryption, and the new constant
symbol oops ! , we have the sequence of transitions of Figure 3. The first two transitions do not
directly reveal the term M . However, they give enough information to the environment to compute
M as dec(x, y), and to input it in the third transition.
The labelled operational semantics leads to an equivalence relation:
Definition 4.4 A labelled bisimulation is a symmetric relation R on closed extended processes such
that A R B implies:
1. A ≈s B;
2. if A→ A′ and A′ is closed, then B →∗ B′ and A′ R B′ for some B′;
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νk.a〈enc(M,k)〉.a〈k〉.a(z).if z =M then c〈 oops ! 〉
νx.a〈x〉
−−−−−→ νk.
(
{enc(M,k)/x} | a〈k〉.a(z).if z =M then c〈 oops ! 〉
)
νy.a〈y〉
−−−−−→ νk.
(
{enc(M,k)/x} | {
k/y} | a(z).if z =M then c〈 oops ! 〉
)
a(dec(x,y))
−−−−−−−→ νk.
(
{enc(M,k)/x} | {
k/y} | if dec(x, y) =M then c〈 oops ! 〉
)
→ νk.
(
{enc(M,k)/x} | {
k/y}
)
| c〈 oops ! 〉
Figure 3: Example transitions
3. if A
α
−→ A′, A′ is closed, and fv (α) ⊆ dom(A), then B →∗
α
−→→∗ B′ and A′ R B′ for some B′.
Labelled bisimilarity (≈l) is the largest such relation.
Conditions 2 and 3 are standard; condition 1, which requires that bisimilar processes be statically
equivalent, is necessary for example in order to distinguish the frames ϕ0 and ϕ2 of Section 4.2. As
in Definition 4.1, we explicitly require that A′ be closed and fv (α) ⊆ dom(A) in order to exclude
transitions that introduce free unused variables.
Our main result is that this relation coincides with observational equivalence. Although such
results are fairly common in process calculi, they are important and non-trivial.
Theorem 4.1 Observational equivalence is labelled bisimilarity: ≈ = ≈l.
The proof of this theorem is outlined in Section 4.5 and completed in the appendix.
The theorem implies that ≈l is closed by application of closing evaluation contexts. However,
unlike the definition of ≈, the definition of ≈l does not include a condition about contexts. It therefore
permits simpler proofs.
In addition, labelled bisimilarity can probably be established via standard “bisimulation up to
context” techniques [124], which enable useful on-the-fly simplifications in frames after output steps.
We do not develop the theory of “up to context” techniques, since we do not use them in this paper.
The following lemmas provide methods for simplifying frames:
Lemma 4.4 (Alias elimination) Let A and B be closed extended processes, M be a term such that
fv (M) ⊆ dom(A), and x be a variable such that x /∈ dom(A). We have A ≈l B if and only if
{M/x} |A ≈l {
M/x} | B
Proof: Both directions follow from context closure of ≈l, for the contexts {M/x} | and νx. , re-
spectively. In the converse direction, since x is not free in A or B, we have A ≡ νx.({M/x} |A),
νx.({M/x} |A) ≈l νx.({M/x} | B), and νx.({M/x} | B) ≡ B hence A ≈l B.
Lemma 4.5 (Name disclosure) Let A and B be closed extended processes and x be a variable such
that x /∈ dom(A). We have A ≈l B if and only if
νn.({n/x} | A) ≈l νn.({
n/x} | B)
Proof: The direct implication follows from context closure of ≈l. Conversely, we show that the
relationR defined by A R B if and only if A and B are closed extended processes and νn.({n/x}|A) ≈l
νn.({n/x} | B) for some x /∈ dom(A) is a labelled bisimulation. This proof is detailed in Appendix D.
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In Lemma 4.4, the substitution {M/x} can affect only the context, since A and B are closed.
However, the lemma implies that the substitution does not give or mask any information about A
and B to the context. In Lemma 4.5, the restriction on n and the substitution {n/x} mean that the
context can access n only indirectly, through the free variable x. Intuitively, the lemma says that
indirect access is equivalent to direct access in this case.
Our labelled operational semantics contrasts with a more naive semantics carried over from the
pure pi calculus, with output labels of the form νu˜.N〈M〉 and rules that permit direct output of any
term, such as:
Out-Term N〈M〉.P
N〈M〉
−−−−→ P
Open
A
νu˜.N〈M〉
−−−−−−→ A′ v ∈ fv(M) ∪ fn(M) \ (fv(N) ∪ fn(N) ∪ {u˜})
νv.A
νv,u˜.N〈M〉
−−−−−−−→ A′
These rules lead to a different, finer equivalence relation, which for example would distinguish
νk, s.a〈(k, s)〉 and νk.a〈(f(k), g(k))〉. This equivalence relation is often inadequate in applications
(as in [11, Section 5.2.1]), hence our definitions.
We have also studied intermediately liberal rules for output, which permit direct output of certain
terms. In particular, the rules of the conference paper permit direct output of channel names. That
feature implies that it is not necessary to export variables of channel types; as Section 4.5 explains,
this property is needed for Theorem 4.1 for those rules. That feature makes little sense in the present
calculus, in which arbitrary terms may be used as channels, so we abandon it in the rules above.
Nevertheless, certain rules with more explicit labels can still be helpful. We explain those rules next.
4.4 Making the Output Labels More Explicit
In the labelled operational semantics of Section 4.3, the labels for outputs do not reveal anything
about the terms being output: those terms are represented by fresh variables. Often, however, more
explicit labels can be convenient in reasoning about protocols, and they do not cause harm as long as
they only make explicit information that is immediately available to the environment. For instance,
for the process νk.a〈(Header, enc(M,k))〉, the label νy.a〈(Header, y)〉 is more informative than νx.a〈x〉.
In this example, the environment could anyway observe that x is a pair such that fst(x) = Header and
use snd(x) for y. More generally, we rely on the following definition to characterize the information
that the environment can derive.
Definition 4.5 Variables x˜ resolve to M˜ in A if and only if A ≡ {M˜/˜x} | νx˜.A. They are solvable in
A if and only if they resolve to some terms in A.
Hence, when variables x˜ resolve to terms M˜ in A, they are in dom(A) and we can erase the restriction
of νx˜.A by applying the context {M˜/˜x} | and by structural equivalence. Intuitively, A does not reveal
more information than νx˜.A, because the environment can build the terms M˜ and use them instead
of x˜.
In general, when variables x˜ are in dom(A), there exist n˜, M˜ , and A′ such that A ≡ νn˜.({M˜/˜x}|A
′).
If variables x˜ resolve to M˜ in A, then n˜ can be chosen empty, so that the terms M˜ are not under
restrictions. The following lemma provides two reformulations of Definition 4.5, including a converse
to this observation. Its proof appears in Appendix E.
Lemma 4.6 The following three properties are equivalent:
1. the variables x˜ resolve to M˜ in A;
2. there exists A′ such that A ≡ {M˜/˜x} | A
′;
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3. (x˜ = M˜)ϕ(A) and the substitution {M˜/˜x} is cycle-free.
For example, using pairs and symmetric encryption, we let:
ϕ
def
= νk.{M/x,
enc(x,k)/y,
(Header,y)/z}
The variable y resolves to snd(z) in ϕ, since
ϕ ≡ {snd(z)/y} | νk.{
M/x,
(Header,enc(x,k))/z}
and z resolves to (Header, y) in ϕ, since
ϕ ≡ {(Header,y)/z} | νk.{
M/x,
enc(x,k)/y}
In contrast, x is not always solvable in ϕ (for instance, when M is k).
A second lemma shows that Definition 4.5 is robust in the sense that it is preserved by static
equivalence, so a fortiori by labelled bisimilarity:
Lemma 4.7 If A ≈s B and x˜ resolve to M˜ in A, then x˜ resolve to M˜ in B.
Proof: Static equivalence preserves property 3 of Lemma 4.6, so we conclude by Lemma 4.6.
We introduce an alternative semantics in which the rules permit composite terms in output labels
but require that every restricted variable that is exported be solvable. In this semantics, the label α in
the relation A
α
−→ A′ ranges over the same input labels N(M) as in Section 4.3, and over generalized
output labels of the form νx˜.N〈M〉, where {x˜} ⊆ fv (M) \ fv (N). The label νx˜.N〈M〉 corresponds
to an output of M on N that reveals the variables x˜. We retain the rules for structural equivalence
and reduction, and rules In, Par, and Struct of Section 4.3. We also keep rule Scope, but only for
labels with no extrusion, that is, for labels N(M) and N〈M〉. This restriction is necessary because
variables may not remain solvable after the application of a context νu. . As a replacement for the
rule Out-Var, we use the rule Out-Term discussed in Section 4.3 and:
Open-Var
A
N〈M〉
−−−−→ A′ {x˜} ⊆ fv (M) \ fv (N)
x˜ solvable in {M/z} | A′ for some z /∈ fv (A′) ∪ {x˜}
νx˜.A
νx˜.N〈M〉
−−−−−−→ A′
These rules are more liberal than those of Section 4.3. For instance, consider A1 = νk.a〈(f(k), g(k))〉
and A2 = νk.a〈(k, f(k))〉. With the rules of Section 4.3, we have:
Ai
νz.a〈z〉
−−−−−→ νx, y.({(x,y)/z} | ϕi)
where ϕi is as in Section 4.2. With the new rules, we also have:
Ai
νx,y.a〈(x,y)〉
−−−−−−−−→ ϕi (5)
Indeed, Ai ≡ νx, y.(a〈(x, y)〉|ϕi) and the variables x, y are solvable in {(x,y)/z}|ϕi because {(x,y/z}|ϕi ≡
{fst(z)/x,snd(z)/y} | νx, y.({(x,y)/z} | ϕi), so we derive:
a〈(x, y)〉
a〈(x,y)〉
−−−−−→ 0 by Out-Term
a〈(x, y)〉 | ϕi
a〈(x,y)〉
−−−−−→ ϕi by Par and Struct
νx, y.(a〈(x, y)〉 | ϕi)
νx,y.a〈(x,y)〉
−−−−−−−−→ ϕi by Open-Var
Ai
νx,y.a〈(x,y)〉
−−−−−−−−→ ϕi by Struct
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Transition (5) is the most informative for A1 since x and y behave like fresh, independent values in
ϕ1. For A2, we also have the more informative transition:
A2
νx.a〈(x,f(x))〉
−−−−−−−−−→ νk.{k/x}
that reveals the link between x and y, but not that x is a name. As in this example, several output
transitions are sometimes possible, each transition leading to an extended process with a different
frame. In reasoning (for example, in proving that a relation is included in labelled bisimilarity), it
often suffices to consider any one of the transitions, so one may be chosen so as to limit the complexity
of the resulting extended processes.
We name “simple semantics” the labelled semantics of Section 4.3 and “refined semantics” the
semantics of this section, and “simple labels” and “refined labels” the corresponding labels. The next
theorem states that the two labelled semantics yield the same notion of equivalence. Thus, making
the output labels more explicit only makes apparent some of the information that is otherwise kept
in the static, equational part of labelled bisimilarity.
Theorem 4.2 Let ≈L be the relation of labelled bisimilarity obtained by applying Definition 4.4 to
the refined semantics. We have ≈l = ≈L.
The proof of Theorem 4.2 relies on the next two lemmas, which relate simple and refined output
transitions.
Lemma 4.8 A
νx˜.N〈M〉
−−−−−−→ A′ if and only if, for some z that does not occur in any of A, A′, x˜, N , and
M , A
νz.N〈z〉
−−−−−→ νx˜.({M/z} | A′), {x˜} ⊆ fv(M) \ fv(N), and the variables x˜ are solvable in {M/z} |A′.
In Lemma 4.8, the transition A
νx˜.N〈M〉
−−−−−−→ A′ is performed in the refined semantics, while the
transition A
νz.N〈z〉
−−−−−→ νx˜.({M/z}|A′) is performed in the simple semantics. However, Lemma 4.9 below
shows that the choice of the semantics does not matter. Lemma 4.9 is a consequence of Lemma 4.8.
Lemma 4.9 A
νx.N〈x〉
−−−−−→ A′ in the refined semantics if and only if A
νx.N〈x〉
−−−−−→ A′ in the simple seman-
tics.
Theorem 4.2 is then proved as follows. By Lemma 4.9, ≈L is a simple-labelled bisimulation, and
thus ≈L ⊆ ≈l. Conversely, to show that ≈l is a refined-labelled bisimulation, it suffices to prove its
bisimulation property for any refined output label. This proof, which relies on Lemma 4.8, and the
proofs of Lemmas 4.6, 4.8, and 4.9 are detailed in Appendix E.
4.5 Proving Theorem 4.1 (≈ = ≈l)
A claim of Theorem 4.1 appears, without proof, in the conference version of this paper, for the calculus
as presented in that version. There, the channels in labels cannot be variables. The claim neglects
to include a corresponding hypothesis that exported variables must not be of channel type. This
hypothesis is implicitly assumed, as it holds trivially for plain processes and is maintained, as an
invariant, by output transitions. Without it, the two extended processes νa.({a/x}) and νa.({a/x} |
a〈N〉) (where the exported variable x stands for the channel a) would constitute a counterexample:
they would not be observationally equivalent but they would be bisimilar in the labelled semantics,
since neither could make a labelled transition. Delaune et al. [76, 78] included the hypothesis in
their study of symbolic bisimulation. Avik Chaudhuri (private communication, 2007) pointed out
this gap in the statement of the theorem, and Bengtson et al. [32] discussed it as motivation for
their work on alternative calculi, the psi calculi, with a more abstract treatment of terms and a
mechanized metatheory. On the other hand, Liu [103] presented a proof of the theorem, making
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explicit the necessary hypothesis. Her proof demonstrated that the theorem was basically right—no
radical changes or new languages were needed. More recently, Liu and others have also developed an
extension of the proof for a stateful variant of the applied pi calculus [17].
Theorem 4.1, in its present form, does not require that hypothesis because of some of the details
of the calculus as we define it in this paper. Specifically, the labelled semantics allows variables that
stand for channels in labels. Therefore, extended processes such as νa.({a/x} |a〈N〉) can make labelled
transitions.
This section outlines the proof of Theorem 4.1. The appendix gives further details, including all
proofs that this section omits. Those details are fairly long and technical. In particular, they rely on a
definition of “partial normal forms” for extended processes, which are designed to simplify reasoning
about reductions. (In an extended process A | B, the frame of A may affect B and vice versa, so A
and B may not reduce independently of each other; partial normal forms are designed to simplify the
analysis of reductions in such situations.) We believe that these partial normal forms may be useful
in other proofs on the applied pi calculus. In this section, we omit further specifics on partial normal
forms, since they are not essential to understanding our main arguments.
The proof of Theorem 4.1 starts with a fairly traditional definition of “labelled bisimulation up
to ≡”:
Definition 4.6 A relation R on closed extended processes is a labelled bisimulation up to ≡ if and
only if R is symmetric and A R B implies:
1. A ≈s B;
2. if A→ A′ and A′ is closed, then B →∗ B′ and A′ ≡R≡ B′ for some closed B′;
3. if A
α
−→ A′, A′ is closed, and fv (α) ⊆ dom(A), then B →∗
α
−→→∗ B′ and A′ ≡R≡ B′ for some
closed B′.
This definition implies that, if R is a labelled bisimulation up to ≡, then ≡R≡ restricted to closed
processes is a labelled bisimulation (since, by Lemma 4.1, static equivalence is invariant by structural
equivalence).
We use the definition to establish the following lemma:
Lemma 4.10 ≈l is closed by application of closing evaluation contexts.
In the proof of this lemma (which is given in Appendix C.2), we show that we can restrict attention
to contexts of the form νu˜.( | C). To every relation R on closed extended processes, we associate a
relation R′ = {(νu˜.(A | C), νu˜.(B | C)) | A R B, νu˜.( | C) closing for A and B}. We prove that, if R
is a labelled bisimulation, then R′ is a labelled bisimulation up to ≡, hence R ⊆ ≡R′≡ ⊆ ≈l. For
R = ≈l, this property entails that ≈l is closed by application of evaluation contexts νu˜.( | C).
Another lemma characterizes barbs in terms of labelled transitions:
Lemma 4.11 Let A be a closed extended process. We have A ⇓a if and only if A→∗
νx.a〈x〉
−−−−−→ A′ for
some fresh variable x and some A′.
We then obtain Lemma 4.12, which is one direction of Theorem 4.1:
Lemma 4.12 ≈l ⊆ ≈.
Proof: We show that ≈l satisfies the three properties of Definition 4.1, as follows.
1. To show that ≈l preserves barbs, we apply Lemma 4.11 and use Properties 2 and 3 of Defini-
tion 4.4.
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2. Suppose that A ≈l B, A→∗ A′, and A′ is closed. Given the trace A = A0 → A1 → . . .→ An =
A′, we instantiate all variables in
⋃n
i=0(fv (Ai) \ dom(Ai)) with fresh names. This instantiation
yields a trace in which all intermediate processes are closed. We can then conclude that B →∗ B′
and A′ ≈l B′ for some B′ by Property 2 of Definition 4.4.
3. ≈l is closed by application of closing evaluation contexts by Lemma 4.10.
Moreover, ≈l is symmetric. Since ≈ is the largest relation that satisfies these properties, we obtain
≈l ⊆ ≈.
The other direction of Theorem 4.1 relies on two lemmas that characterize input and output
transitions. The first lemma characterizes inputs N(M) using processes of the form T pN(M)
def
= p〈p〉 |
N〈M〉.p(x). Here, the use of p as a message in p〈p〉 is arbitrary: we could equally use processes of the
form p〈M ′〉 for any term M ′.
Lemma 4.13 Let A be a closed extended process. Let N and M be terms such that fv(N〈M〉) ⊆
dom(A). Let p be a name that does not occur in A, M , and N .
1. If A
N(M)
−−−−→ A′ and p does not occur in A′, then A | T pN(M) →→ A
′ and A′ 6⇓p.
2. If A | T pN(M) →
∗ A′ and A′ 6⇓p, then A→∗
N(M)
−−−−→→∗ A′.
The second lemma characterizes outputs νx.N 〈x〉 using processes of the form T p,q
νx.N〈x〉
def
= p〈p〉 |
N(x).p(y).q〈x〉.
Lemma 4.14 Let A be a closed extended process. Let N be a term such that fv(N) ⊆ dom(A). Let
p and q be names that do not occur in A and N .
1. If A
νx.N〈x〉
−−−−−→ A′ and p and q do not occur in A′, then A | T p,q
νx.N〈x〉
→→ νx.(A′ | q〈x〉), νx.(A′ |
q〈x〉) 6⇓p, and x /∈ dom(A).
2. Let x be a variable such that x /∈ dom(A). If A |T p,q
νx.N〈x〉
→∗ A′′ and A′′ 6⇓p, then A→∗
νx.N〈x〉
−−−−−→
→∗ A′ and A′′ ≡ νx.(A′ | q〈x〉) for some A′.
A further lemma provides a way of proving the equivalence of two extended processes with the
same domain by putting them in a context that binds the variables in their domain and extrudes
them. Given a family of processes Pi for i in a finite set I, we write
∏
i Pi for the parallel composition
of the processes Pi if I is not empty, and for 0 otherwise.
Lemma 4.15 Let A and B be two closed extended processes with a same domain that contains x˜.
Let Ex˜[ ]
def
= νx˜.(
∏
x∈x˜ nx〈x〉 | ) using names nx that do not occur in A or B. If Ex˜[A] ≈ Ex˜[B], then
A ≈ B.
The final lemma is the other direction of Theorem 4.1:
Lemma 4.16 ≈ is a labelled bisimulation, and thus ≈ ⊆ ≈l.
Proof: The relation ≈ is symmetric. We show that it satisfies the three properties of Definition 4.4.
1. If A ≈ B, then A ≈s B, by Lemma 4.3.
2. If A ≈ B, A→ A′, and A′ is closed, then B →∗ B′ and A′ ≈ B′ for some B′, by Property 2 of
the definition of ≈.
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3. If A ≈ B, A
α
−→ A′, A′ is closed, and fv (α) ⊆ dom(A), then B →∗
α
−→→∗ B′ and A′ ≈ B′ for
some B′. To prove this property, we rely on characteristic contexts | Tα that unambiguously
test for a labelled transition
α
−→ using the disappearance of a barb ⇓ p, and do not otherwise
affect ≈.
Assume A ≈ B, A
α
−→ A′, A′ is closed, and fv (α) ⊆ dom(A).
(a) For input α = N(M) (where N and M may contain variables exported by A and B) and
some fresh name p, we have A | T pN(M) →→ A
′ 6⇓p by Lemma 4.13(1), hence B | T pN(M) →
∗
B′ 6⇓p with A′ ≈ B′, hence B →∗
N(M)
−−−−→→∗ B′ by Lemma 4.13(2).
(b) For output α = νx.N〈x〉 and some fresh names p and q, we have A | T p,q
νx.N〈x〉
→→ νx.(A′ |
q〈x〉) 6⇓p and x /∈ dom(A) by Lemma 4.14(1), hence B | T p,q
νx.N〈x〉
→∗ B′′ 6⇓p for some B′′,
hence B →∗
νx.N〈x〉
−−−−−→→∗ B′ and B′′ ≡ νx.(B′ | q〈x〉) for some B′ by Lemma 4.14(2). We
obtain a pair νx.(A′ | q〈x〉) ≈ νx.(B′ | q〈x〉), and conclude by applying Lemma 4.15.
Hence ≈ is a labelled bisimulation, and ≈ ⊆ ≈l, since ≈l is the largest labelled bisimulation.
Theorem 4.1 is an immediate consequence of Lemmas 4.12 and 4.16.
Considering this proof of Theorem 4.1, we can explain further some aspects of our definition
of observational equivalence (Definition 4.1). That definition includes conditions related to barbs,
reductions, and evaluation contexts (Conditions (1) to (3), respectively), as is done in work on the
ν-calculus [92] and on the join calculus [9]. In an alternative approach, used in CCS [114] and in the
pi calculus [125], equivalence is defined in two stages:
1. First, barbed bisimilarity is defined as the largest barbed bisimulation, that is, the largest
symmetric relation R such that A R B implies Conditions (1) and (2) of Definition 4.1.
2. Second, equivalence is defined as the largest congruence (that is, the largest relation R such
that A R B implies Condition (3) of Definition 4.1) contained in barbed bisimilarity.
The two approaches do not necessarily yield the same equivalence relation; see [85] for positive and
negative examples in variants of the pi calculus. The advantage of our approach is that, in reasoning
about process equivalences, we can add a context at any point after reductions, as we do in the proof
of Lemma 4.16. With the alternative approach, we can add a context only at the beginning, before
any reduction, so we need to build contexts that test for all possible sequences of labelled transitions
that the processes under consideration may make, and that manifest them as different combinations
of barbs. This testing is not possible for all processes, so with the alternative approach, analogues
of Theorem 4.1 would typically require a restriction to so-called image finite processes [114]. Our
definition of observational equivalence avoids this restriction.
It would be interesting to formalize the proofs of this section (and also those of the rest of the
paper) with a theorem prover such as Coq. This formalization may perhaps benefit from past Coq
developments on bisimulations for the pi calculus [91, 93] and the spi calculus [55]. However, the
applied pi calculus introduces additional difficulties (because of the role of terms with equational
theories), and proving our results with Coq would certainly require a major effort.
5 Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement
The fundamental Diffie-Hellman protocol allows two principals to establish a shared secret by exchang-
ing messages over public channels [81]. The principals need not have any shared secrets in advance.
The basic protocol, on which we focus here as an example, does not provide authentication; therefore,
a “bad” principal may play the role of either principal in the protocol. On the other hand, the two
principals that follow the protocol will communicate securely with one another afterwards, even in
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the presence of active attackers. In extended protocols, such as the Station-to-Station protocol [82]
and SKEME [96], additional messages perform authentication.
We program the basic protocol in terms of the binary function symbol f and the unary function
symbol g, with the equation:
f(x, g(y)) = f(y, g(x)) (6)
Concretely, the functions are f(x, y) = yx mod p and g(x) = αx mod p for a prime p and a generator
α of Z∗p, and we have the equation f(x, g(y)) = (α
y)x = αy×x = αx×y = (αx)y = f(y, g(x)). However,
we ignore the underlying number theory, working abstractly with f and g.
The protocol has two symmetric participants, which we represent by the processes A0 and A1. The
protocol establishes a shared key, then the participants respectively run P0 and P1 using the key. We
use the public channel c01 for messages from A0 to A1 and the public channel c10 for communication
in the opposite direction. (Although the use of two distinct public channels is of no value for security,
it avoids some trivial confusions, so makes for a cleaner presentation.) We assume that none of the
values introduced in the protocol appears in P0 and P1, except for the key.
In order to establish the key, A0 invents a name n0, sends g(n0) to A1, and A1 proceeds symmet-
rically. Then A0 computes the key as f(n0, g(n1)) and A1 computes it as f(n1, g(n0)), with the same
result. We find it convenient to use the following substitutions for A0’s message and key:
σ0
def
= {g(n0)/x0}
φ0
def
= {f(n0,x1)/y}
and the corresponding substitutions σ1 and φ1, as well as the frame:
ϕ
def
= (νn0. (φ0 | σ0)) | (νn1. σ1)
With these notations, A0 is:
A0
def
= νn0.(c01〈x0σ0〉 | c10(x1).P0φ0)
and A1 is analogous.
Two reductions represent a normal run of the protocol:
A0 |A1 →→ νx0, x1, n0, n1. (P0φ0 | P1φ1 | σ0 | σ1) (7)
≡ νx0, x1, n0, n1, y. (P0 | P1 | φ0 | σ0 | σ1) (8)
≡ νy.(P0 | P1 | νx0, x1. ϕ) (9)
The two communication steps (7) use structural equivalence to activate the substitutions σ0 and σ1
and extend the scope of the secret values n0 and n1. The structural equivalence (8) crucially relies on
equation (6) in order to reuse the active substitution φ0 instead of φ1 after the reception of x0 in A1.
The next structural equivalence (9) tightens the scope for restricted names and variables, then uses
the definition of ϕ.
We model an eavesdropper as a process c01(x0).c01〈x0〉.c10(x1).c10〈x1〉.P that intercepts messages
on c01 and c10, remembers them, but forwards them unmodified. Using the labelled semantics to
represent the interaction of A0 |A1 with such a passive attacker, we obtain:
A0 |A1
c01〈x0〉
−−−−→ νn0.(σ0 | c10(x1).P0φ0) | A1
c01(x0)
−−−−→ νn0.(σ0 | c10(x1).P0φ0) | νn1.(c10〈σ1x1〉 | P1φ1)
c10〈x1〉
−−−−→ νn0.(σ0 | c10(x1).P0φ0) | νn1.(σ1 | P1φ1)
c10(x1)
−−−−→ νn0.(σ0 | P0φ0) | νn1.(σ1 | P1φ1)
≡ νn0, n1, y. (P0 | P1 | φ0 | σ0 | σ1)
≡ νy.(P0 | P1 | ϕ)
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The labelled transitions
c01〈x0〉
−−−−→
c01(x0)
−−−−→ show that the eavesdropper obtains the message sent on c01
by A0, stores it in x0, and forwards it to A1. The transitions
c10〈x1〉
−−−−→
c10(x1)
−−−−→ deal with the message
on c10 in a similar way. The absence of the restrictions on x0 and x1 corresponds to the fact that the
eavesdropper has obtained the values of these variables.
The following theorem relates this process to
νk.(P0 | P1){
k/y}
which represents the bodies P0 and P1 of A0 and A1 sharing a key k. This key appears as a simple
shared name, rather than as the result of communication and computation. Intuitively, we may
read νk.(P0 | P1){
k/y} as the ideal outcome of the protocol: P0 and P1 execute using a shared key,
without concern for how the key was established, and without any side-effects from weaknesses in the
establishment of the key. The theorem says that this ideal outcome is essentially achieved, up to some
“noise”. This “noise” is a substitution that maps x0 and x1 to unrelated, fresh names. It accounts for
the fact that an attacker may have the key-exchange messages, and that they look just like unrelated
values to the attacker. In particular, the key in use between P0 and P1 has no observable relation to
those messages, or to any other left-over secrets. We view this independence of the shared key as an
important forward-secrecy property.
Theorem 5.1 Let P0 and P1 be processes with free variable y where the name k does not appear. We
have:
νy.(P0 | P1 | ϕ) ≈ νk.(P0 | P1){k/y} | νs0.{s0/x0} | νs1.{
s1/x1}
Proof: The theorem follows from Lemma 4.2 and the static equivalence ϕ ≈s νs0, s1, k.{s0/x0 ,
s1/x1 ,
k/y}, which says that the frame ϕ generated by the protocol execution is equivalent to one that
maps variables to fresh names. This static equivalence is proved automatically by ProVerif, using the
technique presented in [48]. We conclude by applying the context νy.(P0 | P1 | ).
Extensions of the basic protocol add rounds of communication that confirm the key and authen-
ticate the principals. We have studied one such extension with key confirmation. There, the shared
secret f(n0, g(n1)) is used in confirmation messages. Because of these messages, the shared secret can
no longer be equated with a virgin key for P0 and P1. Instead, the final key is computed by hashing
the shared secret. This hashing guarantees the independence of the final key.
We have also studied more advanced protocols that rely on a Diffie-Hellman key exchange, such as
the JFK protocol [14]. The analysis of JFK in the applied pi calculus [7] illustrates the composition
of manual reasoning with invocations of ProVerif.
6 Hash Functions and Message Authentication Codes
Section 3 briefly discusses cryptographic hash functions. In this section we continue their study, and
also treat message authentication codes (MACs). We consider constructions of both hash functions
and MACs. These examples provide a further illustration of the usefulness of equations in the applied
pi calculus. On the other hand, some aspects of the constructions are rather low-level, and we would
not expect to account for all their combinatorial details (e.g., the “birthday attacks” [109]). A higher-
level task is to express and reason about protocols treating hash functions and MACs as primitive;
this is squarely within the scope of our approach.
6.1 Using MACs
MACs serve to authenticate messages using shared keys. When k is a key and M is a message, and k
is known only to a certain principal A and to the recipient B of the message, B may take mac(k,M) as
proof that M comes from A. More precisely, B can check mac(k,M) by recomputing it upon receipt
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νk.(A | B)
a(M)
−−−→ νk.(A |B | b〈(M,mac(k,M))〉)
νx.b〈x〉
−−−−−→ νk.(A |B | {(M,mac(k,M))/x})
b(x)
−−→→ νk.(A | c〈M〉 | {(M,mac(k,M))/x})
νy.c〈y〉
−−−−→ νk.(A | {(M,mac(k,M))/x,
M/y})
Figure 4: A correct trace
of M and mac(k,M), and reason that A must be the sender of M . This property should hold even if
A generates MACs for other messages as well; those MACs should not permit forging a MAC for M .
In the worst case, it should hold even if A generates MACs for other messages on demand.
Using a new binary function symbol mac, we may describe this scenario by the following processes:
A
def
= !a(x).b〈(x,mac(k, x))〉
B
def
= b(y).if mac(k, fst(y)) = snd(y) then c〈fst(y)〉
S
def
= νk.(A | B)
The process S represents the complete system, composed of A and B; the restriction on k means that
k is private to A and B. The process A receives messages on a public channel a and returns them
MACed on the public channel b. When B receives a message on b, it checks its MAC and acts upon
it, here simply by forwarding on a channel c. Intuitively, we would expect that B forwards on c only a
message that A has MACed. In other words, although an attacker may intercept, modify, and inject
messages on b, it should not be able to forge a MAC and trick B into forwarding some other message.
Hence, every message output on c equals a preceding input on a, as illustrated in Figure 4.
This property can be expressed precisely in terms of the labelled semantics and it can be checked
without too much difficulty when mac is a primitive function symbol with no equations. The property
remains true even if there is a function extract that maps a MAC mac(x, y) to the underlying cleart-
ext y, with the equation extract(mac(x, y)) = y. Since MACs are not supposed to guarantee secrecy,
such a function may well exist, so it is safer to assume that it is available to the attacker.
The property is more delicate if mac is defined from other operations, as it invariably is in practice.
In that case, the property may even be taken as the specification of MACs [87]. Thus, a MAC
implementation may be deemed correct if and only if the process S works as expected when mac is
instantiated with that implementation. More specifically, the next section deals with the question of
whether the property remains true when mac is defined from hash functions.
6.2 Constructing Hash Functions and MACs
In Section 3, we give no equations for hash functions. In practice, following Merkle and Damg˚ard,
hash functions are commonly defined by iterating a basic binary compression function, which maps
two input blocks to one output block [109]. Furthermore, keyed hash functions include a key as an
additional argument. Thus, we may have:
h(x, y0 :: y1 :: z) = h(f(x, y0), y1 :: z) (10)
h(x, y :: nil) = f(x, y) (11)
Here, we use the sorts Block for blocks and BlockList for sequences of blocks, defined as lists as
in Section 3, with sorts Block and BlockList instead of Data and List, respectively. The function
h : Block×BlockList→ Block is the keyed hash function, f : Block×Block→ Block is the compression
function.
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νk.(A |B)
a(M)
−−−→ νk.(A |B | b〈(M,mac(k,M))〉)
νx.b〈x〉
−−−−−→ νk.(A |B | {(M,mac(k,M))/x})
b((M+ N,f(snd(x),N)))
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→→ νk.(A | c〈M ++N〉 | {(M,mac(k,M))/x})
νy.c〈y〉
−−−−→ νk.(A | {(M,mac(k,M))/x,
M+ N/y})
Figure 5: An attack scenario
νk.(A | B)
a(M)
−−−→ νk.(A |B | b〈(M,mac(k,M))〉)
νx.b〈(M,x)〉
−−−−−−−→ νk.(A |B | {mac(k,M)/x})
b((M+ N,f(x,N)))
−−−−−−−−−−−→→ νk.(A | c〈M ++N〉 | {mac(k,M)/x})
c〈M+ N〉
−−−−−−→ νk.(A | {mac(k,M)/x})
Figure 6: An attack scenario (with refined labels)
In these equations we are rather abstract in our treatment of blocks, their sizes, and therefore of
padding and other related issues. We also ignore two common twists: some functions use initialization
vectors to start the iteration, and some append a length block to the input. Nevertheless, we can
explain various MAC constructions, describing flaws in some and reasoning about the properties of
others.
A first, classical definition of a MAC from a keyed hash function h is:
mac(x, y)
def
= h(x, y)
For instance, the MAC of a three-block message M =M1 ::M2 ::M3 :: nil with key k is mac(k,M) =
f(f(f(k,M1),M2),M3). More generally, the MAC of a n-block message M = M1 :: . . . ::Mn :: nil
is mac(k,M) = f(. . . (f(k,M1), . . .),Mn). This implementation is subject to a well-known extension
attack. Given the MAC of M = M1 :: . . . ::Mn :: nil, an attacker can compute the MAC of any
extension M ++N =M1 :: . . . ::Mn :: N :: nil without knowing the MAC key, since mac(k,M ++N) =
f(mac(k,M), N).
We describe the extension attack formally, through the operational semantics of the process S of
Section 6.1, in Figures 5 and 6. These figures use the semantics of Sections 4.3 and 4.4 respectively. In
both cases, we assume k 6∈ fn(M)∪ fn(N). Additionally, we adopt the sorts pair : BlockList×Block→
Data, fst : Data → BlockList, and snd : Data → Block, the abbreviation (M,N) for pair(M,N), and
the equations (1) and (2) of Section 3. In Figures 5 and 6, we see that the messageM that the system
MACs differs from the message M ++N that it forwards on c. These transitions are not enabled with
the primitive MAC of Section 6.1, hence S with the proposed MAC implementation is not labelled
bisimilar to S with the primitive MAC.
There are several ways to address extension attacks, and indeed the literature contains many
MAC constructions that are not subject to these attacks. We have considered some of them. Here we
describe a construction that uses the MAC key twice:
mac(x, y)
def
= f(x, h(x, y))
Under this definition, the MAC of M = M1 :: M2 ::M3 :: nil with key k is mac(k,M) = f(k, f(f(f(k,
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M1),M2),M3)), and the process S forwards on c only a message that it has previously MACed, as
desired.
Looking beyond the case of S, we can prove a more general result by comparing the situation where
mac is primitive (and has no special equations) and one with the definition of mac(x, y) as f(x, h(x, y)).
Given a name k and an extended process C that uses the symbol mac, we write [[C]] for the translation
of C in which the definition of mac is expanded wherever the key k is used, with f(k, h(k,M)) replaced
for mac(k,M). The theorem says that this translation yields an equivalent process (so, intuitively,
the constructed MACs work as well as the primitive ones). It applies to a class of equational theories
generated by rewrite rules.
Theorem 6.1 Suppose that the signature Σ is equipped with an equational theory generated by a
convergent rewrite system such that mac and f do not occur in the left-hand sides of rewrite rules; the
only rewrite rules with h at the root of the left-hand side are those of (10) and (11) oriented from left
to right; there are no rewrite rules with :: nor nil at the root of the left-hand side; and names do not
occur in rewrite rules. Suppose that C is closed and the name k appears only as first argument of mac
in C. Then νk.C ≈ νk.[[C]].
In the proof of this theorem (which is given in Appendix F), we use the same notion of partial
normal form as in the proof of Theorem 4.1. We define a relation R by A R B if and only if A and
B are closed, A ≡ νk.C, B ≡ νk.[[C]], C is a closed extended process in partial normal form, and the
name k appears only as MAC key in C. We show that the relation R ∪ R−1 (that is, the union of R
with its inverse relation) is a labelled bisimulation. Static equivalence follows from the preservation
of equality by the translation [[ · ]] for terms in which k occurs only as MAC key; reductions commute
with the translation [[ · ]] and preserve the restriction on the occurrences of the key k. We conclude by
Theorem 4.1. An alternative proof of similar complexity would show that R ∪ R−1 is an observational
bisimulation.
Theorem 6.1 considers a single MAC key at a time. For an extended process with several MAC
keys k1, . . . , kn, we can apply Theorem 6.1 once for each key ki, using structural equivalence to move
each restriction νki to the root of the extended process.
Theorem 6.1 allows cryptographic primitives other than hash functions and MACs, provided the
assumptions on the equational theory are satisfied. The following corollary states a simple special
case for the primitives mentioned in this section. It suffices for treating the system S.
Corollary 6.1 Suppose that the signature Σ is equipped with the equational theory defined by the
equations (1), (2), (3), (4), (10), and (11). Suppose that C is closed and the name k appears only as
first argument of mac in C. Then νk.C ≈ νk.[[C]].
6.3 Constructing Robust Hash Functions
Constructions of hash functions, of the kind described in Section 6.2, typically impose constraints on
the use of these functions. For example, some care is needed in order to thwart extension attacks in the
definition of MACs. The possibility of such attacks stems from structural flaws in the constructions;
details such as the iteration of a compression function are not completely hidden, lead to unwanted
additional properties, and can be exploited.
A line of work in cryptography studies safer hash functions with stronger guarantees [68]. Although
these functions are generally built much as in Section 6.2 by iterating a compression function, their
design conceals their inner structure. The functions thus aim to behave like abstract “random oracles”
on inputs of arbitrary length. A notion of indifferentiability captures this goal.
In this section, as a final, more advanced example, we describe one design that strengthens the
Merkle-Damg˚ard approach, following Coron et al. [68, Section 3.4]. In this example, the attacker is
given only indirect access to functions such as the hash function h. We model this restriction by
inserting a private name k as the first argument of h. (Cryptographically, the name k may reflect
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the initial random sampling of h.) We refer to this argument as a key, of sort Key. We use sorts
Block for blocks and BlockList for sequences of blocks, defined as lists as in Section 3, with sorts Block
and BlockList instead of Data and List, respectively. We use sort Block2 for pairs of blocks, with
pair : Block× Block→ Block2, fst : Block2→ Block, and snd : Block2→ Block, the abbreviation (x, y)
for pair(x, y), and the equations
fst((x, y)) = x snd((x, y)) = x (fst(x), snd(x)) = x (12)
The third equation of (12) is not present in Section 3; it models that all elements of sort Block2 are
pairs. We use sort Block3 for pairs of a Block2 and a Block defined in the same way with overloaded
function symbols pair, fst, and snd, and sort Bool for booleans.
We define the hash function h : Key× BlockList→ Block by:
h(k, z) = h2(k, (0, 0), z) (13)
where
h2(k, x, nil) = fst(x) (14)
h2(k, x, y :: z) = h2(k, f(k, (x, y)), z) (15)
The function h2 : Key × Block2 × BlockList → Block uses a compression function f : Key × Block3 →
Block2. In h2(k, x, z), the variable x represents the fixed-size internal state of the hash function and
z is the remainder of the input. The internal state starts at (0, 0) and is updated by applications of
the compression function f as input blocks are processed. Finally, only the first half of the internal
state is returned.
For instance, the hash of a two-block message M = M1 :: M2 :: nil with key k is h(k,M) =
fst(f(k, (f(k, ((0, 0),M1)),M2))). More generally, we have
h(k,M1 :: . . . ::Mn :: nil) = fst(f(k, (. . . f(k, ((0, 0),M1)) . . . ,Mn)))
Indifferentiability requires that the hash function behave like a black box (like a “random oracle”),
even in interaction with an adversary that also has access to the underlying compression function. The
compression function and the hash function are related, of course. However, as far as the adversary
can tell, it is the compression function that may be defined from the hash function (in fact, from an
ideal hash function without equations as in Section 3) rather than the other way around. Thus, we
express indifferentiability as the equivalence of two systems, each of which provides access to the hash
function and the compression function. In the applied pi calculus, one of the systems is:
νk.(A0h | A
0
f )
where the processes
A0h = !ch(y).if ne list(y) = true then c
′
h〈h(k, y)〉
A0f = !cf (x).c
′
f 〈f(k, x)〉
answer requests to evaluate h and f with key k. We restrict ourselves to hashes of non-empty sequences
of blocks. In practice, one never hashes the empty string, because the input of the hash function is
padded to a non-zero multiple of the block length. This restriction is important in this example, be-
cause the definition of h yields h(k, nil) = 0, and this special hash value would break indifferentiability.
In order to enforce this restriction, we use symbols true : Bool and ne list : BlockList → Bool, with
equations
ne list(x :: nil) = true ne list(x :: y :: z) = ne list(y :: z) (16)
The term ne list(M) is equal to true when M is a non-empty list.
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The other system offers an analogous interface, for an ideal hash function h′ : Key × BlockList →
Block and for a stateful compression function built from h′:
νk.(A1h | A
1
f )
The process A1h answers requests to evaluate an ideal hash function h
′:
A1h = !ch(y).if ne list(y) = true then c
′
h〈h
′(k, y)〉
and A1f simulates the compression function using h
′. The code for A1f , which is considerably more
intricate, captures the core of the security argument as it might appear in the cryptography literature.
(The paper by Coron et al. [68] omits this argument and, as far as we know, this argument does not
appear elsewhere.)
A1f = νℓ, cs.(!cs(s).cf (x).ℓ〈x, s, s〉 | !Q | cs〈((0, 0), nil) :: nil〉)
Q = ℓ(x, t, s).if t = nil then P0 else
if fst(hd(t)) = fst(x) then P1 else ℓ〈x, tl(t), s〉
P0 = c′f 〈f
′(k, x)〉 | cs〈s〉
P1 = let z = snd(hd(t)) in
let z′ = z ++ snd(x) in
let r = (h′(k, z′), fc(k, z
′)) in
c′f 〈r〉 | cs〈(r, z
′) :: s〉
In this definition, let x = M in P is syntactic sugar for P{M/x}, ℓ(x, t, s).P is syntactic sugar for
ℓ(y).let x = fst(y) in let t = fst(snd(y)) in let s = snd(snd(y)) in P where y is a fresh variable, and
ℓ〈x, t, s〉 is syntactic sugar for ℓ〈(x, (t, s))〉, with the appropriate sorts and overloading of the function
symbols for pairs. The function symbol f′ : Key×Block3→ Block2 represents the compression function
outside the domain used for implementing the hash function, and the function symbol fc : Key ×
BlockList → Block represents the second projection of the compression function inside that domain.
The channel cs maintains global private state, a lookup table that maps each term (h
′(k,M), fc(k,M))
with M = M1 :: . . . ::Mn :: nil built as a result of previous compression requests to the term M , and
initially maps (0, 0) to nil. This lookup table is represented as a list of pairs. Each table element, of
sort Block2Blocks, is a pair of a Block2 and a BlockList; the table, of sort Block2Blocks List, is a list
of Block2Blocks; we overload the function symbols for pairs and lists. Upon a compression request
with input x, the process Q looks up fst(x) in the table: Q receives as input x, the initial state of the
table s, and the tail t of the lookup table. It uses a local channel l for encoding the recursive call.
The auxiliary processes P0 and P1 complete compression requests in the cases where lookups fail and
succeed, respectively. When a lookup fails, the compression request is outside the domain used for
implementing the hash function, so P0 answers it using f
′, and leaves the table unchanged. When a
lookup succeeds, we have either fst(x) = (h′(k,M), fc(k,M)) with M = M1 :: . . . ::Mn−1 :: nil and
n > 0 or fst(x) = (0, 0) and we let M = nil. The lookup yields z =M , P1 computes z
′ = z ++ snd(x)
and returns r = (h′(k, z′), fc(k, z
′)) as result of the compression request. The table is extended by
adding the mapping from r to z′.
Let us now explain, informally, why this code ensures that the results of the compression function
are consistent with those of hash computations. The result of a compression request with argument x
needs to be made consistent with the hash function when
x = (f(k, (. . . f(k, ((0, 0),M1)) . . . ,Mn−1)),Mn) (17)
for some M1, . . . ,Mn (n > 0), because in that case
h(k,M1 :: . . . ::Mn :: nil) = fst(f(k, x)) (18)
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that is, in the system νk.(A0h | A
0
f ), the result of the hash request with argument M1 :: . . . ::Mn :: nil
computed by A0h is equal to the first block of the result of the compression request with argument x
computed by A0f . We need to have an analogous equality in the system νk.(A
1
h | A
1
f ). In the system
νk.(A0h | A
0
f ), equality (17) holds exactly when fst(x) is the result of previous compression requests
f(k, (. . . f(k, ((0, 0),M1)) . . . ,Mn−1)) for some M1, . . . ,Mn−1. In the system νk.(A
1
h | A
1
f ), the table
lookup tests a corresponding condition and, when it succeeds, P1 retrieves z =M1 :: . . . ::Mn−1 :: nil,
computes z′ = M1 :: . . . ::Mn−1 ::Mn :: nil since snd(x) = Mn, and returns r = (h
′(k, z′), fc(k, z
′)).
Hence, fst(r) = h′(k, z′) and the result of the hash request with argument z′ = M1 :: . . . ::Mn :: nil
computed by A1h is equal to the first block of the result r of the compression request with argument x
computed by A1f .
Formally, we obtain the following observational equivalence:
Theorem 6.2 νk.(A0h | A
0
f ) ≈ νk.(A
1
h | A
1
f ).
In the proof of this theorem (which is given in Appendix G), we define a relation R between config-
urations of the two systems, and show that R ∪ R−1 is a labelled bisimulation. A key step of this
proof consists in proving static equivalence between related configurations; this step formalizes the
informal explanation of the process Af1 given above. We conclude by Theorem 4.1.
7 Related Work
This section aims to position the applied pi calculus with respect to research on process calculi and
on the analysis of security protocols. As discussed in Section 1, the applied pi calculus has been the
basis for much further work since its initial publication; this section does not discuss many papers
that build on the applied pi calculus. (Some of those papers, and others, are mentioned elsewhere in
this paper.)
7.1 Process Calculi
The applied pi calculus has many commonalities with the original pi calculus [113] and its relatives,
such as the spi calculus [11] (discussed in Sections 3 and 4). In particular, the model of communication
adopted in the applied pi calculus is deliberately classical: communication is through named channels,
and value computation is rather separate from communication.
Furthermore, active substitutions are reminiscent of the constraints of the fusion calculus [134].
They are especially close to the substitution environments that Boreale et al. employ in their proof
techniques for a variant of the spi calculus with a symmetric cryptosystem [52]. We incorporate sub-
stitutions into processes, systematize them, and generalize from symmetric cryptosystems to arbitrary
operations and equations.
Extensions of the pi calculus are not limited to modelling cryptography: many extensions and
variants of the pi calculus have been designed for diverse applications. Examples include calculi for
mobility, such as the ambient calculus [59], calculi for modelling biological processes, such as the
enhanced pi calculus [73], and calculi for service-oriented computing, which model the contracts that
services implement, the composition of services, and their protocols [100, 106, 56, 72]. The psi cal-
culi [32] provide a general framework parameterized by nominal data types for terms, conditions
(generalizing comparison between terms), and assertions (generalizing our notion of frames) and their
operational semantics. They also give sufficient conditions on these parameters to ensure that the
resulting observational equivalence coincides with labelled bisimilarity. The framework accommodates
encodings of the pi calculus and several of its variants, for example ones with fusion [136] and con-
current constraints [56]. In particular, Bengtson et al. give an encoding of the applied pi calculus
into their framework. However, as they explain, the result of this encoding differs from the applied
pi calculus in the way processes interact with contexts. In particular, an important difference is that,
when an encoded process sends a ciphertext, the ciphertext appears on the label of the transition, and
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an agent that receives this message will immediately learn the cleartext and the key. In psi calculi,
one can avoid such counter-intuitive disclosures by explicitly creating and using aliases. A recent
extension of psi calculi [53, 54] addresses these difficulties with a new form of pattern matching. In
contrast, the management of aliases is built into the applied pi calculus, facilitating the modelling of
security-protocol attackers as contexts.
7.2 Analysis of Security Protocols
The analysis of a security protocol generally requires reasoning about its possible executions. However,
the ways of talking about the executions and their properties vary greatly. We use a process calculus
whose semantics provides a detailed specification for interactions with a context. Because the process
calculus has a proper “new” construct (like the pi calculus but unlike CSP), it provides a direct account
of the generation of new keys and other fresh quantities. It also enables reasoning with equivalence
and implementation relations.
Reasoning with those relations is often more challenging than reasoning about trace properties, but
it can be worthwhile. Equivalences are useful, in particular, for modeling privacy properties [119], for
instance in electronic voting [77]. While proofs of equivalences are difficult to automate in general—
and observational equivalence is undecidable as noted in Section 4.1—, several tools support certain
automatic proofs of equivalences in the applied pi calculus and similar languages: tools have focused
on establishing particular kinds of equivalences such as trace equivalence for bounded processes (that
is, processes without replication) [132, 60, 61] or for restricted classes of unbounded processes [63, 62].
Although ProVerif initially focused on proofs of trace properties [46], it also supports automatic proofs
of diff-equivalences, which are equivalences between processes that share the same structure and differ
only in the choice of terms [48]. A diff-equivalence between two processes requires that the two
processes reduce in the same way, in the presence of any adversary. In particular, the two processes
must have the same branching behaviour. Hence, diff-equivalence is much stronger than observational
equivalence. Maude-NPA [126] and Tamarin [26] also employ that notion. Baudet [27, 28] showed
that diff-equivalence is decidable for bounded processes: he treated a class of equivalences that model
security against off-line guessing attacks in [27] and proved the full result in [28].
Furthermore, the use of a process calculus permits treating security protocols as programs written
in a programming notation—subject to typing [2, 58, 90], to other static analyses [51], and to trans-
lations [1, 9, 10]. Thus, language-based approaches have led to tools such as ProVerif where protocols
can be described by programs, and analyzed using automated techniques that leverage type systems
and Horn clauses [4].
The applied pi calculus is also convenient as an intermediate language. Translations to ProVerif
have been implemented from TulaFale (a language for standardized Web-services protocols) [39], from
F# [40], and from JavaScript in order to verify protocols, including TLS [35].
As in many other works (e.g., [83, 79, 110, 95, 105, 128, 118, 116, 131, 11, 74, 16, 84, 19, 71,
127]), our use of the applied pi calculus conveniently avoids matters of computational complexity and
probability. In contrast, other techniques for the analysis of security protocols employ more concrete
computational models, where principals are basically Turing machines that manipulate bitstrings, and
security depends on the computational limitations of attackers (e.g., [137, 88, 89, 31, 87]).
Although these two approaches remained rather distinct during the 1980s and 1990s, fruitful
connections have now been established (e.g., [102, 120, 12, 75, 45, 50, 65, 21, 6, 25]). In particular,
some work interprets symbolic proofs in terms of concrete, bitstring-based models [12], in some cases
specifically studying the “computational soundness” of the applied pi calculus [30, 65, 21]. Other
work focuses directly on those concrete models but benefits from notations and ideas from process
calculi and programming languages. For example, the tool CryptoVerif [45, 50] provides guarantees
in terms bitstrings, running times, and probabilities, but its input language is strongly reminiscent of
the applied pi calculus, which influenced it—rather than of Turing machines.
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8 Conclusion
In this paper, we describe a uniform extension of the pi calculus, the applied pi calculus, in which
messages may be compound values, not just channel names. We study its theory, developing its
semantics and proof techniques. Although the calculus has no special, built-in features to deal with
security, it has proved useful in the analysis of security protocols.
Famously, the pi calculus is the language of those lively social occasions where all conversations
are exchanges of names. The applied pi calculus opens the possibility of more substantial, structured
conversations; the cryptic character of some of these conversations can only add to their charm and
to their tedium.
The previous paragraph closed the conference paper that introduced the applied pi calculus in
2001. We are now in a better position to assess the possibility to which it refers. As we hoped in
2001, the applied pi calculus has been extensively used for modeling and for reasoning about security
protocols, particularly ones that rely heavily on cryptography (and less for ones that rely on simple
capabilities). The flexibility of the applied pi calculus is a key enabler for those applications. This
flexibility did not render unnecessary or uninteresting the exploration of variants and extensions.
However, it did allow the applied pi calculus to remain a relevant core system—it was not displaced
by an extended language with many more constructs.
We are also in a better position to comment on matters of charm and tedium, alas. It is debatable
whether security protocols have become more charming or more tedious since 2001. It is clear, however,
that they play an ever-growing role, and that their security remains problematic. The evolution of
TLS exemplifies these points. The literature now contains many attacks on TLS, e.g., [37, 13, 133, 20],
but also several partial specifications and proofs [117, 94, 97, 70], sometimes relying on the applied pi
calculus [38, 34], and sometimes with language-based methods of the kind that the applied pi calculus
started to explore [41, 42]. The state-of-the-art approaches [117, 94, 97, 41, 42, 36, 34] rely on refined
frameworks that consider matters of computational complexity and probability, which are beyond the
(explicit) scope of the applied pi calculus, as explained above. In such applications, tools play a helpful
role, often an essential one. Although they sometimes lead to important insights, manual proofs—in
particular, manual proofs of equivalences—can be rather painful and tedious. (We may have suspected
this fact in 2001; on the basis of our experience since then, we now know it with certainty.) On the
other hand, the relative ease of use of ProVerif has contributed greatly to the spread of the applied pi
calculus. The applied pi calculus has evolved through its implementation in ProVerif, and as a result
of its use in this context. That evolution is, in our opinion, an improvement, so the present paper
aims to reflect it.
Finally, independently of the merits and the future of the applied pi calculus, we believe that
languages, and in particular the formalization of attackers as contexts, should continue to play a
role in the analysis of security protocols. The alternatives (defining protocols as interacting Turing
machines?) are not easier. Describing protocols in a programming notation not only makes them
precise but also brings them into the realm where ideas and tools from programming can support
analysis.
Supplementary Material: Proofs
The appendix contains proofs and auxiliary definitions needed for these proofs. After introducing the
notion of simple contexts and proving Lemma 4.1 (Section A), the bulk of the appendix is devoted
to lemmas and definitions that contribute to the proof of Theorem 4.1 (Sections B and C). Section D
presents the proof of Lemma 4.5. Section E presents the proofs related to refined labels. Finally,
Sections F and G present the proofs related to the two constructions of hash functions given in
Sections 6.2 and 6.3 respectively.
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A Simple Contexts and Proof of Lemma 4.1
In order to work with definitions that refer to contexts, such as Definition 4.1, it is convenient to
generalize structural equivalence from extended processes to contexts. For this generalization, we use
the rules of Section 2.2, except that (1) we do not rename bound names and variables whose scope
includes the hole; and (2) in rule New-Par, the hole is considered to contain any name and variable.
Further, in order to avoid special cases in proofs, we often adopt simplifying assumptions on
contexts. We say that an evaluation context E is simple when (1) no name is both free in E and
restricted above the hole; and (2) no variable is both in dom(E) and restricted above the hole. We
say that E is simple for A if, in addition, it is closing for A. These conditions on scopes exclude, for
example, a〈s〉 | νs.( ) and {s/x} | νx.( ).
Lemma A.1 Let A be a closed extended process. Given a simple context E for A, there exists a
context E′ of the form νu˜.( |B) such that E ≡ E′ and all subcontexts of E′ are simple for A.
Proof: We construct the context E′ from E as follows:
1. We rename all names and variables bound by restrictions that are not above the hole to distinct
fresh names and variables.
2. We move all restrictions above the hole in E to the root of E. These moves are possible because
the names and variables bound by these restrictions do not occur elsewhere: they are not free
since E is simple for A and they are not bound by other restrictions by the renaming of step 1.
3. We reorganize parallel compositions by associativity and commutativity so that the obtained
context is of the form νu˜.( |B).
Hence we obtain a context E′ = νu˜.( |B) such that E ≡ E′ and E′ is closing for A, that is, E′[A] is
closed.
The subcontexts of E′ are , |B, and contexts of the form νu˜′.( |B) where u˜′ is a suffix of u˜. The
contexts and | B have no names and variables bound in the hole. In the contexts νu˜′.( | B), the
names and variables bound in the hole are u˜′, and they are not free. So all these contexts are simple.
We show that all subcontexts of E′ are closing for A. For the context E′′ = , we have E′′[A] = A
and we know by hypothesis that A is closed. For the other subcontexts, we proceed by removing one
by one the elements of u˜′.
• Suppose that νx.E′′[A] is closed where E′′ = νu˜′′.( | B). We have fv (E′′[A]) \ dom(E′′[A]) =
fv (νx.E′′[A]) \ dom(νx.E′′[A]) = ∅, so E′′[A] is closed.
• Suppose that νn.E′′[A] is closed where E′′ = νu˜′′.( |B). Then E′′[A] is obviously also closed.
Lemma A.2 Let A and B be two closed extended processes.
1. Let σ be a bijective renaming. We have A ≈s B if and only if Aσ ≈s Bσ.
2. Let A′ and B′ be obtained from A and B, respectively, by replacing all variables (including their
occurrences in domains of active substitutions) with distinct variables. We have A ≈s B if and
only if A′ ≈s B′.
Proof: To show the first point, suppose that A ≈s B. Hence for all terms M and N , (M = N)ϕ(A)
if and only if (M = N)ϕ(B). So (Mσ = Nσ)ϕ(Aσ) if and only if (Mσ = Nσ)ϕ(Bσ), since the
equational theory is closed under renaming. So Aσ ≈s Bσ. The same argument also shows the
converse, via the inverse renaming.
To show the second point, suppose that A ≈s B. Hence for all terms M and N , (M = N)ϕ(A) if
and only if (M = N)ϕ(B). We let M ′ and N ′ be obtained from M and N , respectively, by the same
variable replacement as the one that transforms A and B into A′ and B′. So (M ′ = N ′)ϕ(A′) if and
only if (M ′ = N ′)ϕ(B′), since Mσ = M ′σ′ where ϕ(A) ≡ νn˜.σ and ϕ(A′) ≡ νn˜.σ′. So A′ ≈s B′. As
above, the same argument also shows the converse, via the inverse variable replacement.
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Lemma 4.1 Let A and B be closed extended processes. If A ≡ B or A → B, then A ≈s B. If
A ≈s B, then E[A] ≈s E[B] for all closing evaluation contexts E[ ].
Proof: We show that, if A ≡ B, then ϕ(A) ≡ ϕ(B), by an easy induction on the derivation of
A ≡ B. We then show that, if A → B, then ϕ(A) ≡ ϕ(B) since the frame is not affected by Comm,
Then, and Else. Since Definition 4.2 considers frames up to structural equivalence, we conclude that
static equivalence is invariant by structural equivalence and reduction.
For the context-closure property, we suppose that A ≈s B and we show that for all closing
evaluation contexts E, we have E[A] ≈s E[B]. We first rename the free names and variables of E,
so that the obtained context is simple, and apply Lemma A.2. Then by Lemma A.1, we construct a
context E′ such that E ≡ E′ and all subcontexts of E′ are simple. Since static equivalence is invariant
by structural equivalence, it is sufficient to show that E′[A] ≈s E′[B]. All subcontexts of E′ are closing
evaluation contexts, so we proceed by structural induction on E′. The cases of name restriction and
variable restriction hold because they restrict the range of M and N in Definition 4.2. In the case of
parallel composition, we have E′ ≡ | νn˜.({M˜
′
/˜x} | P ) with fv(M˜ ′) ∪ fv(P ) ⊆ dom(A) = dom(B) and
{x˜} ∩ dom(A) = ∅. By renaming the names n˜ so that they do not occur free in A and B, we have
ϕ(E′[A]) ≡ νn˜.(ϕ(A) | {M˜
′
/˜x}) and ϕ(E
′[B]) ≡ νn˜.(ϕ(B) | {M˜
′
/˜x}). Since we have already handled the
case of name restriction, it suffices to consider the closing context | {M
′
/x} with fv (M
′) ⊆ dom(A)
and x /∈ dom(A). In this case, we apply the inductive hypothesis usingM{M
′
/x} and N{M
′
/x} instead
of M and N in Definition 4.2.
B Proof of Theorem 4.1: Partial Normal Forms
Our proof of Theorem 4.1, outlined in Section 4.5, requires a definition of partial normal forms,
which we present in Section B.1. A semantics on partial normal forms corresponds to the standard
semantics (Section B.2). We can soundly restrict attention to reductions between closed processes in
the semantics of partial normal forms (Section B.3). Moreover, partial normal forms enable helpful
compositions and decompositions of reductions (Section B.4).
B.1 Definition of Partial Normal Forms
In this section, we define partial normal forms and prove two of their basic properties.
We first define the normalization of the parallel composition of two substitutions. The composition
σ ⊎ σ′ of two substitutions σ and σ′ such that σ | σ′ is cycle-free is defined as follows: we reorder
σ | σ′ into {M1/x1 , . . . ,
Ml/xl} where xi /∈ fv (Mj) for all i ≤ j ≤ l; we let σ0 = 0 and σi+1 =
σi{Mi+1/xi+1} | {
Mi+1/xi+1} for 0 ≤ i ≤ l − 1; then σ ⊎ σ
′ = σl. By definition, we have σ ⊎ σ′ ≡ σ | σ′.
The partial normal form pnf(A) of an extended process A is an extended process of the form
νn˜.({M˜/˜x} | P ) such that (fv (P ) ∪ fv (M˜)) ∩ {x˜} = ∅. The sequence of restrictions νn˜ may be empty,
in which case the partial normal form is written {M˜/˜x} | P . The substitution {M˜/˜x} may be empty, in
which case it is written 0. The partial normal form of A is defined by induction on A as follows:
pnf(P ) = 0 | P
pnf({M/x}) = {
M/x} | 0
pnf(νn.A) = νn, n˜.(σ | P ) where pnf(A) = νn˜.(σ | P ) and n /∈ {n˜}
pnf(νx.A) = νn˜.(σ|dom(σ)\{x} | P ) where pnf(A) = νn˜.(σ | P )
pnf(A | B) = νn˜, n˜′.(σ ⊎ σ′ | (P | P ′)(σ ⊎ σ′))
where pnf(A) = νn˜.(σ | P ), pnf(B) = νn˜′.(σ′ | P ′) and n˜ and n˜′
are renamed so that they are disjoint, the names of n˜ are not free
in σ′ | P ′, and the names of n˜′ are not free in σ | P .
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The last four cases apply only when the argument of pnf is not a plain process. We define a normal
process as an extended process in partial normal form.
Two simple lemmas provide some basic properties of partial normal forms.
Lemma B.1 A ≡ pnf(A).
Proof: By induction on the syntax of A.
Lemma B.2 If A is closed, then pnf(A) is closed.
Proof: We prove by induction on the syntax of A that fv(pnf(A)) ⊆ fv (A) and dom(pnf(A)) =
dom(A). The result follows.
B.2 Relation between the Standard Semantics and the Semantics on Par-
tial Normal Forms
In this section, we define an operational semantics on partial normal forms, by defining structural
equivalence, internal reduction, and labelled transitions. We relate this semantics to the standard
semantics of the applied pi calculus given in Sections 2.2 and 4.3.
We begin with the definition of structural equivalence on partial normal forms. Let
⋄
≡ be the
smallest equivalence relation on plain processes closed by application of evaluation contexts such that
Par-0′ P | 0
⋄
≡ P
Par-A
′ P | (Q |R)
⋄
≡ (P |Q) | R
Par-C
′ P |Q
⋄
≡ Q | P
Repl
′ !P
⋄
≡ P | !P
New-0′ νn.0
⋄
≡ 0
New-C
′ νn.νn′.P
⋄
≡ νn′.νn.P
New-Par
′ P | νn.Q
⋄
≡ νn.(P |Q) when n 6∈ fn(P )
Rewrite
′ P{M/x}
⋄
≡ P{N/x} when Σ ⊢M = N
and let
◦
≡ be the smallest equivalence relation on normal processes such that
Plain
′′ νn˜.(σ | P )
◦
≡ νn˜.(σ | P ′)
when P
⋄
≡ P ′ and (fv (P ) ∪ fv (P ′)) ∩ dom(σ) = ∅
New-C
′′ νn˜.(σ | P )
◦
≡ νn˜′.(σ | P ) when n˜′ is a reordering of n˜
New-Par
′′ νn˜.(σ | νn′.P )
◦
≡ νn˜, n′.(σ | P ) when n′ /∈ fn(σ)
Rewrite
′′ νn˜.(σ | P )
◦
≡ νn˜.(σ′ | P )
when dom(σ) = dom(σ′)
and Σ ⊢ xσ = xσ′ for all x ∈ dom(σ)
and (fv(xσ) ∪ fv (xσ′)) ∩ dom(σ) = ∅ for all x ∈ dom(σ)
In Plain′′ andRewrite′′, the hypotheses on free variables ensure that the process remains normalized
in case fresh variables are introduced (respectively, via Rewrite′ and by rewriting the substitution
σ to σ′).
We also introduce the corresponding reduction relation. Let →⋄ be the smallest relation on plain
processes closed by
⋄
≡ and by application of evaluation contexts such that:
Comm
′ N〈M〉.P |N(x).Q →⋄ P |Q{M/x}
Then
′ if M =M then P else Q →⋄ P
Else
′ if M = N then P else Q →⋄ Q
for any ground terms M and N such that Σ 6⊢M = N
and let→◦ be the smallest relation on normal processes closed by
◦
≡ such that νn˜.(σ |P )→◦ νn˜.(σ |P ′)
when P →⋄ P ′.
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Lemma B.3 1. If P
⋄
≡ P ′, then Pσ
⋄
≡ P ′σ.
2. If P →⋄ P ′, then Pσ →⋄ P ′σ.
Proof: These properties are immediate by induction on derivations. The proof of Property 2 relies
on Property 1 in the case in which one applies
⋄
≡. Note that the change from Comm to Comm′ is
crucial for Property 2.
Lemma B.4 Assume that νn˜.(σ |P ), νn˜′.(σ′ |P ′), and νn˜′′.(σ′′ |P ′′) are normal processes. If νn˜.(σ |
P )
◦
≡ νn˜′.(σ′ | P ′), then
1. νn˜.(σ|dom(σ)\{x} | P )
◦
≡ νn˜′.(σ′|dom(σ′)\{x} | P
′);
2. νn, n˜.(σ | P )
◦
≡ νn, n˜′.(σ′ | P ′); and
3. if σ |σ′′ and σ′ |σ′′ are cycle-free, then νn˜, n˜′′.(σ ⊎σ′′ | (P |P ′′)(σ ⊎ σ′′))
◦
≡ νn˜′, n˜′′.(σ′ ⊎σ′′ | (P ′ |
P ′′)(σ′ ⊎ σ′′)).
If νn˜.(σ | P )→◦ νn˜′.(σ′ | P ′), then
4. νn˜.(σ|dom(σ)\{x} | P )→◦ νn˜
′.(σ′|dom(σ′)\{x} | P
′);
5. νn, n˜.(σ | P )→◦ νn, n˜′.(σ′ | P ′); and
6. if σ | σ′′ and σ′ | σ′′ are cycle-free, then νn˜, n˜′′.(σ ⊎ σ′′ | (P | P ′′)(σ ⊎ σ′′)) →◦ νn˜′, n˜′′.(σ′ ⊎ σ′′ |
(P ′ | P ′′)(σ′ ⊎ σ′′)).
Proof: We establish these properties by induction on derivations. To prove Property 3 in the
case
⋄
≡, we use that if P
⋄
≡ P ′ then (P | P ′′)(σ ⊎ σ′′)
⋄
≡ (P ′ | P ′′)(σ ⊎ σ′′), which follows from
Lemma B.3(1). To prove Properties 4 to 6, we use Properties 1 to 3, respectively, in the case in
which we apply
◦
≡. Additionally, to prove Property 6 in the case →⋄, we use that if P →⋄ P ′ then
(P | P ′′)(σ ⊎ σ′′)→⋄ (P ′ | P ′′)(σ ⊎ σ′′), which follows from Lemma B.3(2).
Lemma B.5 If A ≡ B, then pnf(A)
◦
≡ pnf(B).
Proof: By induction on the derivation of A ≡ B. We first notice that, if P and Q are plain processes,
then pnf(P |Q) = 0 | (P |Q) can also be obtained by applying the definition of pnf(A |B) for extended
processes, with the same result: pnf(P ) = 0 | P , pnf(Q) = 0 | Q, so pnf(P | Q) = 0 | (P | Q). We
use this property to avoid distinguishing whether A, B, C are plain processes or not in the first three
cases and in the last case.
• Case A ≡ A | 0.
Let pnf(A) = νn˜.(σ | P ). We have pnf(A | 0) = νn˜.(σ | (P | 0)). Since P
⋄
≡ P | 0, we have
pnf(A)
◦
≡ pnf(A | 0).
• Case A | (B | C) ≡ (A |B) | C.
Let pnf(A) = νn˜.(σ |P ), pnf(B) = νn˜′.(σ′ |P ′), and pnf(C) = νn˜′′.(σ′′ |P ′′). To compute pnf(A|(B |
C)), we first rename n˜′ and n˜′′ so that they are disjoint, the names of n˜′ are not free in σ′′ |P ′′, and
the names of n˜′′ are not free in σ′ |P ′. Then pnf(B |C) = νn˜′, n˜′′.(σ′⊎σ′′ |(P ′ |P ′′)(σ′⊎σ′′)). Then, we
rename n˜ and n˜′, n˜′′ so that they are disjoint, the names of n˜ are not free in σ′⊎σ′′ |(P ′ |P ′′)(σ′⊎σ′′),
and the names of n˜′, n˜′′ are not free in σ | P . Hence, n˜, n˜′ and n˜′′ are renamed so that they are
disjoint, the names of n˜ are not free in σ′ | P ′ and σ′′ |P ′′, the names of n˜′ are not free in σ |P and
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σ′′ |P ′′, and the names of n˜′′ are not free in σ |P and σ′ | P ′. This condition is the same as the one
obtained when we compute pnf((A | B) | C). Let σ0 = σ ⊎ (σ′ ⊎ σ′′) = (σ ⊎ σ′) ⊎ σ′′. So
pnf(A | (B | C)) = νn˜, n˜′, n˜′′.(σ0 | (P | (P
′ | P ′′)(σ′ ⊎ σ′′))σ0)
= νn˜, n˜′, n˜′′.(σ0 | (Pσ0 | (P
′σ0 | P
′′σ0)))
◦
≡ νn˜, n˜′, n˜′′.(σ0 | ((Pσ0 | P
′σ0) | P
′′σ0)) = pnf((A | B) | C)
since Pσ0 | (P ′σ0 | P ′′σ0)
⋄
≡ (Pσ0 | P ′σ0) | P ′′σ0.
• Case A |B ≡ B | A.
Let pnf(A) = νn˜.(σ|P ) and pnf(B) = νn˜′.(σ′ |P ′). We rename n˜ and n˜′ so that they are disjoint, the
names of n˜ are not free in σ′ |P ′, and the names of n˜′ are not free in σ |P . Let σ0 = σ⊎σ
′ = σ′ ⊎σ.
We have pnf(A | B) = νn˜, n˜′.(σ0 | (Pσ0 | P ′σ0))
◦
≡ νn˜′, n˜.(σ0 | (P ′σ0 | Pσ0)) = pnf(B | A) since
Pσ0 | P ′σ0
⋄
≡ P ′σ0 | Pσ0.
• Case !P ≡ P | !P .
We have pnf(!P ) = 0 | !P
◦
≡ 0 | (P | !P ) = pnf(P | !P ), since !P
⋄
≡ P | !P .
• Case νn.0 ≡ 0.
We have pnf(νn.0) = 0 | νn.0
◦
≡ 0 | 0 = pnf(0), since νn.0
⋄
≡ 0.
• Case νu.νv.A ≡ νv.νu.A.
If A is a plain process, then u and v are names. (If u or v were variables, these variables would be
in the domain of A, so A would not be a plain process.) In this case, pnf(νu.νv.A) = 0 | νu.νv.A
◦
≡
0 | νv.νu.A = pnf(νv.νu.A) since νu.νv.A
⋄
≡ νv.νu.A.
If A is not a plain process, let pnf(A) = νn˜.(σ | P ). If u and v are names, then we have
pnf(νu.νv.A) = νu, v, n˜.(σ | P )
◦
≡ νv, u, n˜.(σ | P ) = pnf(νv.νu.A). If u and v are variables, then
pnf(νu.νv.A) = νn˜.(σ|dom(σ)\{u,v} | P ) = pnf(νv.νu.A). If u is a name and v is a variable, then
pnf(νu.νv.A) = νu, n˜.(σ|dom(σ)\{v} | P ) = pnf(νv.νu.A). The remaining case is symmetric.
• Case A | νu.B ≡ νu.(A |B) with u 6∈ fv (A) ∪ fn(A).
If B is a plain process, then u is a name and pnf(νu.B) = 0 | νu.B.
– If A is also a plain process, then pnf(A | νu.B) = 0 | (A | νu.B)
◦
≡ 0 | νu.(A |B) = pnf(νu.(A |B))
since A | νu.B
⋄
≡ νu.(A |B).
– If A is not a plain process, then let pnf(A) = νn˜.(σ | P ). We rename n˜ so that the names of
n˜ are not free in B and do not contain u. We have pnf(A | νu.B) = νn˜.(σ | (P | νu.B)σ)
◦
≡
νn˜.(σ | νu.(P |B)σ)
◦
≡ νu, n˜.(σ | (P |B)σ) = pnf(νu.(A | B)).
If B is not a plain process, then let pnf(B) = νn˜′.(σ′ | P ′). Let pnf(A) = νn˜.(σ | P ). We rename
n˜ and n˜′ so that n˜ and n˜′ are disjoint and do not contain u, the names of n˜ are not free in σ′ | P ′,
and the names of n˜′ are not free in σ | P .
– If u is a name, then pnf(A | νu.B) = νn˜, u, n˜′.(σ ⊎ σ′ | (P | P ′)(σ ⊎ σ′))
◦
≡ νu, n˜, n˜′.(σ ⊎ σ′ | (P |
P ′)(σ ⊎ σ′)) = pnf(νu.(A |B)).
– If u is a variable, then
pnf(A | νu.B) = νn˜, n˜′.(σ ⊎ (σ′|dom(σ′)\{u}) | (P | P
′)(σ ⊎ (σ′|dom(σ′)\{u})))
= νn˜, n˜′.((σ ⊎ σ′)|dom(σ⊎σ′)\{u} | (P | P
′)(σ ⊎ σ′))
= pnf(νu.(A |B))
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• Case νx.{M/x} ≡ 0.
We have pnf(νx.{M/x}) = 0 | 0 = pnf(0).
• Case {M/x} |A ≡ {M/x} |A{M/x}.
Let pnf(A) = νn˜.(σ |P ). We rename n˜ so that these names do not occur in M . We have pnf({M/x} |
A) = νn˜.(({M/x} ⊎ σ) | (0 | P )({M/x} ⊎ σ)) and pnf({M/x} | A{M/x}) = νn˜.(({M/x} ⊎ σ{M/x}) | (0 |
P{M/x})({M/x} ⊎ σ)), so pnf({M/x} | A) = pnf({M/x} | A{M/x}).
• Case {M/x} ≡ {N/x} with Σ ⊢M = N .
We have pnf({M/x}) = {M/x} | 0
◦
≡ {N/x} | 0 = pnf({N/x}).
• Case νx.A ≡ νx.B knowing that A ≡ B.
Let pnf(A) = νn˜.(σ | P ) and pnf(B) = νn˜′.(σ′ | P ′). By induction hypothesis, we have pnf(A)
◦
≡
pnf(B), that is, νn˜.(σ | P )
◦
≡ νn˜′.(σ′ | P ′). By Lemma B.4(1), we conclude that
pnf(νx.A) = νn˜.(σ|dom(σ)\{x} | P )
◦
≡ νn˜′.(σ′|dom(σ′)\{x} | P
′) = pnf(νx.B)
• Case νn.A ≡ νn.B knowing that A ≡ B. By induction hypothesis, we have pnf(A)
◦
≡ pnf(B).
If A and B are plain processes, then pnf(A) = 0 |A
◦
≡ 0 |B = pnf(B), so νn.(0 |A)
◦
≡ νn.(0 |B) by
Lemma B.4(2), so
pnf(νn.A) = 0 | νn.A
◦
≡ 0 | νn.B = pnf(νn.B)
by New-Par′′.
If A is a plain process and B is not a plain process, then let pnf(B) = νn˜.(σ | P ). We have
pnf(A) = 0 |A
◦
≡ νn˜.(σ | P ) = pnf(B), so νn.(0 | A)
◦
≡ νn, n˜.(σ | P ) by Lemma B.4(2), so
pnf(νn.A) = 0 | νn.A
◦
≡ νn, n˜.(σ | P ) = pnf(νn.B)
by New-Par′′.
If A and B are not plain processes, then let pnf(A) = νn˜.(σ | P ) and pnf(B) = νn˜′.(σ′ | P ′). We
have
pnf(νn.A) = νn, n˜.(σ | P )
◦
≡ νn, n˜′.(σ′ | P ′) = pnf(νn.B)
by Lemma B.4(2).
• Case A |A′′ ≡ B | A′′ knowing that A ≡ B.
Let pnf(A) = νn˜.(σ | P ), pnf(B) = νn˜′.(σ′ | P ′), and pnf(A′′) = νn˜′′.(σ′′ | P ′′). We rename n˜, n˜′,
and n˜′′ so that n˜ and n˜′ are disjoint from n˜′′, the names of n˜ and n˜′ are not free in σ′′ | P ′′, the
names of n˜′′ are not free in σ | P and σ′ | P ′. By induction hypothesis, we have pnf(A)
◦
≡ pnf(B),
that is, νn˜.(σ | P )
◦
≡ νn˜′.(σ′ | P ′), so
pnf(A |A′′) = νn˜, n˜′′.(σ ⊎ σ′′ | (P | P ′′)(σ ⊎ σ′′))
◦
≡ νn˜′, n˜′′.(σ′ ⊎ σ′′ | (P ′ | P ′′)(σ′ ⊎ σ′′)) = pnf(B |A′′)
by Lemma B.4(3).
Lemma B.6 If P ≡ Q, then P
⋄
≡ Q.
Proof: By Lemma B.5, P ≡ Q implies pnf(P ) = 0 | P
◦
≡ pnf(Q) = 0 | Q. We show that, if
0|P
◦
≡ νn˜.(σ|Q), then σ = 0 and P
⋄
≡ νn˜.Q, by an easy induction on the derivation of 0|P
◦
≡ νn˜.(σ|Q).
By applying this result to 0 | P
◦
≡ 0 |Q, we obtain P
⋄
≡ Q.
Lemma B.7 If P
⋄
≡ Q, then P ≡ Q. If A
◦
≡ B, then A ≡ B.
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Proof: By induction on the derivations of P
⋄
≡ Q and of A
◦
≡ B, respectively.
Lemma B.8 If A→ B, then pnf(A)→◦ pnf(B).
Proof: By induction on the derivation of A→ B.
• Cases Comm, Then, and Else. A and B are plain processes, so pnf(A) = 0 |A→◦ 0 |B = pnf(B),
since A→⋄ B by Comm′, Then′, and Else′ respectively.
• Case νx.A→ νx.B knowing A→ B. The result follows easily from Lemma B.4(4).
• Case νn.A→ νn.B knowingA→ B. The result follows easily from Lemma B.4(5), by distinguishing
cases depending on whether A and B are plain processes or not, as in the proof of Lemma B.5.
• Case A | A′′ → B | A′′ knowing A → B. The result follows easily from Lemma B.4(6), as in the
proof of Lemma B.5.
• If we apply ≡, the result follows immediately from Lemma B.5.
Lemma B.9 If P →⋄ Q, then P → Q. If A→◦ B, then A→ B.
Proof: By induction on the derivations of P →⋄ Q and A→◦ B, respectively. In the cases in which
we apply
⋄
≡ or
◦
≡, we rely on Lemma B.7.
Similarly, we define restricted labelled transitions. First, for plain processes, we define P
α
−→⋄ A as
follows:
In
′ N(x).P
N(M)
−−−−→⋄ P{M/x}
Out-Var
′ x /∈ fv (N〈M〉.P )
N〈M〉.P
νx.N〈x〉
−−−−−→⋄ P | {M/x}
Scope
′ P
α
−→⋄ A n does not occur in α
νn.P
α
−→⋄ νn.A
Par
′ P
α
−→⋄ A bv (α) ∩ fv (Q) = ∅
P |Q
α
−→⋄ A |Q
Struct
′ P
⋄
≡ Q Q
α
−→⋄ B B ≡ A
P
α
−→⋄ A
We define A
α
−→◦ B, where A is a normal process and B is an extended process, as follows: there exist
n˜, σ, P , α′, B′ such that A
◦
≡ νn˜.(σ |P ), P
α′
−→⋄ B′, B ≡ νn˜.(σ |B′), fv(σ)∩ bv (α′) = ∅, Σ ⊢ ασ = α′,
and the elements of n˜ do not occur in α.
We give below an alternative formulation of
α
−→⋄.
Lemma B.10 We have P
α
−→⋄ A if and only if for some n˜, P1, P2, A1, N , M , P
′, x, we have
P
⋄
≡ νn˜.(P1 |P2), A ≡ νn˜.(A1 |P2), {n˜} ∩ fn(α) = ∅, bv(α)∩ fv (P1 |P2) = ∅, and one of the following
two cases holds:
1. α = N(M), P1 = N(x).P
′, and A1 = P
′{M/x}; or
2. α = νx.N〈x〉, P1 = N〈M〉.P ′, and A1 = P ′ | {M/x}.
Proof: For the implication from left to right, we proceed by induction on this derivation of P
α
−→⋄ A.
• Case In′: We are in the first case with P2 = 0 and n˜ = ∅.
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• Case Out-Var′: We are in the second case with P2 = 0 and n˜ = ∅.
• Case Scope′: P
α
−→⋄ A has been derived from Q
α
−→⋄ B with P = νn.Q, A = νn.B, and n does
not occur in α. By induction hypothesis, Q
⋄
≡ νn˜′.(Q1 | Q2), B ≡ νn˜′.(B1 | Q2), {n˜′} ∩ fn(α) = ∅
and bv(α) ∩ fv(Q1 |Q2) = ∅. So P
⋄
≡ νn, n˜′.(Q1 |Q2), A
⋄
≡ νn, n˜′.(B1 |Q2), {n, n˜′} ∩ fn(α) = ∅ and
bv(α) ∩ fv(Q1 |Q2) = ∅.
• Case Par′: P
α
−→⋄ A has been derived from Q
α
−→⋄ B with P = Q | Q′, A = B | Q′, and bv(α) ∩
fv (Q′) = ∅. By induction hypothesis, Q
⋄
≡ νn˜′.(Q1 | Q2), B ≡ νn˜′.(B1 | Q2), {n˜′} ∩ fn(α) = ∅
and bv (α) ∩ fv (Q1 | Q2) = ∅. So P
⋄
≡ νn˜′.(Q1 | Q2) | Q′
⋄
≡ νn˜.(Q1{n˜/˜n′} | (Q2{
n˜/˜n′} | Q
′)) and
A ≡ νn˜′.(B1 |Q2) |Q
′ ≡ νn˜.(B1{
n˜/˜n′} | (Q2{
n˜/˜n′} |Q
′)) where n˜ consists of fresh names that do not
occur in α nor Q′. Let P1 = Q1{n˜/˜n′}, P2 = Q2{
n˜/˜n′}|Q
′, and A1 = B1{n˜/˜n′}. Then P
⋄
≡ νn˜.(P1 |P2),
A ≡ νn˜.(A1 |P2), {n˜} ∩ fn(α) = ∅, bv(α)∩ fv(P1 |P2) = ∅, and the two cases are preserved because
the renaming of n˜′ into n˜ leaves α unchanged, so in the first case, it leaves N and M unchanged,
and just renames inside P ′, and in the second case, it leaves N unchanged and renames inside M
and P ′.
• Case Struct′: P
α
−→⋄ A has been derived from Q
α
−→⋄ B with P
⋄
≡ Q and B ≡ A. By induction
hypothesis, Q
⋄
≡ νn˜′.(Q1 |Q2), B ≡ νn˜′.(B1 |Q2), {n˜′} ∩ fn(α) = ∅ and bv(α)∩ fv (Q1 |Q2) = ∅. So
P
⋄
≡ νn˜′.(Q1 |Q2), A ≡ νn˜′.(B1 |Q2), {n˜′} ∩ fn(α) = ∅ and bv(α) ∩ fv(Q1 |Q2) = ∅.
For the converse implication, we have P1
α
−→⋄ A1 by In
′ in Case 1 and by Out-Var′ in Case 2. Then
P1 | P2
α
−→⋄ A1 | P2 by Par
′, νn˜.(P1 | P2)
α
−→⋄ νn˜.(A1 | P2) by Scope
′, and P
α
−→⋄ A by Struct
′.
Lemma B.11 If P
α
−→⋄ A and fv(σ) ∩ bv (α) = ∅, then Pσ
ασ
−−→⋄ Aσ.
Proof: By Lemma B.3(1), if P
⋄
≡ P ′, then Pσ
⋄
≡ P ′σ, We show that, if A ≡ B and dom(σ) ∩
dom(A) = ∅, then Aσ ≡ Bσ, by noticing that Aσ ≡ νx˜.(A | σ) where {x˜} = dom(σ). Then, we use
the characterization of Lemma B.10, after renaming the elements of n˜ so that {n˜} ∩ fn(σ) = ∅.
Lemma B.12 If A
α
−→ B, then pnf(A)
α
−→◦ B.
Proof: By induction on the derivation of A
α
−→ B.
• In all cases in which A is a plain process, we have pnf(A) = 0 | A
α
−→⋄ B since, for plain processes,
the rules that define A
α
−→⋄ B are the same as those that define A
α
−→ B. So pnf(A) = 0 |A
α
−→◦ B,
with α′ = α, σ = 0, and n˜ = ∅.
• Case Scope with u = n. We have A′
α
−→ B′, n does not occur in α, A = νn.A′, and B = νn.B′.
By induction hypothesis, pnf(A′)
α
−→◦ B′, so pnf(A′)
◦
≡ νn˜.(σ | P ), P
α′
−→⋄ B′′, B′ ≡ νn˜.(σ | B′′),
fv (σ)∩ bv (α′) = ∅, Σ ⊢ ασ = α′, and the elements of n˜ do not occur in α. So pnf(A)
◦
≡ νn, n˜.(σ |P )
and B ≡ νn, n˜.(σ | B′′), so pnf(A)
α
−→◦ B.
• Case Scope with u = x. We have A′
α
−→ B′, x does not occur in α, A = νx.A′, and B = νx.B′.
By induction hypothesis, pnf(A′)
α
−→◦ B′, so pnf(A′)
◦
≡ νn˜.(σ | P ), P
α′
−→⋄ B′′, B′ ≡ νn˜.(σ | B′′),
fv (σ) ∩ bv(α′) = ∅, Σ ⊢ ασ = α′, and the elements of n˜ do not occur in α. Let σ′ = σ|dom(σ)\{x}.
So pnf(A)
◦
≡ νn˜.(σ′ | P ), P
α′
−→⋄ B′′, B ≡ νn˜.(σ′ | B′′), fv (σ′) ∩ bv(α′) = ∅, Σ ⊢ ασ′ = α′ since x
does not occur in α, and the elements of n˜ do not occur in α, so pnf(A)
α
−→◦ B.
• Case Par. We have A′
α
−→ B′, bv(α) ∩ fv (B0) = ∅, A = A′ | B0, and B = B′ | B0. By induction
hypothesis, pnf(A′)
α
−→◦ B′, so pnf(A′)
◦
≡ νn˜.(σ |P ), P
α′
−→⋄ B′′, B′ ≡ νn˜.(σ |B′′), fv(σ)∩bv (α′) = ∅,
Σ ⊢ ασ = α′, and the elements of n˜ do not occur in α. Let pnf(B0) = νn˜′.(σ′ | P ′), where n˜ and
n˜′ are renamed so that they are disjoint, the names of n˜ are not free in σ′ | P ′, and the names
41
of n˜′ are not free in σ | P , in α, nor in B′′. Then pnf(A)
◦
≡ νn˜, n˜′.(σ ⊎ σ′ | (P | P ′)(σ ⊎ σ′)). By
Par
′, P | P ′
α′
−→⋄ B
′′ | P ′. (We have bv (α′) ∩ fv (P ′) = ∅ because fv (P ′) ⊆ fv (pnf(B0)) ⊆ fv(B0),
bv(α′) = bv (α), and bv(α)∩fv (B0) = ∅.) By Lemma B.11, (P |P ′)(σ⊎σ′)
α′(σ⊎σ′)
−−−−−−→⋄ (B′′ |P ′)(σ⊎σ′).
(We have fv(σ ⊎ σ′) ∩ bv (α′) = ∅ because fv (σ) ∩ bv(α′) = ∅ and fv(σ′) ∩ bv(α′) = ∅.) Moreover,
B = B′ | B0 ≡ νn˜.(σ | B
′′) | νn˜′.(σ′ | P ′) ≡ νn˜, n˜′.(σ ⊎ σ′ | (B′′ | P ′)(σ ⊎ σ′))
fv(σ ⊎ σ′) ∩ bv (α′(σ ⊎ σ′)) = fv(σ ⊎ σ′) ∩ bv (α′) = ∅
Σ ⊢ α(σ ⊎ σ′) = ασ(σ ⊎ σ′) = α′(σ ⊎ σ′)
and the elements of n˜, n˜′ do not occur in α, so pnf(A)
α
−→◦ B.
• Case Struct. We have A′
α
−→ B′, A ≡ A′, and B ≡ B′. By induction hypothesis, pnf(A′)
α
−→ B′,
so pnf(A′)
◦
≡ νn˜.(σ | P ), P
α′
−→⋄ B
′′, B′ ≡ νn˜.(σ | B′′), fv(σ) ∩ bv(α′) = ∅, Σ ⊢ ασ = α′, and the
elements of n˜ do not occur in α. By Lemma B.5, pnf(A)
◦
≡ pnf(A′), so pnf(A)
◦
≡ νn˜.(σ | P ), and
B ≡ νn˜.(σ | B′′), hence pnf(A)
α
−→◦ B.
Lemma B.13 If P
α
−→⋄ A, then P
α
−→ A. If A
α
−→◦ B, then A
α
−→ B.
Proof: The first point is proved by induction on the derivation of P
α
−→⋄ A. In the case Struct
′,
we use Lemma B.7.
For the second point, we have A
◦
≡ νn˜.(σ | P ), P
α′
−→⋄ B′, B ≡ νn˜.(σ | B′), fv (σ) ∩ bv(α′) = ∅,
Σ ⊢ ασ = α′, and the elements of n˜ do not occur in α, for some n˜, σ, P , α′, B′. By Lemma B.10, we
have P
⋄
≡ νn˜′.(P1 | P2), B′ ≡ νn˜′.(B1 | P2), {n˜′} ∩ fn(α′) = ∅, bv(α′) ∩ fv (P1 | P2) = ∅, and one of the
following two cases holds:
1. α′ = N ′(M ′), P1 = N
′(x).P ′, and B1 = P
′{M
′
/x};
2. α′ = νx.N ′〈x〉, P1 = N ′〈M ′〉.P ′, and B1 = P ′ | {M
′
/x}
for some n˜′, P1, P2, B1, N
′, M ′, P ′, x. We rename the elements of n˜′ so that {n˜′} ∩ fn(α) = ∅.
In Case 1, α = N(M) for some N and M . We have
A ≡ νn˜, n˜′.(σ |N ′(x).P ′ | P2) ≡ νn˜, n˜
′.(σ |N(x).P ′ | P2)
using Lemma B.7 and Rewrite, since Σ ⊢ Nσ = N ′. We have
B ≡ νn˜, n˜′.(σ | P ′{M
′
/x} | P2) ≡ νn˜, n˜
′.(σ | P ′{M/x} | P2)
using Rewrite, since Σ ⊢Mσ =M ′. Hence, we derive
N(x).P ′
α
−→ P ′{M/x} by In
N(x).P ′ | P2 | σ
α
−→ P ′{M/x} | P2 | σ by Par
νn˜, n˜′.(N(x).P ′ | P2 | σ)
α
−→ νn˜, n˜′.(P ′{M/x} | P2 | σ) by Scope
A
α
−→ B by Struct
To apply Par, we notice that fv (P2 | σ) ∩ bv (α) = ∅ since bv(α) = bv(α′).
In Case 2, α = νx.N 〈x〉 for some N . We have
A ≡ νn˜, n˜′.(σ |N ′〈M ′〉.P ′ | P2) ≡ νn˜, n˜
′.(σ |N〈M ′〉.P ′ | P2)
using Lemma B.7 and Rewrite, since Σ ⊢ Nσ = N ′. We have
B ≡ νn˜, n˜′.(σ | P ′ | {M
′
/x} | P2)
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Hence, we derive
N〈M ′〉.P ′
α
−→ P ′ | {M
′
/x} by Out-Var
N〈M ′〉.P ′ | P2 | σ
α
−→ P ′ | {M
′
/x} | P2 | σ by Par
νn˜, n˜′.(N〈M ′〉.P ′ | P2 | σ)
α
−→ νn˜, n˜′.(P ′ | {M
′
/x} | P2 | σ) by Scope
A
α
−→ B by Struct
B.3 Restriction to Closed Processes
Next, we show that we can restrict ourselves to reductions between closed processes in the semantics
on partial normal forms. Let R be an inductive relation on processes. We say that a derivation of
R is closed when all processes that appear in the derivation are closed, and that a derivation of R is
closed on the left when all processes that appear in the derivation before applying R are closed.
Let A and B be two normal processes. We write Σ ⊢ A = B when B is obtained from A by
replacing some terms M with terms N such that Σ ⊢M = N . When Σ ⊢ P = Q, we have P
⋄
≡ Q by
(possibly several) applications of Rewrite′. When Σ ⊢ A = B, we have A
◦
≡ B by (possibly several)
applications of Rewrite′ and Rewrite′′.
Lemma B.14 1. If P
⋄
≡ Q and Σ ⊢ P = Pσ, then Pσ
⋄
≡ Qσ and Σ ⊢ Q = Qσ.
2. If A
◦
≡ B and Σ ⊢ A = Aσ, then Aσ
◦
≡ Bσ and Σ ⊢ B = Bσ.
Proof: We prove these properties by induction on the derivations. All cases are straightforward.
(When y ∈ dom(A), we consider that A{a/y} = A.) In the cases Rewrite
′ and Rewrite′′, we
use that the equational theory is closed under substitution of terms for variables. In the cases of
transitivity of
⋄
≡ and
◦
≡, we use the induction hypothesis twice.
Lemma B.15 If A ≡ B, then Aσ ≡ Bσ.
Proof: We prove this lemma by induction on the derivation of A ≡ B.
Lemma B.16 In all the cases below, Y is a set of variables, σ is a substitution from Y to pairwise
distinct fresh names.
1. If P
⋄
≡ Q, Y
def
= fv(P ) ∪ fv (Q), and Σ ⊢ P = Pσ, then Σ ⊢ Q = Qσ and Pσ
⋄
≡ Qσ by a closed
derivation.
2. If P →⋄ Q, Y
def
= fv(P )∪ fv (Q), and Σ ⊢ P = Pσ, then Σ ⊢ Q = Qσ and Pσ →⋄ Qσ by a closed
derivation.
3. If P
α
−→⋄ A, Y
def
= fv(P )∪ fv (α)∪ (fv (A)\dom(A)), and Σ ⊢ P = Pσ, then Σ ⊢ α = ασ, A ≡ Aσ,
and Pσ
ασ
−−→⋄ Aσ by a derivation closed on the left.
4. If A
◦
≡ B, Y
def
= (fv (A) \ dom(A)) ∪ (fv (B) \ dom(B)), and Σ ⊢ A = Aσ, then Σ ⊢ B = Bσ and
Aσ
◦
≡ Bσ by a closed derivation.
5. If A→◦ B, Y
def
= (fv (A) \ dom(A))∪ (fv (B) \ dom(B)), and Σ ⊢ A = Aσ, then Σ ⊢ B = Bσ and
Aσ →◦ Bσ by a closed derivation.
Proof: We prove the lemma by induction on the derivations. All cases are straightforward. In the
casesRewrite′, Rewrite′′, and Else′, we use that the equational theory is closed under substitution
of names for variables. In the cases of transitivity of
⋄
≡ and
◦
≡, we use the induction hypothesis and
notice that, if a variable does not occur free in a certain process, then we can substitute it or not
without changing the result. We use a similar argument when we apply a structural equivalence step
and a reduction step. In the case Struct′, we additionally use Lemma B.15.
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Lemma B.17 1. If P →⋄ Q and P is closed, then P →⋄ Q by a derivation closed on the left.
2. If A→◦ B and A is closed, then A→◦ B by a derivation closed on the left.
3. If P
α
−→⋄ A, P is closed, and α is νx.N〈x〉 or N(M) for some ground term N , then P
α
−→⋄ A by
a derivation closed on the left.
4. If A
α
−→◦ B, A is closed, and fv(α) ⊆ dom(A), then A
α
−→◦ B by a derivation closed on the left,
and the label α′ of the transition P
α′
−→⋄ B′ used in the definition of A
α
−→◦ B is closed.
Proof: In the proof below, Y ranges over sets of variables and σ maps Y to pairwise distinct fresh
names. The first two properties immediately follow from Lemma B.16. For instance, if P →⋄ Q and
P is closed, let Y = fv(P ) ∪ fv (Q) = fv(Q). We have P = Pσ, so a fortiori Σ ⊢ P = Pσ. By
Lemma B.16(2), we have Σ ⊢ Q = Qσ and P = Pσ →⋄ Qσ by a closed derivation, so Q
⋄
≡ Qσ. Hence
P →⋄ Q by a derivation closed on the left.
Property 3: Suppose that α = N(M) where N is a ground term. By Lemma B.10, P
⋄
≡
νn˜.(N(x).P1 | P2), A ≡ νn˜.(P1{M/x} | P2), and {n˜} ∩ fn(α) = ∅. Let Y = fv(N(x).P1 | P2). We
rename x so that x /∈ Y . Since P is closed, P = Pσ, so a fortiori Σ ⊢ P = Pσ. By Lemma B.16(1),
P = Pσ
⋄
≡ νn˜.(N(x).P1σ|P2σ) by a closed derivation and Σ ⊢ νn˜.(N(x).P1 |P2) = νn˜.(N(x).P1σ|P2σ),
so Σ ⊢ P1 = P1σ and Σ ⊢ P2 = P2σ. Hence A ≡ νn˜.(P1{M/x} | P2) ≡ νn˜.(P1σ{M/x} | P2σ). We derive
N(x).P1σ
N(M)
−−−−→⋄ P1σ{
M/x} by In
′
N(x).P1σ | P2σ
N(M)
−−−−→⋄ P1σ{
M/x} | P2σ by Par
′
νn˜.(N(x).P1σ | P2σ)
N(M)
−−−−→⋄ νn˜.(P1σ{
M/x} | P2σ) by Scope
′
P
N(M)
−−−−→⋄ A by Struct
′
using the previous closed derivation of P
⋄
≡ νn˜.(N(x).P1σ | P2σ). In the resulting derivation, all
intermediate processes before
α
−→⋄ are closed. The case α = νx.N 〈x〉 where N is a ground term can
be proved in a similar way, or by using Lemma B.16(3) since α is closed.
Property 4: Suppose that A is closed and A
α
−→◦ B. Then A
◦
≡ νn˜.(σ′ | P ), P
α′
−→⋄ B′, B ≡
νn˜.(σ′ | B′), fv (σ′) ∩ bv(α′) = ∅, Σ ⊢ ασ′ = α′, and the names n˜ do not occur in α. Let Y =
(fv (σ′) \ dom(σ′)) ∪ fv (P ) ∪ fv(α′) ∪ (fv (B′) \ dom(B′)). Then Σ ⊢ A = Aσ, so by Lemma B.16(4),
Aσ
◦
≡ νn˜.(σ′σ | Pσ) by a closed derivation and Σ ⊢ νn˜.(σ′ | P ) = νn˜.(σ′σ | Pσ), so Σ ⊢ σ′ = σ′σ
and Σ ⊢ P = Pσ. Hence by Lemma B.16(3), Pσ
α′σ
−−→⋄ B′σ by a derivation closed on the left, and
B′ ≡ B′σ. So B ≡ νn˜.(σ′σ | B′σ), fv(σ′σ) ∩ bv (α′σ) = ∅, Σ ⊢ ασ′σ = α′σ, and the names n˜ do not
occur in α. Hence we obtain the desired derivation using α′σ instead of α′, σ′σ instead of σ′, Pσ
instead of P , and B′σ instead of B′.
B.4 Decomposition and Composition of Reductions on Partial Normal
Forms
The next few lemmas allow us to analyze internal reductions and labelled transitions on partial normal
forms. Most of these lemmas describe the possible reductions of a process. Lemma B.20 composes two
reductions: if two processes perform labelled transitions, one an output transition and the other an
input transition on the same channel, then their parallel composition performs an internal reduction.
Lemma B.18 Suppose that P0 is closed, α is νx.N ′〈x〉 or N ′(M ′) for some ground term N ′, and
P0
α
−→⋄ A. Then one of the following cases holds:
1. P0 = P |Q and either P
α
−→⋄ A′ and A ≡ A′ | Q, or Q
α
−→⋄ A′ and A ≡ P | A′, for some P , Q,
and A′;
44
2. P0 = νn.P , P
α
−→⋄ A′, and A ≡ νn.A′ for some P , A′, and n that does not occur in α;
3. P0 = !P , P
α
−→⋄ A′, and A ≡ A′ | !P for some P and A′;
4. P0 = N(x).P , α = N
′(M ′), Σ ⊢ N = N ′, and A ≡ P{M
′
/x} for some N , x, P , N ′, and M ′;
5. P0 = N〈M〉.P , α = νx.N ′〈x〉, Σ ⊢ N = N ′, x /∈ fv(P0), and A ≡ P | {M/x} for some N , M , P ,
x, and N ′.
Proof: An obvious approach for proving this result is to proceed by induction on the derivation of
P0
α
−→⋄ A. However, the statement is not strong enough to provide an inductive invariant. For instance,
in case P0
α
−→⋄ A is derived from P0 = νn.νn′.P
⋄
≡ νn′.νn.P
α
−→⋄ A, we can apply the statement to
νn′.νn.P
α
−→⋄ A by induction hypothesis, because νn′.νn.P
α
−→⋄ A is derived by a derivation smaller
than that of P0
α
−→⋄ A. Hence, we obtain that νn.P
α
−→⋄ A′ and A ≡ νn′.A′ for some A′. However, we
cannot apply the result to νn.P
α
−→⋄ A
′, because we are not sure that the derivation of νn.P
α
−→⋄ A
′
is smaller than that of P0
α
−→⋄ A. For this reason, we strengthen the induction hypothesis as shown
below, to make sure that it can be applied to a labelled transition, such as νn.P
α
−→⋄ A′, obtained by
applying the desired result itself.
Let Prop(P0
α
−→⋄ A) be the greatest property such that Prop(P0
α
−→⋄ A) holds if and only if one of
the following cases holds:
1. P0 = P |Q and either P
α
−→⋄ A′, Prop(P
α
−→⋄ A′), and A ≡ A′ |Q, or Q
α
−→⋄ A′, Prop(Q
α
−→⋄ A′),
and A ≡ P | A′, for some P , Q, and A′;
2. P0 = νn.P , P
α
−→⋄ A′, Prop(P
α
−→⋄ A′), and A ≡ νn.A′ for some P , A′, and n that does not
occur in α;
3. P0 = !P , P
α
−→⋄ A′, Prop(P
α
−→⋄ A′), and A ≡ A′ | !P for some P and A′;
4. P0 = N(x).P , α = N
′(M ′), Σ ⊢ N = N ′, and A ≡ P{M
′
/x} for some N , x, P , N ′, and M ′;
5. P0 = N〈M〉.P , α = νx.N ′〈x〉, Σ ⊢ N = N ′, x /∈ fv (P0), and A ≡ P | {M/x} for some N , M , P ,
x, and N ′.
Let us show that, if P0
α
−→⋄ A is derived by a derivation closed on the left, then Prop(P0
α
−→⋄ A), by
induction on the derivation of P0
α
−→⋄ A.
• Case In′. We have P0 = N(x).P , α = N(M), and A = P{M/x}, so we are in Case 4 of Prop(P0
α
−→⋄
A) with N ′ = N and M ′ =M .
• Case Out-Var′. We have P0 = N〈M〉.P , α = νx.N 〈x〉, x /∈ fv(P0), and A = P | {M/x}, so we are
in Case 5 of Prop(P0
α
−→⋄ A) with N ′ = N .
• Case Scope′. We have P0 = νn.P , n does not occur in α, P
α
−→⋄ A′, and A = νn.A′ for some A′.
We obtain Prop(P
α
−→⋄ A′) by induction hypothesis, so we are in Case 2 of Prop(P0
α
−→⋄ A).
• Case Par′. We have P0 = P | Q, P
α
−→⋄ A
′ and A = A′ | Q for some P , Q, and A′. We obtain
Prop(P
α
−→⋄ A′) by induction hypothesis, so we are in Case 1 of Prop(P0
α
−→⋄ A).
• Case Struct′. We have P0
⋄
≡ Q0
α
−→⋄ B ≡ A. The case in which P0 = Q0 is obvious. Let us
consider the case in which the structural equivalence P0
⋄
≡ Q0 consists of applying a single structural
equivalence step. (The case in which it consists of several steps can be transformed into several
applications of Struct′.) The process Q0 is closed, and by induction hypothesis Prop(Q0
α
−→⋄ B).
We show that, if P0
⋄
≡ Q0
α
−→⋄ B ≡ A, Prop(Q0
α
−→⋄ B), and all processes in the derivation of
P0
⋄
≡ Q0 are closed, then Prop(P0
α
−→⋄ A), by induction on the derivation of P0
⋄
≡ Q0.
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– Case P0 = Q0 | 0
⋄
≡ Q0. We have Q0
α
−→⋄ B, Prop(Q0
α
−→⋄ B), and A ≡ B ≡ B | 0, so we are in
Case 1 of Prop(P0
α
−→⋄ A).
– Case P0
⋄
≡ P0 | 0. Since Prop(P0 | 0
α
−→⋄ B), we have either P0
α
−→⋄ B′, Prop(P0
α
−→⋄ B′), and
B ≡ B′ | 0 for some B′, or 0
α
−→⋄ B
′, Prop(0
α
−→⋄ B
′), and B ≡ P |B′ for some B′. By definition
of Prop, Prop(0
α
−→⋄ B′) is impossible, so we are in the first case: Prop(P0
α
−→⋄ B′) and A ≡ B′.
Since Prop(P0
α
−→⋄ B′) is invariant by structural equivalence applied to B′, we can then conclude
that Prop(P0
α
−→⋄ A).
– Case P0 = P | (Q | R)
⋄
≡ (P | Q) | R. We have Prop((P | Q) | R
α
−→⋄ B), so either P | Q
α
−→⋄ B
′,
Prop(P |Q
α
−→⋄ B′), and B ≡ B′ |R for some B′, or R
α
−→⋄ B′, Prop(R
α
−→⋄ B′), and B ≡ (P |Q)|B′
for some B′. In the first case, either P
α
−→⋄ B′′, Prop(P
α
−→⋄ B′′), and B′ ≡ B′′ |Q for some B′′,
or Q
α
−→⋄ B′′, Prop(Q
α
−→⋄ B′′), and B′ ≡ P |B′′ for some B′′. Consider for instance the last case,
in which Q reduces. The other two cases are similar. Since R is closed, bv (α) ∩ fv (R) = ∅, so by
Par
′, Q |R
α
−→⋄ B′′ |R, Prop(Q |R
α
−→⋄ B′′ |R), and A ≡ B ≡ B′ |R ≡ (P |B′′) |R ≡ P | (B′′ |R),
so we are in Case 1 of Prop(P0
α
−→⋄ A).
– Case P0 = (P |Q) |R
⋄
≡ P | (Q |R). This case is similar to the previous one.
– Case P0 = P | Q
⋄
≡ Q | P . (This case is its own symmetric.) This case is immediate, since the
desired result is invariant by swapping P and Q.
– Case P0 = !P
⋄
≡ P | !P . Since Prop(P | !P
α
−→⋄ B), either P
α
−→⋄ B
′, Prop(P
α
−→⋄ B
′), and
B ≡ B′ | !P for some B′, or !P
α
−→⋄ B′, Prop(!P
α
−→⋄ B′), and B ≡ P | B′ for some B′. In
the first case, we are in Case 3 of Prop(P0
α
−→⋄ A) with A′ = B′. In the second case, since
Prop(!P
α
−→⋄ B′), we have P
α
−→⋄ B′′, Prop(P
α
−→⋄ B′′), and B′ ≡ B′′ | !P for some B′′. Hence,
A ≡ B ≡ B′ | P ≡ B′′ | !P , so we are in Case 3 of Prop(P0
α
−→⋄ A) with A′ = B′′.
– Case P0 = P | !P
⋄
≡ !P . Since Prop(!P
α
−→⋄ B), we have P
α
−→⋄ B′, Prop(P
α
−→⋄ B′), and
B ≡ B′ | !P for some B′. We are in Case 1 of Prop(P0
α
−→⋄ A) with A′ = B′.
– Case P0 = νn.0
⋄
≡ 0. We have that Prop(0
α
−→⋄ B) is impossible, so this case never happens.
– Case P0 = 0
⋄
≡ νn.0. Since Prop(νn.0
α
−→⋄ B), we have Prop(0
α
−→⋄ B′), which is impossible, so
this case never happens.
– Case P0 = νn.νn
′.P
⋄
≡ νn′.νn.P . (This case is its own symmetric.) We rename n and n′ so that
they do not occur in α. Since Prop(νn′.νn.P
α
−→⋄ B), we have νn.P
α
−→⋄ B
′, Prop(νn.P
α
−→⋄ B
′),
and B ≡ νn′.B′ for some B′, so P
α
−→⋄ B′′, Prop(P
α
−→⋄ B′′), and B′ ≡ νn.B′′ for some B′′.
Hence, by Scope’, νn′.P
α
−→⋄ νn
′.B′′, Prop(νn′.P
α
−→⋄ νn
′.B′′), and we have A ≡ B ≡ νn′.B′ ≡
νn′.νn.B′′ ≡ νn.νn′.B′′, so we are in Case 2 of Prop(P0
α
−→⋄ A) with A′ = νn′.B′′.
– Case P0 = P |νn.Q
⋄
≡ νn.(P |Q) and n /∈ fn(P ). We rename n so that it does not occur in α. Since
Prop(νn.(P |Q)
α
−→⋄ B), we have P |Q
α
−→⋄ B′, Prop(P |Q
α
−→⋄ B′), and B ≡ νn.B′ for some B′, so
either P
α
−→⋄ B′′, Prop(P
α
−→⋄ B′′), and B′ ≡ B′′ |Q for some B′′, or Q
α
−→⋄ B′′, Prop(Q
α
−→⋄ B′′),
and B′ ≡ P | B′′ for some B′′. In the first case, we rename n in Q so that n /∈ fn(B′′),
hence A ≡ B ≡ νn.B′ ≡ νn.(B′′ | Q) ≡ B′′ | νn.Q, so we are in Case 1 of Prop(P0
α
−→⋄ A)
with A′ = B′′. In the second case, by Scope′, νn.Q
α
−→⋄ νn.B′′, Prop(νn.Q
α
−→⋄ νn.B′′), and
A ≡ B ≡ νn.B′ ≡ νn.(P |B′′) ≡ P |νn.B′′ since n /∈ fn(P ), so we are in Case 1 of Prop(P0
α
−→⋄ A)
with A′ = νn.B′′.
– Case P0 = νn.(P |Q)
⋄
≡ P | νn.Q and n /∈ fn(P ). This case is fairly similar to the previous one.
– Case P0 = P1{M/x}
⋄
≡ P1{N/x} and Σ ⊢ M = N . (This case is its own symmetric.) We have
Prop(P1{N/x}
α
−→⋄ B). We show by induction on the syntax of P1 that, if Prop(P1{N/x}
α
−→⋄ B),
Σ ⊢M = N , and A ≡ B, then Prop(P1{M/x}
α
−→⋄ A).
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∗ Case P1 = P | Q. We have Prop(P{N/x} | Q{N/x}
α
−→⋄ B), so we have either P{N/x}
α
−→⋄ B′,
Prop(P{N/x}
α
−→⋄ B′), and B ≡ B′ | Q{N/x}, or Q{N/x}
α
−→⋄ B′, Prop(Q{N/x}
α
−→⋄ B′), and
B ≡ P{N/x} | B′ for some B′. Hence P1{M/x} = P{M/x} | Q{M/x} and either P{M/x}
⋄
≡
P{N/x}
α
−→⋄ B
′, Prop(P{M/x}
α
−→⋄ B
′) by induction hypothesis, and A ≡ B ≡ B′ | Q{N/x} ≡
B′ |Q{M/x}, or Q{M/x}
⋄
≡ Q{N/x}
α
−→⋄ B′, Prop(Q{M/x}
α
−→⋄ B′) by induction hypothesis, and
A ≡ B ≡ P{N/x} | B′ ≡ P{M/x} | B′, so we are in Case 1 of Prop(P1{M/x}
α
−→⋄ A).
∗ Case P1 = νn.P . We rename n so that it does not occur in α. We have Prop(νn.P{N/x}
α
−→⋄ B),
so P{N/x}
α
−→⋄ B
′, Prop(P{N/x}
α
−→⋄ B
′), and B ≡ νn.B′ for some B′. Hence P1{
M/x} =
νn.P{M/x}, P{M/x}
⋄
≡ P{N/x}
α
−→⋄ B′, Prop(P{M/x}
α
−→⋄ B′) by induction hypothesis, and
A ≡ B ≡ νn.B′, so we are in Case 2 of Prop(P1{M/x}
α
−→⋄ A).
∗ Case P1 = !P . We have Prop(!P{N/x}
α
−→⋄ B), so P{N/x}
α
−→⋄ B′, Prop(P{N/x}
α
−→⋄ B′),
and B ≡ B′ | !P{N/x} for some B
′. Hence P1{
M/x} = !P{
M/x}, P{
M/x}
⋄
≡ P{N/x}
α
−→⋄ B
′,
Prop(P{M/x}
α
−→⋄ B′) by induction hypothesis, and A ≡ B ≡ B′ | !P{N/x} ≡ B′ | !P{M/x}, so
we are in Case 3 of Prop(P1{M/x}
α
−→⋄ A).
∗ Case P1 = N1(x1).P . We rename x1 so that x1 6= x. We have Prop(N1{N/x}(x1).P{N/x}
α
−→⋄
B), so α = N ′(M ′), Σ ⊢ N1{N/x} = N ′, and B ≡ P{N/x}{M
′
/x1}. So Σ ⊢ N1{
M/x} = N ′,
and A ≡ B ≡ P{M/x}{M
′
/x1}, hence Prop(N1{
M/x}(x1).P{M/x}
α
−→⋄ A), so we are in Case 4
of Prop(P1{M/x}
α
−→⋄ A).
∗ Case P1 = N1〈M1〉.P . We have Prop(N1{N/x}〈M1{N/x}〉.P{N/x}
α
−→⋄ B), so α = νx1.N ′〈x1〉,
Σ ⊢ N1{N/x} = N ′, and B ≡ P{N/x} | {M1{
N/x}/x1}. So Σ ⊢ N1{
M/x} = N ′, and A ≡ B ≡
P{N/x} | {
M1{
M/x}/x1}, hence Prop(N1{
M/x}〈M1{
M/x}〉.P{
M/x}
α
−→⋄ A), so we are in Case 5 of
Prop(P1{M/x}
α
−→⋄ A).
Using this result, we obtain Prop(P0
α
−→⋄ A).
– Case P0 = P | Q
⋄
≡ P ′ | Q knowing P
⋄
≡ P ′. Since Prop(P ′ | Q
α
−→⋄ B), either P ′
α
−→⋄ A′,
Prop(P ′
α
−→⋄ A′), and A ≡ A′ | Q for some A′, or Q
α
−→⋄ A′, Prop(Q
α
−→⋄ A′), and A ≡ P ′ | A′
for some A′. In the first case, by Struct′, P
α
−→⋄ A′. By induction hypothesis, Prop(P
α
−→⋄ A′).
Moreover, A ≡ A′ | Q, so we are in Case 1 of Prop(P0
α
−→⋄ A). In the second case, Q
α
−→⋄ A′,
Prop(Q
α
−→⋄ A
′), and A ≡ P ′ | A′ ≡ P | A′, so we are in Case 1 of Prop(P0
α
−→⋄ A).
– Case P0 = νn.P
⋄
≡ νn.P ′ knowing P
⋄
≡ P ′. We rename n so that it does not occur in α. Since
Prop(νn.P ′
α
−→⋄ B), we have P ′
α
−→⋄ A′, Prop(P ′
α
−→⋄ A′), and A ≡ νn.A′ for some A′. By
Struct
′, P
α
−→⋄ A′. By induction hypothesis, Prop(P
α
−→⋄ A′). Moreover, A ≡ νn.A′, so we are
in Case 2 of Prop(P0
α
−→⋄ A).
Since P0 is closed and α is νx.N ′〈x〉 or N ′(M ′) for some ground term N ′, by Lemma B.17(3), there
exists a derivation of P0
α
−→⋄ A closed on the left. So by applying the previous result, Prop(P0
α
−→⋄ A),
which yields the desired property.
Lemma B.19 If νn˜.(σ | P ) is a closed normal process, νn˜.(σ | P )
α
−→◦ A, fv (α) ⊆ dom(σ), and the
elements of n˜ do not occur in α, then P
ασ
−−→⋄ A′, A ≡ νn˜.(σ | A′), and bv (α) ∩ dom(σ) = ∅ for some
A′.
Proof: By Lemma B.17(4), we consider a derivation of νn˜.(σ | P )
α
−→◦ A closed on the left and
the label α′ below is closed. By definition of
α
−→◦, we have νn˜.(σ | P )
◦
≡ νn˜′.(σ′ | P ′), P ′
α′
−→⋄ B,
A ≡ νn˜′.(σ′ |B), Σ ⊢ ασ′ = α′ for some n˜′, σ′, P ′, α′, B such that the elements of n˜′ do not occur in α
and fv (σ′)∩ bv(α′) = ∅. By applying Lemma B.10 back and forth, since P ′
α′
−→⋄ B and Σ ⊢ ασ′ = α′,
we have P ′
ασ′
−−→⋄ B. We proceed by induction on the derivation of νn˜.(σ | P )
◦
≡ νn˜′.(σ′ | P ′).
• Base case: νn˜.(σ | P ) = νn˜′.(σ′ | P ′), and the desired result holds.
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• Transitivity: the result is proved by applying the induction hypothesis twice.
• Case Plain′′: n˜ = n˜′, σ = σ′, P
⋄
≡ P ′
ασ
−−→⋄ B, and A ≡ νn˜.(σ | B), so the result holds.
• Case New-C′′: n˜′ is a reordering of n˜, νn˜.(σ | P )
◦
≡ νn˜′.(σ | P ), P
ασ
−−→⋄ B and A ≡ νn˜′.(σ | B), so
P
ασ
−−→⋄ B and A ≡ νn˜′.(σ |B) ≡ νn˜.(σ |B), hence the result holds.
• Case New-Par′′: P = νn′.P ′, νn˜.(σ | νn′.P ′)
◦
≡ νn˜, n′.(σ | P ′), P ′
ασ
−−→⋄ B, and A ≡ νn˜, n′.(σ | B)
where the elements of n˜, n′ do not occur in α and n′ /∈ fn(σ). By Scope′, P = νn′.P ′
ασ
−−→⋄ νn′.B
and by New-Par, A ≡ νn˜, n′.(σ |B) ≡ νn˜.(σ | νn′.B), hence the result holds.
• Case New-Par′′ reversed: νn˜, n′.(σ | P )
◦
≡ νn˜.(σ | νn′.P ), νn′.P
ασ
−−→⋄ B and A ≡ νn˜.(σ | B)
where the elements of n˜ do not occur in α and n′ /∈ fn(σ). We rename n′ so that it does not
occur in α. By Lemma B.18, P
ασ
−−→⋄ B′ and B ≡ νn′.B′ for some B′. Hence, P
ασ
−−→⋄ B′ and
A ≡ νn˜.(σ | B) ≡ νn˜.(σ | νn′.B′) ≡ νn˜, n′.(σ | B′) by New-Par, so the result holds.
• Case Rewrite′′: νn˜.(σ |P )
◦
≡ νn˜.(σ′ |P ), P
ασ′
−−→⋄ B and A ≡ νn˜.(σ′ |B) where dom(σ) = dom(σ′),
Σ ⊢ xσ = xσ′ for all x ∈ dom(σ), and (fv (xσ) ∪ fv (xσ′)) ∩ dom(σ) = ∅ for all x ∈ dom(σ). Hence
P
ασ′
−−→⋄ B and Σ ⊢ ασ = ασ′, so by applying Lemma B.10 back and forth, P
ασ
−−→⋄ B. Moreover,
A ≡ νn˜.(σ′ |B) ≡ νn˜.(σ |B) by several applications of Rewrite, so the result holds.
Lemma B.20 If P and Q are closed processes, N is a ground term, P
N(x)
−−−→⋄ A, and Q
νx.N〈x〉
−−−−−→⋄ B,
then P |Q→⋄ R and R ≡ νx.(A | B) for some R.
Proof: By Lemma B.10, we have P
⋄
≡ νn˜.(N(y).P1 | P2), A ≡ νn˜.(P1{x/y} | P2), {n˜} ∩ fn(N) = ∅
and Q
⋄
≡ νn˜′.(N〈M〉.Q1 |Q2), B ≡ νn˜′.(Q1 | {M/x} |Q2), {n˜′} ∩ fn(N) = ∅, x /∈ fv (N〈M〉.Q1 |Q2).
Let Y = fv (νn˜.(N(y).P1 | P2)). We rename y so that y /∈ Y . Let σ be a substitution from Y to
pairwise distinct fresh names. Since P and N are closed, Pσ = P and Nσ = N , so a fortiori Σ ⊢ P =
Pσ. By Lemma B.16(1), P
⋄
≡ νn˜.(N(y).P1σ | P2σ) and Σ ⊢ νn˜.(N(y).P1 | P2) = νn˜.(N(y).P1σ | P2σ).
Then, by introducing fresh names n˜1, n˜
′
1,
P |Q
⋄
≡ νn˜1, n˜
′
1.(N(y).P1σ{
n˜1/˜n} | P2σ{
n˜1/˜n}
|N〈M{n˜
′
1/˜n′}〉.Q1{
n˜′1/˜n′} |Q2{
n˜′1/˜n′})
→⋄ νn˜1, n˜
′
1.(P1σ{
n˜1/˜n}{
M{n˜
′
1/˜n′}/y} | P2σ{
n˜1/˜n} |Q1{
n˜′1/˜n′} |Q2{
n˜′1/˜n′}) = R
and
νx.(A | B) ≡ νx, n˜1, n˜
′
1.(P1σ{
x/y,
n˜1 /˜n} | P2σ{
n˜1/˜n}
|Q1{
n˜′1/˜n′} | {
M{n˜
′
1/˜n′}/x} |Q2{
n˜′1/˜n′})
≡ νn˜1, n˜
′
1.(P1σ{
M{n˜
′
1/˜n′}/y,
n˜1 /˜n} | P2σ{
n˜1/˜n} |Q1{
n˜′1/˜n′} |Q2{
n˜′1/˜n′})
≡ R
because x is not free in P1σ, P2σ, Q1, Q2, since νn˜.(N(y).P1σ|P2σ) is closed and x /∈ fv(N〈M〉.Q1 |Q2).
Lemma B.21 Suppose that P0 is a closed process and P0 →⋄ R. Then one of the following cases
holds:
1. P0 = P |Q for some P and Q, and one of the following cases holds:
(a) P →⋄ P ′ and R ≡ P ′ |Q for some P ′,
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(b) P
N(x)
−−−→⋄ A, Q
νx.N〈x〉
−−−−−→⋄ B, and R ≡ νx.(A | B) for some A, B, x, and ground term N ,
and two symmetric cases obtained by swapping P and Q;
2. P0 = νn.P , P →⋄ Q′, and R ≡ νn.Q′ for some n, P , and Q′;
3. P0 = !P , P | P →⋄ Q′, and R ≡ Q′ | !P for some P and Q′;
4. P0 = if M = N then P else Q and either Σ ⊢M = N and R ≡ P , or Σ ⊢M 6= N and R ≡ Q,
for some M , N , P , and Q.
Proof: We proceed similarly to Lemma B.18. Let Prop(P0 →⋄ R0) be the greatest property such
that Prop(P0 →⋄ R0) holds if and only if one of the following cases holds:
1. P0 = P |Q for some P and Q, and one of the following cases holds:
(a) P →⋄ P
′, Prop(P →⋄ P
′), and R0 ≡ P
′ |Q for some P ′,
(b) P
N(x)
−−−→⋄ A, Q
νx.N〈x〉
−−−−−→⋄ B, and R0 ≡ νx.(A | B) for some A, B, x, and ground term N ,
and two symmetric cases obtained by swapping P and Q, named (a’) and (b’) respectively;
2. P0 = νn.P , P →⋄ Q′, Prop(P →⋄ Q′), and R0 ≡ νn.Q′ for some n, P , and Q′;
3. P0 = !P , P | P →⋄ Q′, Prop(P | P →⋄ Q′), and R0 ≡ Q′ | !P for some P and Q′;
4. P0 = if M = N then P else Q and either Σ ⊢M = N and R0 ≡ P , or Σ ⊢M 6= N and R0 ≡ Q,
for some M , N , P , and Q.
Let us show that, if P0 →⋄ R0 is derived by a derivation closed on the left, then Prop(P0 →⋄ R0), by
induction on the derivation of P0 →⋄ R0.
• In the case Comm′, P0 = P |Q where P = N〈M〉.P
′, Q = N(x).Q′, and R0 = P
′ |Q′{M/x}, so by
choosing a fresh variable y, P
νy.N〈y〉
−−−−−→⋄ P ′ | {M/y}, Q
N(y)
−−−→⋄ Q′{y/x}, νy.(P ′ | {M/y} | Q′{y/x}) ≡
P ′|Q′{M/x} ≡ R0, andN is ground since P0 is closed. Therefore, we are in Case 1.(a’) of Prop(P0 →⋄
R0).
• In the case Then′, we are in Case 4 of Prop(P0 →⋄ R0) with P0 = if M = M then P else Q and
R0 = P .
• In the case Else′, we are in Case 4 of Prop(P0 →⋄ R0) with P0 = if M = N then P else Q,
Σ ⊢M 6= N , and R0 = Q.
• If we apply a reduction under an evaluation context E, then P0 = E[P ] →⋄ E[P ′] = R0 is derived
from P →⋄ P ′. By induction hypothesis, we have Prop(P →⋄ P ′), and we are in Case 1.(a)
(respectively, 1.(a’) or 2) of Prop(P0 →⋄ R0) when E is E′ |Q (respectively, Q |E′ or νn.E′).
• Finally, suppose that we use
⋄
≡. We have P0
⋄
≡ Q0 →⋄ R1
⋄
≡ R0. The case in which P0 = Q0 is
obvious by induction, since R1
⋄
≡ R0 implies R1 ≡ R0 by Lemma B.7. Let us consider the case in
which the structural equivalence P0
⋄
≡ Q0 consists of applying a single structural equivalence step.
(The case in which it consists of several steps can be transformed into several applications of the
rule.) The process Q0 is closed, and by induction hypothesis Prop(Q0 →⋄ R1). We show that, if
P0
⋄
≡ Q0 →⋄ R1 ≡ R0, Prop(Q0 →⋄ R1), and all processes in the derivation of P0
⋄
≡ Q0 are closed,
then Prop(P0 →⋄ R0), by induction on the derivation of P0
⋄
≡ Q0.
– Case P0 = Q0 | 0
⋄
≡ Q0. We have Q0 →⋄ R1, Prop(Q0 →⋄ R1), and R0 ≡ R1 ≡ R1 | 0, so we are
in Case 1.(a) of Prop(P0 →⋄ R0).
49
– Case P0
⋄
≡ P0 | 0. Since Prop(P0 | 0→⋄ R1), we have either
1. P0 →⋄ R′, Prop(P0 →⋄ R′), and R1 ≡ R′ | 0 for some R′;
2. P0
N(x)
−−−→⋄ A, 0
νx.N〈x〉
−−−−−→⋄ B;
3. P0
νx.N〈x〉
−−−−−→⋄ A, 0
N(x)
−−−→⋄ B; or
4. 0→⋄ R′, Prop(0→⋄ R′), and R1 ≡ P0 | R′ for some R′.
Cases 2 and 3 are impossible by Lemma B.18. Case 4 is impossible since, by definition of Prop,
Prop(0 →⋄ R′) does not hold. So we are in the first case: Prop(P0 →⋄ R′) and R0 ≡ R1 ≡
R′ | 0 ≡ R′. Since Prop(P0 →⋄ R
′) is invariant by structural equivalence applied to R′, we can
then conclude that Prop(P0 →⋄ R0).
– Case P0 = P | (Q | R)
⋄
≡ (P |Q) | R. Since Prop((P |Q) |R→⋄ R1), we have four cases:
∗ P |Q→⋄ R2, Prop(P |Q→⋄ R2), and R1 ≡ R2 |R. We have again four cases.
· P →⋄ R3, Prop(P →⋄ R3), and R2 ≡ R3 | Q. Then R0 ≡ R1 ≡ R2 | R ≡ (R3 | Q) | R ≡
R3 | (Q | R), so we are in Case 1.(a) of Prop(P0 →⋄ R0).
· Q→⋄ R3, Prop(Q→⋄ R3), and R2 ≡ P |R3. Then Q |R→⋄ R3 |R, Prop(Q |R→⋄ R3 |R),
and R0 ≡ R1 ≡ R2 |R ≡ (P |R3)|R ≡ P |(R3 |R), so we are in Case 1.(a’) of Prop(P0 →⋄ R0).
· P
N(x)
−−−→⋄ A, Q
νx.N〈x〉
−−−−−→⋄ B, and R2 ≡ νx.(A | B) for some A, B, x, and ground term N .
Then Q |R
νx.N〈x〉
−−−−−→⋄ B |R by Par
′, and R0 ≡ R1 ≡ R2 |R ≡ νx.(A |B) |R ≡ νx.(A | (B |R))
since x /∈ fv (R), so we are in Case 1.(b) of Prop(P0 →⋄ R0).
· P
νx.N〈x〉
−−−−−→⋄ A, Q
N(x)
−−−→⋄ B, and R2 ≡ νx.(A | B) for some A, B, x, and ground term N .
This case can be handled similarly to the previous one.
∗ R→⋄ R2, Prop(R→⋄ R2), and R1 ≡ (P |Q) |R2. Then Q |R→⋄ Q |R2, Prop(Q |R→⋄ Q |R2),
and R0 ≡ R1 ≡ (P |Q) | R2 ≡ P | (Q |R2), so we are in Case 1.(a’) of Prop(P0 →⋄ R0).
∗ P |Q
N(x)
−−−→⋄ A, R
νx.N〈x〉
−−−−−→⋄ B, and R1 ≡ νx.(A |B) for some A, B, x, and ground term N . By
Lemma B.18, either P
N(x)
−−−→⋄ A′ and A ≡ A′ |Q for some A′, or Q
N(x)
−−−→⋄ A′ and A ≡ P | A′
for some A′. In the first case, P
N(x)
−−−→⋄ A′, Q | R
νx.N〈x〉
−−−−−→⋄ Q | B by Par
′ and Struct′,
and R0 ≡ R1 ≡ νx.(A | B) ≡ νx.((A′ | Q) | B) ≡ νx.(A′ | (Q | B)), so we are in Case 1.(b) of
Prop(P0 →⋄ R0). In the second case, by Lemma B.20, Q | R →⋄ R2 and R2 ≡ νx.(A′ | B) for
some R2, Prop(Q |R→⋄ R2), and R0 ≡ R1 ≡ νx.(A |B) ≡ νx.((P |A
′) |B) ≡ P | νx.(A′ |B) ≡
P |R2 since x /∈ fv (P ). Hence, we are in Case 1.(a’) of Prop(P0 →⋄ R0).
∗ P | Q
νx.N〈x〉
−−−−−→⋄ A, R
N(x)
−−−→⋄ B, and R1 ≡ νx.(A | B) for some A, B, x, and ground term N .
This case can be handled similarly to the previous one.
– Case P0 = (P |Q) |R
⋄
≡ P | (Q |R). This case is similar to the previous one.
– Case P0 = P | Q
⋄
≡ Q | P . (This case is its own symmetric.) This case is immediate, since the
desired result is invariant by swapping P and Q.
– Case P0 = !P
⋄
≡ P | !P . Since Prop(P | !P →⋄ R1), we have four cases:
∗ P →⋄ P ′, Prop(P →⋄ P ′), and R1 ≡ P ′ | !P for some P ′. Hence P |P →⋄ P ′ |P , Prop(P |P →⋄
P ′ | P ), and R0 ≡ R1 ≡ P ′ | !P ≡ (P ′ | P ) | !P , so we are in Case 3 of Prop(P0 →⋄ R0).
∗ !P →⋄ P
′, Prop(!P →⋄ P
′), and R1 ≡ P | P
′ for some P ′. Since Prop(!P →⋄ P
′), we have
P | P →⋄ R2, Prop(P | P →⋄ R2), and P ′ ≡ R2 | !P . So P | P →⋄ R2, Prop(P | P →⋄ R2), and
R0 ≡ R1 ≡ P | P ′ ≡ P | (R2 | !P ) ≡ R2 | !P , so we are in Case 3 of Prop(P0 →⋄ R0).
∗ P
N(x)
−−−→⋄ A, !P
νx.N〈x〉
−−−−−→⋄ B, and R1 ≡ νx.(A | B) for some A, B, x, and ground term
N . By Lemma B.18, P
νx.N〈x〉
−−−−−→⋄ B′ and B ≡ B′ | !P for some B′. So by Lemma B.20,
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P | P →⋄ R2 and R2 ≡ νx.(A | B′) for some R2. So P | P →⋄ R2, Prop(P | P →⋄ R2), and
R0 ≡ R1 ≡ νx.(A | B) ≡ νx.(A | (B′ | !P )) ≡ νx.(A | B′) | !P ≡ R2 | !P since x /∈ fv (!P ). So we
are in Case 3 of Prop(P0 →⋄ R0).
∗ P
νx.N〈x〉
−−−−−→⋄ A, !P
N(x)
−−−→⋄ B, and R1 ≡ νx.(A |B) for some A, B, x, and ground term N . This
case can be handled similarly to the previous one.
– Case P0 = P | !P
⋄
≡ !P . Since Prop(!P →⋄ R1), we have P | P →⋄ R2, Prop(P | P →⋄ R2), and
R1 ≡ R2 | !P for some R2. Since Prop(P | P →⋄ R2), we have four cases, which reduce to two by
symmetry:
∗ P →⋄ P ′, Prop(P →⋄ P ′), and R2 ≡ P ′ |P for some P ′. Hence R0 ≡ R1 ≡ R2 |!P ≡ P ′ |P |!P ≡
P ′ | !P , so we are in Case 1.(a) of Prop(P0 →⋄ R0).
∗ P
N(x)
−−−→⋄ A, P
νx.N〈x〉
−−−−−→⋄ B, and R2 ≡ νx.(A |B) for some A, B, x, and ground term N . Hence
P
N(x)
−−−→⋄ A, !P
⋄
≡ P | !P
νx.N〈x〉
−−−−−→⋄ B | !P by Par
′ so !P
νx.N〈x〉
−−−−−→⋄ B | !P by Struct
′, and
R0 ≡ R1 ≡ R2 | !P ≡ νx.(A |B) | !P ≡ νx.(A | (B | !P )) since x /∈ fv(!P ). So we are in Case 1.(b)
of Prop(P0 →⋄ R0).
– Case P0 = νn.0
⋄
≡ 0. We have that Prop(0→⋄ R1) is impossible, so this case never happens.
– Case P0 = 0
⋄
≡ νn.0. Since Prop(νn.0→⋄ R1), we have Prop(0→⋄ R′1), which is impossible, so
this case never happens.
– Case P0 = νn.νn
′.P
⋄
≡ νn′.νn.P . (This case is its own symmetric.) Since Prop(νn′.νn.P →⋄
R1), we have νn.P →⋄ R′1, Prop(νn.P →⋄ R
′
1), and R1 ≡ νn
′.R′1 for some R
′
1, so P →⋄ R
′′
1 ,
Prop(P →⋄ R′′1 ), and R
′
1 ≡ νn.R
′′
1 for some R
′′
1 . Hence, νn
′.P →⋄ νn′.R′′1 , Prop(νn
′.P →⋄
νn′.R′′1 ), and R0 ≡ R1 ≡ νn
′.R′1 ≡ νn
′.νn.R′′1 ≡ νn.νn
′.R′′1 , so we are in Case 2 of Prop(P0 →⋄
R0) with Q
′ = νn′.R′′1 .
– Case P0 = P | νn.Q
⋄
≡ νn.(P | Q) and n /∈ fn(P ). Since Prop(νn.(P | Q) →⋄ R1), we have
P |Q →⋄ R2, Prop(P | Q →⋄ R2), and R1 ≡ νn.R2 for some R2. Since Prop(P | Q →⋄ R2), we
have four cases:
∗ P →⋄ P ′, Prop(P →⋄ P ′), and R2 ≡ P ′ |Q for some P ′. We rename n in Q so that n /∈ fn(P ′).
Hence P →⋄ P ′, Prop(P →⋄ P ′), and R0 ≡ R1 ≡ νn.R2 ≡ νn.(P ′ | Q) ≡ P ′ | νn.Q since
n /∈ fn(P ′). So we are in Case 1.(a) of Prop(P0 →⋄ R0).
∗ Q→⋄ Q′, Prop(Q→⋄ Q′), and R2 ≡ P |Q′ for some Q′. Then νn.Q→⋄ νn.Q′, Prop(νn.Q→⋄
νn.Q′), and R0 ≡ R1 ≡ νn.R2 ≡ νn.(P | Q′) ≡ P | νn.Q′ since n /∈ fn(P ). So we are in
Case 1.(a’) of Prop(P0 →⋄ R0).
∗ P
N(x)
−−−→⋄ A, Q
νx.N〈x〉
−−−−−→⋄ B, and R2 ≡ νx.(A | B) for some A, B, x, and ground term N .
We need to rename n so that n /∈ fn(N)∪fn(A). To do that, we first show that, for all processes
P , P ′, if P
⋄
≡ P ′ and Σ ⊢ P{n
′
/n} = P , then Σ ⊢ P ′{n
′
/n} = P ′, by induction on the derivation
of P
⋄
≡ P ′.
We also show that, if A ≡ A′, then A{n
′
/n} ≡ A′{n
′
/n}, by induction on the derivation of
A ≡ A′.
By Lemma B.10, since P
N(x)
−−−→⋄ A, we have P
⋄
≡ νn˜.(N(y).P1 |P2), A ≡ νn˜.(P1{x/y} |P2), and
{n˜}∩ fn(N) = ∅, for some n˜, P1, P2, y, and since Q
νx.N〈x〉
−−−−−→⋄ B, we have Q
⋄
≡ νn˜′.(N〈M〉.Q1 |
Q2), A ≡ νn˜′.(Q1 | {M/x} |Q2), {n˜′} ∩ fn(N) = ∅, and x /∈ fv(N〈M〉.Q1 |Q2), for some n˜′, Q1,
Q2, M . Let n
′ be a fresh name.
· First case: n /∈ n˜. We have P{n
′
/n} = P since n /∈ fn(P ), so by the result shown
above, Σ ⊢ (νn˜.(N(y).P1 | P2)){n
′
/n} = νn˜.(N(y).P1 | P2), so Σ ⊢ N{n
′
/n} = N , P
⋄
≡
νn˜.(N{n
′
/n}(y).P1{n
′
/n} | P2{n
′
/n}), A{n
′
/n} ≡ νn˜.(P1{n
′
/n}{x/y} |P2{n
′
/n}), and fn(N{n
′
/n})
∩ {n˜} = ∅, so by Lemma B.10, P
N{n
′
/n}(x)
−−−−−−−→⋄ A{
n′/n}.
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· Second case: n ∈ n˜, so n /∈ fn(N). We have N{n
′
/n} = N . So P
⋄
≡ νn˜.(N{n
′
/n}(y).P1} | P2),
A{n
′
/n} ≡ νn˜.(P1{x/y} | P2), and {n˜} ∩ fn(N{n
′
/n}) = ∅, so by Lemma B.10, P
N{n
′
/n}(x)
−−−−−−−→⋄
A{n
′
/n}.
Let N ′ = N{n
′
/n} and A′ = A{n
′
/n}. Hence in both cases, P
N ′(x)
−−−−→⋄ A′ and Σ ⊢ N ′ = N , so
Q
⋄
≡ νn˜′.(N ′〈M〉.Q1 |Q2), A ≡ νn˜′.(Q1 | {M/x} |Q2), {n˜′}∩ fn(N ′) = ∅, and x /∈ fv (N ′〈M〉.Q1 |
Q2), so by Lemma B.10, Q
νx.N ′〈x〉
−−−−−−→⋄ B. Hence P
N ′(x)
−−−−→⋄ A′, νn.Q
νx.N ′〈x〉
−−−−−−→⋄ νn.B by
Scope
′, and R0 ≡ R1 ≡ νn.R2 ≡ νn.νx.(A′ | B) ≡ νx.(A′ | νn.B), so we are in Case 1.(b) of
Prop(P0 →⋄ R0).
∗ P
νx.N〈x〉
−−−−−→⋄ A, Q
N(x)
−−−→⋄ B, and R2 ≡ νx.(A | B) for some A, B, x, and ground term N . This
case can be handled similarly to the previous one.
– Case P0 = νn.(P |Q)
⋄
≡ P | νn.Q and n /∈ fn(P ). This case is fairly similar to the previous one.
– Case P0 = P1{M/x}
⋄
≡ P1{N/x} and Σ ⊢ M = N . (This case is its own symmetric.) We have
Prop(P1{N/x} →⋄ R1). We show by induction on the syntax of P1 that, if Prop(P1{N/x} →⋄ R1),
Σ ⊢M = N , and R0 ≡ R1, then Prop(P1{M/x} →⋄ R0).
∗ Case P1 = P |Q. We have Prop(P{N/x} |Q{N/x} →⋄ R1), so we have four cases:
· P{N/x} →⋄ P
′, Prop(P{N/x} →⋄ P
′), and R1 ≡ P
′|Q{N/x} for some P
′. We have P{M/x} →⋄
P ′, Prop(P{M/x} →⋄ P ′) by induction hypothesis, and R0 ≡ R1 ≡ P ′ |Q{N/x}, so we are in
Case 1.(a) of Prop(P{M/x} |Q{M/x} →⋄ R0).
· Q{N/x} →⋄ Q′, Prop(Q{N/x} →⋄ Q′), and R1 ≡ P{N/x} | Q′ for some Q′. This case is
obtained from the previous one by swapping P and Q.
· P{N/x}
N ′(x)
−−−−→⋄ A, Q{N/x}
νx.N ′〈x〉
−−−−−−→⋄ B, and R1 ≡ νx.(A | B) for some A, B, x, and ground
term N ′. Then P{M/x}
N ′(x)
−−−−→⋄ A, Q{M/x}
νx.N ′〈x〉
−−−−−−→⋄ B by Struct
′, and R1 ≡ νx.(A | B),
so R0 ≡ R1 ≡ νx.(A |B). So we are in Case 1.(b) of Prop(P{M/x} |Q{M/x} →⋄ R0).
· P{N/x}
νx.N ′〈x〉
−−−−−−→⋄ A, Q{N/x}
N ′(x)
−−−−→⋄ B, and R1 ≡ νx.(A | B) for some A, B, x, and ground
term N ′. This case is obtained from the previous one by swapping P and Q.
∗ Case P1 = νn.P . We have Prop(νn.P{
N/x} →⋄ R1), so P{
N/x} →⋄ R2, Prop(P{
N/x} →⋄ R2),
and R1 ≡ νn.R2 for some R2. Hence P1{M/x} = νn.P{M/x}, P{M/x}
⋄
≡ P{N/x} →⋄ R2,
Prop(P{M/x} →⋄ R2) by induction hypothesis, and R0 ≡ R1 ≡ νn.R2, so we are in Case 2 of
Prop(P1{M/x} →⋄ R0).
∗ Case P1 = !P . We have Prop(!P{N/x} →⋄ R1), so P{N/x} | P{N/x} →⋄ R2, Prop(P{N/x} |
P{N/x} →⋄ R2), and R1 ≡ R2 | !P{N/x} for some R2. Since Prop(P{N/x} | P{N/x} →⋄ R2), we
have four cases, which reduce to two by symmetry:
· P{N/x} →⋄ P ′, Prop(P{N/x} →⋄ P ′), and R2 ≡ P ′|P{N/x} for some P ′. We have P{M/x} →⋄
P ′, Prop(P{M/x} →⋄ P
′) by induction hypothesis, so P{M/x} | P{
M/x} →⋄ P
′ | P{M/x} and
R0 ≡ R1 ≡ R2 | !P{N/x} ≡ P ′ |P{N/x} | !P{N/x} ≡ P ′ |P{M/x} | !P{M/x}, so we are in Case 3
of Prop(!P{M/x} →⋄ R0).
· P{N/x}
N ′(x)
−−−−→⋄ A, P{N/x}
νx.N ′〈x〉
−−−−−−→⋄ B, and R2 ≡ νx.(A | B) for some A, B, x, and
ground term N ′. Hence P{M/x}
N ′(x)
−−−−→⋄ A, P{
M/x}
νx.N ′〈x〉
−−−−−−→⋄ B by Struct
′, and R0 ≡
R1 ≡ R2 | !P{N/x} ≡ νx.(A | B) | !P{N/x}. By Lemma B.20, P{M/x} | P{M/x} →⋄ R3 and
R3 ≡ νx.(A | B), so Prop(P{M/x} | P{M/x} →⋄ R3), and R0 ≡ R3 | !P{M/x}, so we are in
Case 3 of Prop(!P{M/x} →⋄ R0).
∗ Case P1 = if M1 = N1 then P else Q. We have Prop(if M1{N/x} = N1{N/x} then P{N/x}
else Q{N/x} →⋄ R1), so we have two cases:
· Σ ⊢ M1{N/x} = N1{N/x} and R1 ≡ P{N/x}. Hence, we have Σ ⊢ M1{M/x} = N1{M/x} and
R0 ≡ R1 ≡ P{M/x}, so we are in Case 4 of Prop(P1{M/x} →⋄ R0).
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· Σ ⊢ M1{N/x} 6= N1{N/x} and R1 ≡ Q{N/x}. Hence, we have Σ ⊢ M1{M/x} 6= N1{M/x} and
R0 ≡ R1 ≡ Q{M/x}, so we are in Case 4 of Prop(P1{M/x} →⋄ R0).
Using this result, we obtain Prop(P0 →⋄ R0).
– Case P0 = P |Q
⋄
≡ P ′ |Q knowing P
⋄
≡ P ′. Since Prop(P ′ |Q→⋄ R1), we have four cases:
∗ P ′ →⋄ P ′′, Prop(P ′ →⋄ P ′′), and R1 ≡ P ′′ |Q for some P ′′. Then P →⋄ P ′′, Prop(P →⋄ P ′′)
by induction hypothesis, and R0 ≡ R1 ≡ P ′′ |Q, so we are in Case 1.(a) of Prop(P0 →⋄ R0).
∗ Q →⋄ Q′, Prop(Q →⋄ Q′), and R1 ≡ P ′ | Q′ for some Q′. Then Q →⋄ Q′, Prop(Q →⋄ Q′),
and R0 ≡ R1 ≡ P ′ |Q′, so we are in Case 1.(a’) of Prop(P0 →⋄ R0).
∗ P ′
N(x)
−−−→⋄ A, Q
νx.N〈x〉
−−−−−→⋄ B, and R1 ≡ νx.(A |B) for some A, B, x, and ground term N . Then
P
N(x)
−−−→⋄ A by Struct
′, Q
νx.N〈x〉
−−−−−→⋄ B, and R0 ≡ R1 ≡ νx.(A |B), so we are in Case 1.(b) of
Prop(P0 →⋄ R0).
∗ P ′
νx.N〈x〉
−−−−−→⋄ A, Q
N(x)
−−−→⋄ B, and R1 ≡ νx.(A |B) for some A, B, x, and ground term N . This
case can be handled similarly to the previous one.
– Case P0 = νn.P
⋄
≡ νn.P ′ knowing P
⋄
≡ P ′. Since Prop(νn.P ′ →⋄ R1), P ′ →⋄ R′1, Prop(P
′ →⋄
R′1), and R1 ≡ νn.R
′
1 for some R
′
1. Then, P →⋄ R
′
1. By induction hypothesis, Prop(P →⋄ R
′
1).
Moreover, R0 ≡ R1 ≡ νn.R′1, so we are in Case 2 of Prop(P0 →⋄ R0).
If P0 is closed and P0 →⋄ R0, then by Lemma B.17(1), there exists a derivation of P0 →⋄ R0 closed
on the left. So by applying the previous result, Prop(P0 →⋄ R0), which yields the desired property.
Lemma B.22 If νn˜.(σ | P ) is a closed normal process and νn˜.(σ | P ) →◦ A, then P →⋄ P ′ and
A ≡ νn˜.(σ | P ′) for some P ′.
Proof: We proceed similarly to Lemma B.19. By Lemma B.17(2), we consider a derivation of
νn˜.(σ | P )→◦ A closed on the left. By definition of →◦, we have νn˜.(σ | P )
◦
≡ νn˜′.(σ′ | P ′), P ′ →⋄ Q′
and A
◦
≡ νn˜′.(σ′ |Q′) for some n˜′, σ′, P ′, Q′. We proceed by induction on the derivation of νn˜.(σ |P )
◦
≡
νn˜′.(σ′ | P ′).
• Base case: νn˜.(σ | P ) = νn˜′.(σ′ | P ′), and the desired result holds.
• Transitivity: the result is proved by applying the induction hypothesis twice.
• Case Plain′′: P
⋄
≡ P ′ →⋄ Q′ and A ≡ νn˜.(σ |Q′), so the result holds.
• Case New-C′′: n˜′ is a reordering of n˜, νn˜.(σ | P )
◦
≡ νn˜′.(σ | P ), P →⋄ Q
′ and A ≡ νn˜′.(σ |Q′), so
P →⋄ Q′ and A ≡ νn˜′.(σ |Q′) ≡ νn˜.(σ |Q′), hence the result holds.
• Case New-Par′′: P = νn′.P ′, νn˜.(σ | νn′.P ′)
◦
≡ νn˜, n′.(σ | P ′), P ′ →⋄ Q′, and A ≡ νn˜, n′.(σ | Q′)
where n′ /∈ fn(σ). Therefore, P = νn′.P ′ →⋄ νn′.Q′ and by New-Par, A ≡ νn˜, n′.(σ | Q′) ≡
νn˜.(σ | νn′.Q′), hence the result holds.
• Case New-Par′′ reversed: νn˜, n′.(σ | P )
◦
≡ νn˜.(σ | νn′.P ), νn′.P →⋄ Q′ and A ≡ νn˜.(σ |Q′) where
n′ /∈ fn(σ). By Lemma B.21, P →⋄ Q′′ and Q′ ≡ νn′.Q′′ for some Q′′. Hence, P →⋄ Q′′ and
A ≡ νn˜.(σ |Q′) ≡ νn˜.(σ | νn′.Q′′) ≡ νn˜, n′.(σ |Q′′) by New-Par, so the result holds.
• Case Rewrite′′: νn˜.(σ | P )
◦
≡ νn˜.(σ′ | P ), P →⋄ Q and A ≡ νn˜.(σ′ |Q) where dom(σ) = dom(σ′),
Σ ⊢ σx = σ′x for all x ∈ dom(σ), and (fv (σx) ∪ fv (σ′x)) ∩ dom(σ) = ∅ for all x ∈ dom(σ). Hence
P →⋄ Q and A ≡ νn˜.(σ′ |Q) ≡ νn˜.(σ |Q) by several applications of Rewrite, so the result holds.
We prove the following strengthened version of Lemma B.22, in which the process P ′ is guaranteed
to be closed.
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Lemma B.23 If νn˜.(σ | P ) is a closed normal process and νn˜.(σ | P ) →◦ A, then P →⋄ P ′ and
A ≡ νn˜.(σ | P ′) for some closed process P ′.
Proof: By Lemma B.22, we get the existence of a process P ′, which may not be closed. Let us
apply Lemma B.16(2). Let Y = fv(P )∪ fv(P ′) = fv(P ′). Let σ′ be a substitution from Y to pairwise
distinct fresh names. Since P is closed, P = Pσ′, so a fortiori Σ ⊢ P = Pσ′. Hence Pσ′ →⋄ P ′σ′ and
Σ ⊢ P ′ = P ′σ′. So P →⋄ P ′σ′ and A ≡ νn˜.(σ | P ′) ≡ νn˜.(σ | P ′σ′), so we get the desired result by
using the closed process P ′σ′ instead of P ′.
The following strengthened version of Lemma B.21 is proved in a similar way.
Lemma B.24 Suppose that P0 is a closed process and P0 →⋄ R. Then one of the following cases
holds:
1. P0 = P |Q for some P and Q, and one of the following cases holds:
(a) P →⋄ P ′ and R ≡ P ′ |Q for some closed process P ′,
(b) P
N(x)
−−−→⋄ A, Q
νx.N〈x〉
−−−−−→⋄ B, and R ≡ νx.(A | B) for some A, B, x, and ground term N ,
and two symmetric cases obtained by swapping P and Q;
2. P0 = νn.P , P →⋄ Q′, and R ≡ νn.Q′ for some n and some closed processes P and Q′;
3. P0 = !P , P | P →⋄ Q′, and R ≡ Q′ | !P for some closed processes P and Q′.
4. P0 = if M = N then P else Q and either Σ ⊢M = N and R ≡ P , or Σ ⊢M 6= N and R ≡ Q,
for some M , N , P , and Q.
C Proof of Theorem 4.1: Main Lemmas
Relying on partial normal forms and their semantics, we prove the remaining lemmas needed for the
proof of Theorem 4.1. Sections C.2 and C.3 establish the two directions of Theorem 4.1. The argument
for the first direction employs lemmas about consequences of static equivalences; these lemmas are in
Section C.1.
C.1 Exploiting Static Equivalence
The lemmas in this section rely on static equivalences in order to analyze and to establish structural
equivalences or reductions. For all these lemmas, we consider the action of two equivalent frames
νn˜.σ ≈s νn˜′.σ′ on a process P ′ such that fn(P ′)∩ {n˜, n˜′} = ∅: we suppose a structural equivalence or
reduction of a process P such that Σ ⊢ P ′σ = P , and prove a corresponding structural equivalence or
reduction of the process P ′σ′. Lemma C.1 deals with structural equivalence, Lemma C.2 with internal
reduction, and Lemma C.3 with labelled transitions.
Lemma C.1 Suppose that νn˜.σ ≈s νn˜′.σ′, fn(P ′) ∩ {n˜, n˜′} = ∅, and Σ ⊢ P ′σ = P . If P
⋄
≡ Q, then
P ′σ′
⋄
≡ Q′σ′ for some Q′ such that fn(Q′) ∩ {n˜, n˜′} = ∅; Σ ⊢ Q = Q′σ; and, (*) if σ, σ′, and P ′σ are
closed, then Q′σ is closed.
Proof: We first prove the lemma without property (*), by induction on the derivation of P
⋄
≡ Q.
The only rule that depends on terms is Rewrite′, and when P
⋄
≡ Q by Rewrite′, Σ ⊢ P ′σ = P = Q,
so taking Q′ = P ′, we have P ′σ′
⋄
≡ Q′σ′, fn(Q′) ∩ {n˜, n˜′} = ∅, and Σ ⊢ Q = Q′σ. For all other base
cases, the structural equivalence rule applied in P
⋄
≡ Q also applies to P ′ and yields a process Q′ such
that P ′
⋄
≡ Q′, fn(Q′) ∩ {n˜, n˜′} = ∅, and Σ ⊢ Q = Q′σ; by Lemma B.3(1) we conclude P ′σ′
⋄
≡ Q′σ′.
The case of transitivity is proved by applying the induction hypothesis twice.
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We now prove the lemma with property (*) by applying Lemma B.16(1) to the structural equiv-
alence P ′σ′
⋄
≡ Q′σ′ for the process Q′ obtained above. Let Y = fv (P ′σ) ∪ fv (Q′σ) = fv(Q′σ) =
fv (Q′) \ dom(σ) and let σ′′ map Y to pairwise distinct fresh names. We have P ′σσ′′ = P ′σ so a
fortiori Σ ⊢ P ′σ = P ′σσ′′, then by Lemma B.16(1) P ′σσ′′
⋄
≡ Q′σσ′′ and Σ ⊢ Q′σ = Q′σσ′′. So
Σ ⊢ Q = Q′σ = (Q′σ′′)σ. Since P ′σ′
⋄
≡ Q′σ′, we have P ′σ′ = P ′σ′σ′′
⋄
≡ Q′σ′σ′′ = (Q′σ′′)σ′. Since
fn(Q′)∩{n˜, n˜′} = ∅, we have fn(Q′σ′′)∩ {n˜, n˜′} = ∅. We also have fv (Q′σ′′) ⊆ dom(σ) = dom(σ′), so
we get the desired result by using Q′σ′′ instead of Q′.
Lemma C.2 Suppose that νn˜.σ ≈s νn˜
′.σ′, fn(P ′) ∩ {n˜, n˜′} = ∅, and Σ ⊢ P ′σ = P . If P →⋄ Q, then
P ′σ′ →⋄ Q′σ′ for some Q′ such that fn(Q′) ∩ {n˜, n˜′} = ∅; Σ ⊢ Q = Q′σ; and, (*) if σ, σ′, and P ′σ
are closed, then Q′σ is closed.
Proof: We first prove the lemma without property (*), by induction on the derivation of P →⋄ Q.
• Case Comm′. We have P = N〈M〉.P0 | N(x).Q0 →⋄ P0 | Q0{M/x} = Q. We rename x so that
x /∈ dom(σ′). Therefore, P ′ = N ′〈M ′〉.P ′0 | N
′′(x).Q′0 for some N
′, M ′, P ′0, N
′′, Q′0 such that
Σ ⊢ N ′σ = N ′′σ = N , Σ ⊢ M ′σ =M , Σ ⊢ P ′0σ = P0, and Σ ⊢ Q
′
0σ = Q0. Let Q
′ = P ′0 |Q
′
0{
M ′/x}.
We have
P ′σ′ = N ′σ′〈M ′σ′〉.P ′0σ
′ |N ′′σ′(x).Q′0σ
′
≡ N ′σ′〈M ′σ′〉.P ′0σ
′ |N ′σ′(x).Q′0σ
′
→⋄ P
′
0σ
′ |Q′0σ
′{M
′σ′/x} = Q
′σ′
since Σ ⊢ N ′σ′ = N ′′σ′ because Σ ⊢ N ′σ = N ′′σ, (fn(N ′) ∪ fn(N ′′)) ∩ {n˜, n˜′} = ∅, and νn˜.σ ≈s
νn˜′.σ′. Moreover, fn(Q′) ∩ {n˜, n˜′} = ∅, and Σ ⊢ Q = P0 |Q0{
M/x} = P
′
0σ |Q
′
0σ{
M ′σ/x} = Q
′σ.
• The cases Then′ and Else′ are similar: the equalities that trigger reductions happen both in P
and in P ′σ.
• The case in which we apply
⋄
≡ holds by Lemma C.1 and induction hypothesis.
• Case in which we apply a context. The reduction P = E[P0] →⋄ Q = E[Q0] is derived from
P0 →⋄ Q0. If E contains a restriction νn. above the hole, we rename n so that n /∈ {n˜, n˜′}. Hence
P ′ = E′[P ′0] with Σ ⊢ E
′σ = E, Σ ⊢ P ′0σ = P0, and fn(P
′
0) ∩ {n˜, n˜
′} = ∅. By induction hypothesis,
P ′0σ
′ →⋄ Q′0σ
′, fn(Q′0) ∩ {n˜, n˜
′} = ∅, and Σ ⊢ Q0 = Q′0σ for some Q
′
0. Let Q
′ = E′[Q′0]. Then
P ′σ′ = E′σ′[P ′0σ
′] →⋄ E′σ′[Q′0σ
′] = Q′σ′, fn(Q′) ∩ {n˜, n˜′} = ∅, and Σ ⊢ Q = E[Q0] = E′σ[Q′0σ] =
Q′σ.
We now prove the lemma with property (*) by applying Lemma B.16(2) to the reduction P ′σ →⋄ Q′σ
for the process Q′ obtained above. Let Y = fv (P ′σ) ∪ fv(Q′σ) = fv(Q′σ) = fv (Q′) \ dom(σ) and let
σ′′ map Y to pairwise distinct fresh names. We have P ′σσ′′ = P ′σ so a fortiori Σ ⊢ P ′σ = P ′σσ′′,
then by Lemma B.16(2), P ′σσ′′ →⋄ Q′σσ′′ and Σ ⊢ Q′σ = Q′σσ′′. So Σ ⊢ Q = Q′σ = (Q′σ′′)σ. Since
P ′σ′ →⋄ Q′σ′, we have P ′σ′ = P ′σ′σ′′ →⋄ Q′σ′σ′′ = (Q′σ′′)σ′. Since fn(Q′) ∩ {n˜, n˜′} = ∅, we have
fn(Q′σ′′) ∩ {n˜, n˜′} = ∅. We also have fv(Q′σ′′) ⊆ dom(σ) = dom(σ′), so we get the desired result by
using Q′σ′′ instead of Q′.
Lemma C.3 gives two variants of the same result: if νn˜.σ ≈s νn˜′.σ′ and P such that Σ ⊢ P ′σ = P
has a labelled transition, then P ′σ′ has a corresponding labelled transition. The two variants differ
by the closure assumptions and conclusions.
Lemma C.3 Suppose that νn˜.σ ≈s νn˜′.σ′, fn(P ′) ∩ {n˜, n˜′} = ∅, Σ ⊢ P ′σ = P , P
α
−→⋄ A, and σ, σ′,
and P ′σ are closed.
1. If α is an output or α = N(M) with some M ′ such that Σ ⊢ M ′σ = M , M ′σ is closed, and
fn(M ′)∩{n˜, n˜′} = ∅; then P ′σ′
α′σ′
−−−→⋄ A′σ′, fn(A′)∩{n˜, n˜′} = ∅, A ≡ A′σ, fn(α′)∩{n˜, n˜′} = ∅,
Σ ⊢ α = α′σ, and A′σ is closed for some A′, α′.
55
2. If α = N(x) and x /∈ dom(σ), then P ′σ′
N ′σ′(x)
−−−−−→⋄ A′σ′, fn(A′) ∩ {n˜, n˜′} = ∅, A ≡ A′σ,
fn(N ′)∩{n˜, n˜′} = ∅, Σ ⊢ N = N ′σ, fv (A′) ⊆ dom(σ)∪{x}, and fv (N ′) ⊆ dom(σ) for some A′,
N ′.
Proof: Property 1: By induction on the derivation of P
α
−→⋄ A.
• Case In′. We have P = N(x).P0
N(M)
−−−−→⋄ P0{M/x} = A and there exists M ′ such that Σ ⊢
M ′σ = M and fn(M ′) ∩ {n˜, n˜′} = ∅. We rename x so that x /∈ dom(σ). So P ′ = N ′(x).P ′0 with
Σ ⊢ N = N ′σ and Σ ⊢ P0 = P ′0σ. Let A
′ = P ′0{
M ′/x} and α′ = N ′(M ′). Then we have P ′σ′ =
N ′σ′(x).P ′0σ
′ N
′σ′(M ′σ′)
−−−−−−−→⋄ P ′0σ
′{M
′σ′/x} = A′σ′, fn(A′) ∩ {n˜, n˜′} = ∅, Σ ⊢ A = P ′0σ{
M ′σ/x} = A′σ,
fn(α′) ∩ {n˜, n˜′} = ∅, and Σ ⊢ α = α′σ. Since P ′σ is closed, fv(P ′0) ⊆ dom(σ) ∪ {x}; moreover M
′σ
is closed, so A′σ is closed.
• Case Out-Var′. We have P = N〈M〉.P0
νx.N〈x〉
−−−−−→⋄ P0 | {M/x} = A with x /∈ fv(N 〈M〉.P0). So
P ′ = N ′〈M ′〉.P ′0 with Σ ⊢ N = N
′σ, Σ ⊢ M = M ′σ, and Σ ⊢ P0 = P ′0σ. Let A
′ = P ′0 | {
M ′/x}
and α′ = νx.N ′〈x〉. We have P ′σ′ = N ′σ′〈M ′σ′〉.P ′0σ
′ νx.N
′σ′〈x〉
−−−−−−−→⋄ P ′0σ
′ | {M
′σ′/x} = A′σ′, fn(A′) ∩
{n˜, n˜′} = ∅, Σ ⊢ A = P ′0σ | {
M ′σ/x} = A′σ, fn(α′) ∩ {n˜, n˜′} = ∅, and Σ ⊢ α = α′σ. Since P ′σ is
closed, P ′0σ is closed; moreover M
′σ is closed, so A′σ is closed.
• Case Scope′. The transition P = νn.P0
α
−→⋄ νn.A0 = A is derived from P0
α
−→⋄ A0, where n does
not occur in α. We rename n so that n /∈ {n˜, n˜′} and n /∈ fn(σ) ∪ fn(σ′). We have P ′ = νn.P ′0
for some P ′0, so Σ ⊢ P
′
0σ = P0 and P
′
0σ is closed. By induction hypothesis, P
′
0σ
′ α
′σ′
−−−→⋄ A′0σ
′,
fn(A′0) ∩ {n˜, n˜
′} = ∅, Σ ⊢ A0 = A
′
0σ, fn(α
′) ∩ {n˜, n˜′} = ∅, Σ ⊢ α = α′σ, and A′0σ is closed for some
A′0, α
′. Let A′ = νn.A′0. Then P
′σ′
α′σ′
−−−→⋄ A′σ′ by Scope
′, so we have the desired result.
• Case Par′. The transition P = P0 | Q0
α
−→⋄ A0 | Q0 = A is derived from P0
α
−→⋄ A0, where
bv(α) ∩ fv(Q0) = ∅. We have P ′ = P ′0 | Q
′
0 for some P
′
0, Q
′
0, so Σ ⊢ P
′
0σ = P0, Σ ⊢ Q
′
0σ = Q0,
and P ′0σ and Q
′
0σ are closed. By induction hypothesis, P
′
0σ
′ α
′σ′
−−−→⋄ A′0σ
′, fn(A′0) ∩ {n˜, n˜
′} = ∅,
Σ ⊢ A0 = A′0σ, fn(α
′) ∩ {n˜, n˜′} = ∅, Σ ⊢ α = α′σ, and A′0σ is closed for some A
′
0, α
′. Let
A′ = A′0 | Q
′
0. Then P
′σ′
α′σ′
−−−→⋄ A′σ′ by Par
′, since fv (Q′0σ
′) = ∅. Since P ′σ is closed, Q′0σ is
closed, so A′σ is closed. Therefore, we have the desired result.
• Case Struct′ follows by Lemma C.1 and induction hypothesis.
Property 2: By Lemma B.10, P
⋄
≡ νn˜′′.(N(y).P1 | P2), A ≡ νn˜′′.(P1{x/y} | P2), and {n˜′′} ∩ fn(N) = ∅,
for some n˜′′, P1, P2, N , y. We rename n˜
′′ so that {n˜′′}∩ (fn(σ)∪ fn(σ′)) = ∅, and we rename y so that
y /∈ dom(σ). By Lemma C.1, P ′σ′
⋄
≡ Q′σ′, fn(Q′) ∩ {n˜, n˜′} = ∅, and Σ ⊢ νn˜′′.(N(y).P1 | P2) = Q′σ
for some Q′ such that Q′σ is closed, so fv (Q′) ⊆ dom(σ) = dom(σ′). Hence, Q′ is of the form Q′ =
νn˜′′.(N ′(y).P ′1 | P
′
2) with Σ ⊢ N = N
′σ, Σ ⊢ P1 = P ′1σ, and Σ ⊢ P2 = P
′
2σ. Hence, by Lemma B.10,
P ′σ′
⋄
≡ Q′σ′ = νn˜′′.(N ′σ′(y).P ′1σ
′ |P ′2σ
′)
N ′σ′(x)
−−−−−→⋄ νn˜′′.(P ′1σ
′{x/y} |P ′2σ
′). Let A′ = νn˜′′.(P ′1{
x/y} |P ′2).
Then P ′σ′
N ′σ′(x)
−−−−−→⋄ A′σ′, fn(A′) ∩ {n˜, n˜′} = ∅ and fn(N ′) ∩ {n˜, n˜′} = ∅ because fn(Q′) ∩ {n˜, n˜′} = ∅,
A ≡ νn˜′′.(P1{x/y} | P2) ≡ νn˜′′.(P ′1σ{
x/y} | P ′2σ) ≡ A
′σ, Σ ⊢ N = N ′σ, and fv(A′) ⊆ dom(σ) ∪ {x} and
fv (N ′) ⊆ dom(σ) = dom(σ′) because fv (Q′) ⊆ dom(σ) = dom(σ′).
C.2 Labelled Bisimilarity Implies Observational Equivalence
The goal of this section is to establish the lemmas needed in the outline of the argument that labelled
bisimilarity implies observational equivalence in Section 4.5.
Lemma C.4 Let A and B be two extended processes. Let σ be a bijective renaming (a substitution
that is a bijection from names to names). We have:
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• A ≡ B if and only if Aσ ≡ Bσ,
• A→ B if and only if Aσ → Bσ,
• A
α
−→ B if and only if Aσ
ασ
−−→ Bσ.
Let A′, B′, and α′ be obtained from A, B, and α, respectively, by replacing all variables (including
their occurrences in domains of active substitutions) with distinct variables. We have:
• A ≡ B if and only if A′ ≡ B′,
• A→ B if and only if A′ → B′,
• A
α
−→ B if and only if A′
α′
−→ B′.
Proof: The implications from left to right are proved by induction on the derivations. We use that
the equational theory is closed under renaming of names and variables. The same argument also
proves the converse implications, via the inverse renaming.
Lemma C.5 Let A and B be two closed extended processes.
• Let σ be a bijective renaming. We have A ≈l B if and only if Aσ ≈l Bσ.
• Let A′ and B′ be obtained from A and B, respectively, by replacing all variables (including their
occurrences in domains of active substitutions) with distinct variables. We have A ≈l B if and only
if A′ ≈l B′.
Proof: To prove the first point, we define a relation R by A′ R B′ if and only if A′ = Aσ, B′ = Bσ,
and A ≈l B for some A and B. We show that R satisfies the three properties of Definition 4.4. Then
R ⊆ ≈l, so if A ≈l B, then A′ = Aσ ≈l B′ = Bσ.
1. Property 1 comes from Lemma A.2.
2. If A′ R B′, A′ → A′1, and A
′
1 is closed, then by Lemma C.4, A = A
′σ−1 → A′1σ
−1. We let
A′′ = A′1σ
−1, which is also closed. So by definition of ≈l, B →∗ B′′ and A′′ ≈l B′′ for some B′′.
By Lemma C.4, B′ = Bσ →∗ B′′σ. We let B′1 = B
′′σ. We have A′1 R B
′
1 and B
′ →∗ B′1. So
Property 2 holds.
3. The proof of Property 3 is similar to the proof of Property 2.
The same argument also proves the converse, via the inverse renaming.
The proof of the second point is similar.
Lemma 4.10 ≈l is closed by application of closing evaluation contexts.
Proof: Let A and B be two closed extended processes such that A ≈l B, and E be an evaluation
context closing for A and B. Our goal is to show that E[A] ≈l E[B]. We first rename the free names
and variables of E by Lemma C.5, so that the obtained context is simple. Then by Lemma A.1, we
construct a context E′ of the form νu˜.( | C′′) such that E ≡ E′. Since ≈l is invariant by structural
equivalence, it is sufficient to show that E′[A] ≈l E
′[B]. Hence, it is sufficient to consider evaluation
contexts of the form νu˜.( | C), such that νu˜.(A | C) and νu˜.(B | C) are closed.
To every relation R on closed extended processes, we associate the relation R′ = {(νu˜.(A |
C), νu˜.(B | C)) | A R B, νu˜.( | C) closing for A and B}. We prove that, if R is a labelled bisim-
ulation, then R′ is a labelled bisimulation up to ≡, hence R ⊆ ≡R′≡ ⊆ ≈l. For R = ≈l, this
establishes that ≈l is closed by application of evaluation contexts νu˜.( | C).
Assume S R′ T , with S = νu˜.(A | C), T = νu˜.(B | C), and A R B. Let pnf(A) = νn˜.(σ | P ),
pnf(B) = νn˜′.(σ′ |P ′), pnf(C) = νn˜′′.(σ′′ |P ′′), u˜ consist of names n˜′′′ and variables x˜. We suppose that
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A or C is not a plain process. (The case in which A and C are plain processes is simpler.) Since A R B,
we have dom(A) = dom(B), so we also have that B or C is not a plain process. We rename n˜, n˜′, and
n˜′′ so that they are disjoint, the names of n˜ and of n˜′ are not free in σ′′ |P ′′, and the names of n˜′′ are
not free in σ |P nor in σ′ |P ′. Since A is closed, by Lemma B.2, pnf(A) is closed, so P and the image of
σ have no free variables, so they are not modified by σ′′. Similarly, P ′ and the image of σ′ have no free
variables, so they are not modified by σ′′. Hence pnf(S) = νn˜′′′, n˜, n˜′′.((σ | σ′′σ)|dom(σ|σ′′σ)\{x˜}|P |P
′′σ)
and pnf(T ) = νn˜′′′, n˜′, n˜′′.((σ′ | σ′′σ′)|dom(σ′|σ′′σ′)\{x˜} | P
′ | P ′′σ′).
We argue that R′ satisfies the three properties of a labelled bisimulation up to ≡ (Definition 4.6).
The proof of the first property is trivial; those of the last two properties (given in more detail below)
go as follows. From a (labelled or internal) reduction of S, we infer a reduction of pnf(S), hence
a reduction of P | P ′′σ by a decomposition lemma (Lemma B.19 or B.22), hence reductions of P
and/or P ′′σ by another decomposition lemma (Lemma B.18 or B.24). From a reduction of P , we
infer a reduction of A, hence a reduction of B since R is labelled bisimulation, so a reduction of P ′
by a decomposition lemma. From a reduction of P ′′σ, we infer a reduction of P ′′σ′ using the static
equivalence A ≈s B, which means that νn.σ ≈s νn′.σ′. Therefore, in all cases, we obtain a reduction
of P ′ | P ′′σ′, hence a reduction of pnf(T ), so a reduction of T . In more detail, the proof proceeds as
follows.
1. S ≈s T immediately follows from A ≈s B by Lemma 4.1.
2. For every S → S′ with S′ closed, we prove that T →∗ T ′ and S′ ≡R′≡ T ′ for some T ′.
By Lemma B.8, we have pnf(S) →◦ pnf(S′). By Lemma B.22, we have P | P ′′σ →⋄ Q and
pnf(S′) ≡ νn˜′′′, n˜, n˜′′.((σ | σ′′σ)|dom(σ|σ′′σ)\{x˜} | Q) for some Q. By Lemma B.24, we have four
cases:
(a) P →⋄ Q′ and Q ≡ Q′ | P ′′σ for some closed process Q′. By Lemmas B.1 and B.9, A ≡
νn˜.(σ | P )→ A′ where A′ = νn˜.(σ |Q′). Since A R B and A′ is closed, we have B →∗ B′
and A′ R B′ for some B′. By Lemma B.8, pnf(B) →◦∗ pnf(B′), so by Lemma B.23,
P ′ →⋄∗ Q′′ and pnf(B′) ≡ νn˜′.(σ′ |Q′′) for some closed process Q′′. We rename n˜′′ so that
{n˜′′} ∩ fn(Q′) = ∅ and {n˜′′} ∩ fn(Q′′) = ∅. Hence, by Lemmas B.1 and B.9,
T ≡ νn˜′′′, n˜′, n˜′′.((σ′ | σ′′σ′)|dom(σ′|σ′′σ′)\{x˜} | P
′ | P ′′σ′)
→∗ νn˜′′′, n˜′, n˜′′.((σ′ | σ′′σ′)|dom(σ′|σ′′σ′)\{x˜} |Q
′′ | P ′′σ′)
≡ νu˜.(νn˜′.(σ′ |Q′′) | νn˜′′.(σ′′ | P ′′)) ≡ νu˜.(B′ | C)
If there is at least one reduction step in this trace, we let T ′ = νu˜.(B′ | C); otherwise, we
let T ′ = T . In all cases, T →∗ T ′ and T ′ ≡ νu˜.(B′ | C). Since A′ R B′,
S′ ≡ νn˜′′′, n˜, n˜′′.((σ | σ′′σ)|dom(σ|σ′′σ)\{x˜} |Q
′ | P ′′σ)
≡ νu˜.(νn˜.(σ |Q′) | νn˜′′.(σ′′ | P ′′))
≡ νu˜.(A′ | C) ,
and νu˜.( | C) is closing for A′ and B′, we have S′ ≡R′≡ T ′.
(b) P ′′σ →⋄ Q′ and Q ≡ P |Q′ for some closed process Q′. Since A R B, we have A ≈s B, that
is, νn˜.σ ≈s νn˜′.σ′. By Lemma C.2, P ′′σ′ →⋄ Q′′σ′, fn(Q′′)∩{n˜, n˜′} = ∅, and Σ ⊢ Q′ = Q′′σ
for some Q′′ such that Q′′ is closed, so fv (Q′′) ⊆ dom(σ) = dom(σ′). So by Lemmas B.1
and B.9,
T ≡ νn˜′′′, n˜′, n˜′′.((σ′ | σ′′σ′)|dom(σ′|σ′′σ′)\{x˜} | P
′ | P ′′σ′)
→ νn˜′′′, n˜′, n˜′′.((σ′ | σ′′σ′)|dom(σ′|σ′′σ′)\{x˜} | P
′ |Q′′σ′)
≡ νu˜.(νn˜′.(σ′ | P ′) | νn˜′′.(σ′′ |Q′′)) ≡ νu˜.(B | C′)
58
where C′ = νn˜′′.(σ′′ |Q′′). Moreover,
S′ ≡ νn˜′′′, n˜, n˜′′.((σ | σ′′σ)|dom(σ|σ′′σ)\{x˜} | P |Q
′′σ)
≡ νu˜.(νn˜.(σ | P ) | νn˜′′.(σ′′ |Q′′))
≡ νu˜.(A | C′)
We let T ′ = νu˜.(B | C′). We have T → T ′. Since fv(Q′′) ⊆ dom(σ) = dom(σ′), νu˜.( | C′)
is closing for A and B, and since A R B, we have S′ ≡R′ T ′.
(c) P
N(x)
−−−→⋄ A1, P ′′σ
νx.N〈x〉
−−−−−→⋄ C1, and Q ≡ νx.(A1 | C1) for some A1, C1, x, and ground
term N . We rename x so that x /∈ dom(σ) = dom(σ′). By Lemma B.10 applied twice, P
⋄
≡
νn˜1.(N(y).P1|P2), A1 ≡ νn˜1.(P1{x/y}|P2), {n˜1}∩fn(N) = ∅ and P ′′σ
⋄
≡ νn˜2.(N〈M〉.P3|P4),
C1 ≡ νn˜2.(P3 |{M/x} |P4), {n˜2}∩ fn(N) = ∅, x /∈ fv(N〈M〉.P3 |P4). By Lemma B.16(1), we
transform νn˜1.(N(y).P1 |P2) and νn˜2.(N〈M〉.P3 |P4) into closed processes that satisfy the
same properties. Since A R B, we have A ≈s B, that is, νn˜.σ ≈s νn˜′.σ′. By Lemma C.1,
P ′′σ′
⋄
≡ Q′σ′, fn(Q′) ∩ {n˜, n˜′} = ∅, and Σ ⊢ Q′σ = νn˜2.(N〈M〉.P3 | P4) for some Q′ such
that Q′σ is closed, so fv (Q′) ⊆ dom(σ). Then Q′ is of the form Q′ = νn˜2.(N ′〈M ′〉.P ′3 |P
′
4),
with Σ ⊢ N ′σ = N , Σ ⊢ M ′σ = M , Σ ⊢ P ′3σ = P3, Σ ⊢ P
′
4σ = P4, and fv (N
′〈M ′〉) ⊆
dom(σ) = dom(A). We rename n˜1 and n˜2 so that {n˜1} ∩ fn(M) = ∅, {n˜1} ∩ {n˜2} = ∅,
{n˜1}∩ (fn(P ′3σ)∪ fn(P
′
4σ)∪ fn(σ |σ
′′σ)) = ∅, {n˜2}∩ (fn(P1)∪ fn(P2)∪ fn(σ |σ′′σ)) = ∅. By
Lemma B.10, P
⋄
≡ νn˜1.(N(y).P1 |P2)
N(M)
−−−−→⋄ νn˜1.(P1{M/y}|P2). By definition of
N ′(M ′)
−−−−−→◦,
A ≡ νn˜.(σ | P )
N ′(M ′)
−−−−−→◦ A
′ where A′ = νn˜.(σ | νn˜1.(P1{
M/y} | P2)). (The elements of n˜
do not occur in N ′(M ′) since fn(Q′) ∩ {n˜, n˜′} = ∅.) So by Lemma B.13, A
N ′(M ′)
−−−−−→ A′.
Since A′ is closed and A R B, we have B →∗
N ′(M ′)
−−−−−→ B′′ →∗ B′ and A′ R B′ for some B′,
B′′. By Lemmas B.8 and B.12, pnf(B) = νn˜′.(σ′ | P ′)→◦∗
N ′(M ′)
−−−−−→◦ B′′. By Lemmas B.23
and B.19, P ′ →⋄∗
N ′σ′(M ′σ′)
−−−−−−−→⋄ B′′′ and B′′ ≡ νn˜′.(σ′ |B′′′) for some B′′′. By Lemma B.10,
P ′ →⋄∗
⋄
≡ νn˜3.(N ′σ′(z).P5 |P6), B′′′ ≡ νn˜3.(P5{M
′σ′/z}|P6), and {n˜3}∩fn(N ′σ′(M ′σ′)) = ∅
for some n˜3, P5, and P6. We rename n˜
′′ so that {n˜′′} ∩ fn(νn˜1.(P1{M/y} | P2)) = ∅ and
{n˜′′} ∩ fn(B′′′) = ∅. Then we have
S′ ≡ νn˜′′′, n˜, n˜′′.((σ | σ′′σ)|dom(σ|σ′′σ)\{x˜} | νx.(A1 | C1))
≡ νu˜.νn˜.νn˜′′.(σ | σ′′σ | νx.(νn˜1.(P1{
x/y} | P2) | νn˜2.(P3 | {
M/x} | P4))
≡ νu˜.νn˜.νn˜′′.(σ | σ′′σ | νx.(νn˜1.(P1{
x/y} | P2) | νn˜2.(P
′
3σ | {
M/x} | P
′
4σ))
≡ νu˜.νn˜.νn˜′′.νn˜1.νn˜2.(σ | σ
′′σ | P1{
M/y} | P2 | P
′
3σ | P
′
4σ)
≡ νu˜.νn˜.νn˜′′.νn˜1.νn˜2.(σ | σ
′′ | P1{
M/y} | P2 | P
′
3 | P
′
4)
≡ νu˜, n˜2.νn˜.νn˜
′′.(σ | νn˜1.(P1{
M/y} | P2) | σ
′′ | (P ′3 | P
′
4))
≡ νu˜, n˜2.(A
′ | C′)
where C′ = νn˜′′.(σ′′ | (P ′3 | P
′
4)). We have
T ≡ νn˜′′′, n˜′, n˜′′.((σ′ | σ′′σ′)|dom(σ′|σ′′σ′)\{x˜} | P
′ | P ′′σ′)
→∗≡ νu˜.νn˜′.νn˜′′.(σ′ | σ′′σ′ | νn˜3.(N
′σ′(z).P5 | P6)
| νn˜2.(N ′σ′〈M
′σ′〉.P ′3σ
′ | P ′4σ
′))
→ νu˜, n˜2.νn˜
′.νn˜′′.(σ′ | σ′′σ′ | νn˜3.(P5{
M ′σ′/z} | P6) | (P
′
3σ
′ | P ′4σ
′))
≡ νu˜, n˜2.νn˜
′.νn˜′′.(σ′ | νn˜3.(P5{
M ′σ′/z} | P6) | σ
′′ | (P ′3 | P
′
4))
≡ νu˜, n˜2.(νn˜
′.(σ′ |B′′′) | C′)
≡ νu˜, n˜2.(B
′′ | C′)→∗ νu˜.(B′ | C′)
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We let T ′ = νu˜, n˜2.(B
′ | C′). Hence, T →∗ T ′. Since fv(P ′3 | P
′
4) ⊆ fv (Q
′) ⊆ dom(σ),
νu˜, n˜2.( | C′) is closing for A′ and B′, and moreover A′ R B′, so S′ ≡R′ T ′.
(d) P
νx.N〈x〉
−−−−−→⋄ A1, P ′′σ
N(x)
−−−→⋄ C1, and Q ≡ νx.(A1 | C1) for some A1, C1, x, and ground
term N . We rename x so that x /∈ dom(σ) = dom(σ′). By Lemma B.16(3), we transform
A1 into a closed extended process that satisfies the same properties. Since A R B, we
have A ≈s B, that is, νn˜.σ ≈s νn˜
′.σ′. By Lemma C.3(2), P ′′σ′
N ′σ′(x)
−−−−−→⋄ C2σ
′, fn(C2) ∩
{n˜, n˜′} = ∅, C1 ≡ C2σ, fn(N ′) ∩ {n˜, n˜′} = ∅, Σ ⊢ N = N ′σ, fv(C2) ⊆ dom(σ) ∪ {x},
and fv(N ′) ⊆ dom(σ) = dom(A) for some C2 and N
′. By definition of
νx.N ′〈x〉
−−−−−−→◦, A ≡
νn˜.(σ | P )
νx.N ′〈x〉
−−−−−−→◦ A′ where A′ = νn˜.(σ | A1), so by Lemma B.13, A
νx.N ′〈x〉
−−−−−−→ A′.
Since A′ is closed and A R B, we have B →∗
νx.N ′〈x〉
−−−−−−→ B′′ →∗ B′ and A′ R B′ for
some B′, B′′. By Lemmas B.8 and B.12, pnf(B) = νn˜′.(σ′ | P ′) →◦∗
νx.N ′〈x〉
−−−−−−→◦ B′′. By
Lemmas B.23 and B.19, P ′ →⋄
∗ νx.N
′σ′〈x〉
−−−−−−−→⋄ B
′′′ and B′′ ≡ νn˜′.(σ′ |B′′′) for some B′′′. By
Lemma B.20, P ′ | P ′′σ′ →⋄∗→⋄ νx.(B′′′ | C2σ′). We rename n˜′′ so that {n˜′′} ∩ fn(A1) = ∅
and {n˜′′} ∩ fn(B′′′) = ∅. Moreover,
S′ ≡ νn˜′′′, n˜, n˜′′.((σ | σ′′σ)|dom(σ|σ′′σ)\{x˜} | νx.(A1 | C1))
≡ νx, u˜.νn˜.νn˜′′.(σ | σ′′σ |A1 | C2σ)
≡ νx, u˜.(νn˜.(σ | A1) | νn˜
′′.(σ′′ | C2))
≡ νx, u˜.(A′ | C′)
where C′ = νn˜′′.(σ′′ | C2). We have
T ≡ νn˜′′′, n˜′, n˜′′.((σ′ | σ′′σ′)|dom(σ′|σ′′σ′)\{x˜} | P
′ | P ′′σ′)
→∗→ νn˜′′′, n˜′, n˜′′.((σ′ | σ′′σ′)|dom(σ′|σ′′σ′)\{x˜} | νx.(B
′′′ | C2σ
′))
≡ νx, u˜.(νn′.(σ′ |B′′′) | νn′′.(σ′′ | C2)) ≡ νx, u˜.(B
′′ | C′)
→∗ νx, u˜.(B′ | C′)
We let T ′ = νx, u˜.(B′ | C′). We have T →∗ T ′ and, since A′ R B′ and νx, u˜.( | C′) is
closing for A′ and B′, S′ ≡R′ T ′.
3. For every S
α
−→ S′ with S′ closed and fv(α) ⊆ dom(S), we prove that T →∗
α
−→→∗ T ′ and
S′ ≡R′≡ T ′ for some T ′. We rename n˜′′′, n˜, n˜′, n˜′′ so that these names do not occur in
α. By Lemma B.12, we have pnf(S)
α
−→◦ S′. By Lemma B.19, we have P | P ′′σ
α′
−→⋄ A0,
S′ ≡ νn˜′′′, n˜, n˜′′.((σ | σ′′σ)|dom(σ|σ′′σ)\{x˜} | A0), and bv(α) ∩ dom(σ | σ
′′σ) \ {x˜} = ∅ for α′ =
α(σ | σ′′σ)|dom(σ|σ′′σ)\{x˜} = ασ
′′σ and some A0. We rename x˜ so that bv(α) ∩ {x˜} = ∅. By
Lemma B.18, we have two cases:
(a) P
α′
−→⋄ A1 and A0 ≡ A1 | P ′′σ for some A1. By Lemma B.16(3), we transform A1 into
a closed extended process that satisfies the same properties. We have α′ = (ασ′′)σ, the
elements of n˜ do not occur in ασ′′, because they do not occur in α nor in σ′′. We also have
bv (α′)∩ dom(σ) = ∅. By definition of
ασ′′
−−−→◦, we have A ≡ νn˜.(σ |P )
ασ′′
−−−→◦ A′ where A′ =
νn˜.(σ | A1), so by Lemma B.13, A
ασ′′
−−−→ A′. Since fv (α) ⊆ dom(S) ⊆ dom(σ) ∪ dom(σ′′),
we have fv(ασ′′) ⊆ dom(σ) = dom(A). Since A′ is closed and A R B, we have B →∗
ασ′′
−−−→
B′′ →∗ B′ and A′ R B′ for some B′ and B′′. By Lemmas B.8 and B.12, pnf(B) = νn˜′.(σ′ |
P ′) →◦
∗ ασ
′′
−−−→◦ B
′′. By Lemmas B.23 and B.19, P ′ →⋄
∗ ασ
′′σ′
−−−−→⋄ B
′′′, B′′ ≡ νn˜′.(σ′ | B′′′),
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and bv (α) ∩ dom(σ′) = ∅ for some B′′′. Hence by Par′, P ′ | P ′′σ′ →⋄∗
ασ′′σ′
−−−−→⋄ B′′′ | P ′′σ′.
By definition of
α
−→◦,
pnf(T ) = νn˜′′′, n˜′, n˜′′.((σ′ | σ′′σ′)|dom(σ′|σ′′σ′)\{x˜} | P
′ | P ′′σ′)
→◦
∗ α−→◦ νn˜
′′′, n˜′, n˜′′.((σ′ | σ′′σ′)|dom(σ′|σ′′σ′)\{x˜} | B
′′′ | P ′′σ′) .
(We have bv(α) ∩ fv ((σ′ | σ′′σ′)|dom(σ′|σ′′σ′)\{x˜}) = ∅ because we have bv (α) = bv (α
′),
fv ((σ′ | σ′′σ′)|dom(σ′|σ′′σ′)\{x˜}) = dom(σ
′) ∪ dom(σ′′) \ {x˜} = dom(σ) ∪ dom(σ′′) \ {x˜}, and
bv (α′) ∩ (dom(σ) ∪ dom(σ′′) \ {x˜}) = ∅.) We rename n˜′′ so that {n˜′′} ∩ fn(A1) = ∅ and
{n˜′′} ∩ fn(B′′′) = ∅. By Lemmas B.1, B.9, and B.13, we have
T ≡ pnf(T )
→∗
α
−→ νn˜′′′, n˜′, n˜′′.((σ′ | σ′′σ′)|dom(σ′|σ′′σ′)\{x˜} | B
′′′ | P ′′σ′)
≡ νu˜.(νn˜′.(σ′ | B′′′) | νn˜′′.(σ′′ | P ′′))
≡ νu˜.(B′′ | C)
→∗ νu˜.(B′ | C)
Moreover,
S′ ≡ νn˜′′′, n˜, n˜′′.((σ | σ′′σ)|dom(σ|σ′′σ)\{x˜} | A0)
≡ νn˜′′′, n˜, n˜′′.((σ | σ′′σ)|dom(σ|σ′′σ)\{x˜} | A1 | P
′′σ)
≡ νu˜.(νn˜.(σ | A1) | νn˜
′′.(σ′′ | P ′′))
≡ νu˜.(A′ | C)
We let T ′ = νu˜.(B′ | C). Then we have T →∗
α
−→→∗ T ′ and νu˜.( | C) is closing for A′ and
B′ so S′ ≡R′ T ′.
(b) P ′′σ
α′
−→⋄ A1 and A0 ≡ P | A1 for some A1. Since A R B, we have A ≈s B, that is,
νn˜.σ ≈s νn˜′.σ′. We have Σ ⊢ (ασ′′)σ = α′, so if α′ = N(M), then we have ασ′′ = N ′(M ′),
Σ ⊢M ′σ =M , and fn(M ′)∩{n˜, n˜′} = ∅ for some N ′,M ′. By Lemma C.3(1), P ′′σ′
α′′σ′
−−−→⋄
A′′σ′, fn(A′′) ∩ {n˜, n˜′} = ∅, A1 ≡ A′′σ, fn(α′′) ∩ {n˜, n˜′} = ∅, Σ ⊢ α′ = α′′σ, and A′′σ is
closed for some A′′, α′′. By Par’, P ′|P ′′σ′
α′′σ′
−−−→⋄ P ′|A′′σ′. We have Σ ⊢ ασ′′σ = α′ = α′′σ,
fn(ασ′′) ∩ {n˜, n˜′} = ∅, fn(α′′) ∩ {n˜, n˜′} = ∅, and νn˜.σ ≈s νn˜
′.σ′, so Σ ⊢ ασ′′σ′ = α′′σ′ by
definition of static equivalence. By definition of
α
−→◦,
pnf(T ) = νn˜′′′, n˜′, n˜′′.((σ′ | σ′′σ′)|dom(σ′|σ′′σ′)\{x˜} | P
′ | P ′′σ′)
α
−→◦ νn˜
′′′, n˜′, n˜′′.((σ′ | σ′′σ′)|dom(σ′|σ′′σ′)\{x˜} | P
′ |A′′σ′) .
(We have bv(α′′σ′) ∩ fv ((σ′ | σ′′σ′)|dom(σ′|σ′′σ′)\{x˜}) = ∅ because bv(α
′′σ′) = bv (α′′) =
bv (α′), fv ((σ′ | σ′′σ′)|dom(σ′|σ′′σ′)\{x˜}) = dom(σ
′)∪dom(σ′′)\{x˜} = dom(σ)∪dom (σ′′)\{x˜},
and bv (α′) ∩ (dom(σ) ∪ dom(σ′′) \ {x˜}) = ∅.) Hence, by Lemmas B.1, B.9, and B.13, we
have
T ≡ pnf(T )
α
−→ νn˜′′′, n˜′, n˜′′.((σ′ | σ′′σ′)|dom(σ′|σ′′σ′)\{x˜} | P
′ | A′′σ′)
≡ νu˜.(νn˜′.(σ′ | P ′) | νn˜′′.(σ′′ | A′′))
≡ νu˜.(B | C′)
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where C′ = νn˜′′.(σ′′ |A′′). Moreover,
S′ ≡ νn˜′′′, n˜, n˜′′.((σ | σ′′σ)|dom(σ|σ′′σ)\{x˜} | A0)
≡ νn˜′′′, n˜, n˜′′.((σ | σ′′σ)|dom(σ|σ′′σ)\{x˜} | P |A1)
≡ νn˜′′′, n˜, n˜′′.((σ | σ′′σ)|dom(σ|σ′′σ)\{x˜} | P |A
′′σ)
≡ νu˜.(νn˜.(σ | P ) | νn˜′′.(σ′′ | A′′))
≡ νu˜.(A | C′)
We let T ′ = νu˜.(B |C′). We have T
α
−→ T ′ and since A R B and νu˜.( |C′) is closing for A
and B, we have S′ ≡R′ T ′.
Lemma 4.11 Let A be a closed extended process. We have A ⇓a if and only if A→∗
νx.a〈x〉
−−−−−→ A′ for
some fresh variable x and some A′.
Proof: In order to establish this claim, we argue that A ≡ E[a〈M〉.P ] for some evaluation context
E[ ] that does not bind a if and only if A
νx.a〈x〉
−−−−−→ A′ for some fresh variable x and some A′.
For the implication from left to right, let x be a fresh variable. We derive
a〈M〉.P
νx.a〈x〉
−−−−−→ P | {M/x} by Out-Var
E[a〈M〉.P ]
νx.a〈x〉
−−−−−→ E[P | {M/x}] by Par and Scope
A
νx.a〈x〉
−−−−−→ E[P | {M/x}] by Struct, since A ≡ E[a〈M〉.P ]
Conversely, if A
νx.a〈x〉
−−−−−→ A′ for some fresh variable x and some A′, then we show by induction on
the derivation that A ≡ E[a〈M〉.P ] for some evaluation context E[ ] that does not bind a. In case
Out-Var, the context E is empty. In case Scope, a restriction that does not bind a is added to E.
In case Par, a parallel composition is added to E. In case Struct, the context E is unchanged.
C.3 Observational Equivalence Implies Labelled Bisimilarity
Finally, the goal of this section is to establish the lemmas needed in the outline of the argument
that observational equivalence implies labelled bisimilarity in Section 4.5. The section also contains a
corollary, namely that observational equivalence and static equivalence coincide on frames.
Lemma C.6 Let P be a plain process. The existence of P ′ such that Σ ⊢ P = P ′ and p /∈ fn(P ′) is
preserved by structural equivalence (
⋄
≡) and reduction (→⋄) of P .
Let A be a normal process. The existence of A′ such that Σ ⊢ A = A′ and p /∈ fn(A′) is preserved
by structural equivalence (
◦
≡) and reduction (→◦) of A.
Proof: Property 1: Suppose that P
⋄
≡ Q, Σ ⊢ P = P ′, and p /∈ fn(P ′). We show that there exists
Q′ such that Σ ⊢ Q = Q′ and p /∈ fn(Q′), by induction on the derivation of P
⋄
≡ Q. We consider
as base cases the application of each rule under an evaluation context, in the two directions, and use
induction only for transitivity.
• Case Rewrite′, under an evaluation context E. We have E[P1{M/x}]
⋄
≡ E[P1{N/x}], Σ ⊢M = N ,
Σ ⊢ E[P1{M/x}] = P ′, and p /∈ fn(P ′). Since Σ ⊢ E[P1{N/x}] = E[P1{M/x}] = P ′, we have the
result with Q′ = Q.
• Case Par-C′, under an evaluation context E. We have E[P1 |Q1]
⋄
≡ E[Q1 |P1], Σ ⊢ E[P1 |Q1] = P ′,
and p /∈ fn(P ′). Since Σ ⊢ E[P1 |Q1] = P ′, we have P ′ = E′[P ′1 |Q
′
1] with Σ ⊢ E = E
′, Σ ⊢ P1 = P ′1,
and Σ ⊢ Q1 = Q′1. Let Q
′ = E′[Q′1 | P
′
1]. We have Σ ⊢ E[Q1 | P1] = Q
′ and p /∈ fn(Q′) = fn(P ′).
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• All other base cases are handled similarly to case Par-C′.
• The case of transitivity follows by applying the induction hypothesis twice.
Property 2: Suppose that P →⋄ Q, Σ ⊢ P = P ′, and p /∈ fn(P ′). We show that there exists Q′ such
that Σ ⊢ Q = Q′ and p /∈ fn(Q′), by induction on the derivation of P →⋄ Q. Again, we consider as
base cases the application of each rule under an evaluation context, and use induction only for the
application of
⋄
≡.
• Case Comm′, under an evaluation context E. We have E[N〈M〉.P1 |N(x).Q1]→⋄ E[P1 |Q1{M/x}],
Σ ⊢ E[N〈M〉.P1 |N(x).Q1] = P ′, and p /∈ fn(P ′). Since Σ ⊢ E[N〈M〉.P1 |N(x).Q1] = P ′, we have
P ′ = E′[N ′〈M ′〉.P ′1 | N
′′(x).Q′1] with Σ ⊢ E = E
′, Σ ⊢ M = M ′, Σ ⊢ P1 = P ′1, and Σ ⊢ Q1 = Q
′
1.
Let Q′ = E′[P ′1 |Q
′
1{
M ′/x}]. We have Σ ⊢ E[P1 |Q1{M/x}] = Q′ and p /∈ fn(Q′) since fn(Q′) ⊆ fn(P ′).
• Case Then′, under an evaluation context E. We have E[if M =M then P1 else Q1]→⋄ E[P1], Σ ⊢
E[if M =M then P1 else Q1] = P
′, and p /∈ fn(P ′). Since Σ ⊢ E[if M =M then P1 else Q1] = P
′,
we have P ′ = E′[if M ′ =M ′′ then P ′1 else Q
′
1] with Σ ⊢ E = E
′ and Σ ⊢ P1 = P ′1. Let Q
′ = E′[P ′1].
We have Σ ⊢ E[P1] = Q′ and p /∈ fn(Q′) since fn(Q′) ⊆ fn(P ′).
• Case Else′ is handled similarly to case Then′.
• In case we additionally apply
⋄
≡, we conclude using Property 1 and the induction hypothesis.
Property 3: Suppose that A
◦
≡ B, Σ ⊢ A = A′, and p /∈ fn(A′). We show that there exists B′ such
that Σ ⊢ B = B′ and p /∈ fn(B′), by induction on the derivation of A
◦
≡ B.
• Case Plain′′ follows from Property 1.
• Case New-Par′′. We have νn˜.(σ | νn′.P )
◦
≡ νn˜, n′.(σ | P ) with n′ /∈ fn(σ), Σ ⊢ νn˜.(σ | νn′.P ) = A′,
and p /∈ fn(A′). If p ∈ {n˜, n′}, then we have the result with B′ = νn˜, n′.(σ | P ). Otherwise, since
Σ ⊢ νn˜.(σ | νn′.P ) = A′, we have A′ = νn˜.(σ′ | νn′.P ′) with Σ ⊢ σ = σ′ and Σ ⊢ P = P ′. Let
B′ = νn˜, n′.(σ′ | P ′). We have Σ ⊢ νn˜, n′.(σ | P ) = B′ and p /∈ fn(B′) since fn(B′) ⊆ fn(A′).
• Case New-Par′′ reversed. We have νn˜, n′.(σ | P )
◦
≡ νn˜.(σ | νn′.P ) with n′ /∈ fn(σ), Σ ⊢ νn˜, n′.(σ |
P ) = A′, and p /∈ fn(A′). If p ∈ {n˜}, then we have the result with B′ = νn˜.(σ | νn′.P ). If
p = n′, then we also have the result with B′ = νn˜.(σ | νn′.P ) because n′ /∈ fn(σ). Otherwise, since
Σ ⊢ νn˜, n′.(σ | P ) = A′, we have A′ = νn˜, n′.(σ′ | P ′) with Σ ⊢ σ = σ′ and Σ ⊢ P = P ′. Let
B′ = νn˜.(σ′ | νn′.P ′). We have Σ ⊢ νn˜.(σ | νn′.P ) = B′ and p /∈ fn(B′).
• Case New-C′′ is handled similarly to case New-Par′′.
• Case Rewrite′′. We have νn˜.(σ | P )
◦
≡ νn˜.(σ′ | P ) with Σ ⊢ σ = σ′, Σ ⊢ νn˜.(σ | P ) = A′, and
p /∈ fn(A′). Since Σ ⊢ νn˜.(σ′ | P ) = νn˜.(σ | P ) = A′, we have the result with B′ = A′.
• The case of transitivity follows by applying the induction hypothesis twice.
Property 4: Suppose that A →◦ B, Σ ⊢ A = A′, and p /∈ fn(A′). We show that there exists B′ such
that Σ ⊢ B = B′ and p /∈ fn(B′). Suppose νn˜.(σ |P )→◦ νn˜.(σ |Q) with P →⋄ Q, Σ ⊢ νn˜.(σ |P ) = A
′,
and p /∈ fn(A′). If p ∈ {n˜}, then we have the result with B′ = νn˜.(σ | Q). Otherwise, since
Σ ⊢ νn˜.(σ |P ) = A′, we have A′ = νn˜.(σ′ |P ′) with Σ ⊢ σ = σ′ and Σ ⊢ P = P ′. Since p /∈ fn(A′) and
p /∈ {n˜}, p /∈ fn(σ′) ∪ fn(P ′). By Property 2, there exists Q′ such that Σ ⊢ Q = Q′ and p /∈ fn(Q′).
Let B′ = νn˜.(σ′ |Q′). We have Σ ⊢ νn˜.(σ |Q) = B′ and p /∈ fn(B′). In case we additionally apply
◦
≡,
we conclude using Property 3 and the induction hypothesis.
Lemma C.7 If p /∈ fn(A), then A 6⇓p.
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Proof: In order to obtain a contradiction, suppose that A ⇓p, that is, that A →∗≡ E[p〈M〉.P ] for
some M , P , and evaluation context E[ ] that does not bind p. Hence, pnf(A) →◦∗
◦
≡ E[p〈M〉.P ] for
some M , P , and evaluation context E[ ] that does not bind p. Let A1 = pnf(A). We have p /∈ fn(A1).
By Lemma C.6, the existence of A′ such that Σ ⊢ A1 = A′ and p /∈ fn(A′) is preserved by structural
equivalence and reduction of A1, so there exists A
′ such that Σ ⊢ E[p〈M〉.P ] = A′ and p /∈ fn(A′).
Hence, there exists N such that Σ ⊢ p = N and p /∈ fn(N). Since the equational theory is preserved
by substitution of terms for names, for all N ′, Σ ⊢ p{N
′
/p} = N{N
′
/p}, that is Σ ⊢ N ′ = N , which
contradicts the assumption that the equational theory is non-trivial.
Lemma C.8 If p /∈ fn(P ) and P →⋄∗
νx.N〈x〉
−−−−−→⋄ A or P →⋄∗
N(M)
−−−−→⋄ A, then Σ ⊢ N 6= p.
Proof: The proof uses ideas similar to the proof of Lemma C.7. By Lemma B.10, P →⋄∗
⋄
≡
νn˜.(N〈M〉.P1 | P2) for some n˜, M , P1, P2 with {n˜} ∩ fn(N) = ∅, or P →⋄∗
⋄
≡ νn˜.(N(x).P1 | P2)
for some for some n˜, x, P1, P2 with {n˜} ∩ fn(N) = ∅. By Lemma C.6, the existence of P ′ such that
Σ ⊢ P = P ′ and p /∈ fn(P ′) is preserved by structural equivalence and reduction of P , so there exists
N ′ such that Σ ⊢ N = N ′ and p /∈ fn(N ′). If we had Σ ⊢ N = p, then we would have Σ ⊢ p = N ′ and
p /∈ fn(N ′), which yields a contradiction as in the proof of Lemma C.7. So Σ ⊢ N 6= p.
Lemma C.9 ≈ ⊆ ≈s.
Proof: If A and B are observationally equivalent, then A | C and B | C have the same barbs for
every C with fv (C) ⊆ dom(A). In particular, A | C and B | C have the same barb ⇓a for every C of
the special form if M = N then a〈s〉, where a does not occur in A or B and fv(C) ⊆ dom(A), that
is, fv (M) ∪ fv(N) ⊆ dom(A). We obtain that A and B are statically equivalent, using the following
property: assuming that A is closed, fv (M) ∪ fv (N) ⊆ dom(A), and a does not occur in A, we have
(M = N)ϕ(A) if and only if A | if M = N then a〈s〉 ⇓a. We show this property below.
Let pnf(A) = νn˜.(σ |P ). We rename n˜ so that {n˜}∩ (fn(M)∪ fn(N)∪{a}) = ∅. If (M = N)ϕ(A),
then Mσ = Nσ, so A | if M = N then a〈s〉 ≡ νn˜.(σ | P | if Mσ = Nσ then a〈s〉)→ νn˜.(σ | P | a〈s〉),
so we conclude that A | if M = N then a〈s〉 ⇓ a. Conversely, in order to obtain a contradiction,
suppose that (M 6= N)ϕ(A) and A | if M = N then a〈s〉 ⇓ a. Lemma 4.11 implies that A | if M =
N then a〈s〉 →∗
νx.a〈x〉
−−−−−→ A′ for some fresh variable x and some A′. So pnf(A | if M = N then a〈s〉) =
νn˜.(σ | P | if Mσ = Nσ then a〈s〉) →◦∗
νx.a〈x〉
−−−−−→◦ A′ by Lemmas B.8 and B.12. Then P | if Mσ =
Nσ then a〈s〉 →⋄∗
νx.a〈x〉
−−−−−→⋄ A′′, A′ ≡ νn˜.(σ | A′′), and x /∈ dom(σ) for some A′′ by Lemmas B.23
and B.19. We have a /∈ fn(pnf(A)), so a /∈ fn(P ). We show by induction on the length of the trace,
that it is impossible to have P | if Mσ = Nσ then a〈s〉 →⋄∗
νx.a〈x〉
−−−−−→⋄ A′′.
• If this trace contains a single step, then P | if Mσ = Nσ then a〈s〉
νx.a〈x〉
−−−−−→⋄ A′′, so by Lemma B.18,
P
νx.a〈x〉
−−−−−→⋄, which yields a contradiction by Lemma C.8.
• If this trace contains several steps, the first step is an internal reduction, so by Lemma B.24, either
P reduces, and we conclude by induction hypothesis, or if Mσ = Nσ then a〈s〉 reduces to 0 and
P | 0→⋄∗
νx.a〈x〉
−−−−−→⋄ A′′, which yields a contradiction by Lemma C.8.
Lemma C.10 Let n˜ be pairwise distinct names. Let n˜′ be pairwise distinct names that do not occur
in P nor in P ′.
If P
⋄
≡ P ′ and Σ ⊢ P = P{n˜
′
/˜n}, then P{
n˜′/˜n}
⋄
≡ P ′{n˜
′
/˜n} and Σ ⊢ P
′ = P ′{n˜
′
/˜n}.
If P →⋄ P ′ and Σ ⊢ P = P{n˜
′
/˜n}, then P{
n˜′/˜n} →⋄ P
′{n˜
′
/˜n} and Σ ⊢ P
′ = P ′{n˜
′
/˜n}.
Proof: By induction on the derivations of P
⋄
≡ P ′ and P →⋄ P ′, respectively.
Lemma 4.13 Let A be a closed extended process. Let N and M be terms such that fv (N〈M〉) ⊆
dom(A). Let p be a name that does not occur in A, M , and N .
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1. If A
N(M)
−−−−→ A′ and p does not occur in A′, then A | T pN(M) →→ A
′ and A′ 6⇓p.
2. If A | T pN(M) →
∗ A′ and A′ 6⇓p, then A→∗
N(M)
−−−−→→∗ A′.
Proof: Property 1: Let pnf(A) = νn˜.(σ|P ). We rename n˜ so that these names do not occur inN ,M ,
p. By Lemma B.12, pnf(A)
N(M)
−−−−→◦ A′. By Lemma B.19, P
Nσ(Mσ)
−−−−−−→⋄ A′′ andA′ ≡ νn˜.(σ|A′′) for some
A′. By Lemma B.10, P
⋄
≡ νn˜′.(Nσ(x′).P1 | P2), A′′ ≡ νn˜′.(P1{Mσ/x′} | P2), {n˜′} ∩ fn(Nσ(Mσ)) = ∅,
for some n˜′, P1, P2, x
′. We rename n˜′ so that p /∈ {n˜′}. Hence, by Lemmas B.1 and B.7,
A | p〈p〉 |N〈M〉.p(x) ≡ pnf(A) | p〈p〉 |N〈M〉.p(x)
≡ νn˜.(σ | νn˜′.(Nσ(x′).P1 | P2)) | p〈p〉 |N〈M〉.p(x)
≡ νn˜.(σ | νn˜′.(Nσ(x′).P1 | P2 | p〈p〉 |Nσ〈Mσ〉.p(x)))
→ νn˜.(σ | νn˜′.(P1{
Mσ/x′} | P2 | p〈p〉 | p(x)))
→ νn˜.(σ | νn˜′.(P1{
Mσ/x′} | P2))
≡ νn˜.(σ | A′′)
≡ A′
Since p /∈ fn(A′), we have A′ 6⇓p by Lemma C.7.
Property 2: Let pnf(A) = νn˜.(σ | P ). By Lemma B.2, pnf(A) is closed. We rename n˜ so that these
names do not occur in N , M , p. Then pnf(A | p〈p〉 | N〈M〉.p(x)) = νn˜.(σ | P | p〈p〉 | Nσ〈Mσ〉.p(x)).
By Lemma B.8, pnf(A | p〈p〉 | N〈M〉.p(x)) →◦
∗ pnf(A′). By Lemma B.23 applied several times,
P | p〈p〉 |Nσ〈Mσ〉.p(x)→⋄∗ P ′ and pnf(A′) ≡ νn˜.(σ |P ′) for some closed process P ′. Since A′ 6⇓p, we
have P ′ 6⇓p. (If we had P ′ ⇓p, we would immediately obtain A′ ⇓p by definition of ⇓p.)
We prove that, if P is a closed process, P |p〈p〉 |p(x)→⋄
∗ P ′, P ′ 6⇓p, and p /∈ fn(P ), then P
⋄
≡→⋄
∗
P ′, by induction on the length of the trace. Since P | p〈p〉 | p(x) ⇓p, the trace P | p〈p〉 | p(x) →⋄∗ P ′
has at least one step: P | p〈p〉 | p(x)→⋄ P1 →⋄∗ P ′ . By Lemmas B.24, B.18, and C.8, the only cases
that can happen in the first step are:
• P →⋄ P ′′ and P ′′ | p〈p〉 | p(x) ≡ P1 →⋄∗ P ′ for some closed process P ′′. As above this trace has
at least one step, so P ′′ | p〈p〉 | p(x) →⋄∗ P ′. By Lemma C.10, we rename p inside P ′′ so that
p /∈ fn(P ′′), and we obtain the desired result by induction hypothesis.
• p〈p〉
νy.N〈y〉
−−−−−→⋄ A1 ≡ {p/y}, p(x)
N(y)
−−−→⋄ A2 ≡ 0, Σ ⊢ N = p, P1 ≡ P |νy.(A1 |A2) ≡ P |νy.({p/y}|0) ≡
P so P | p〈p〉 | p(x)→⋄ P
⋄
≡ P1 →⋄∗ P ′, so we obtain P
⋄
≡→⋄∗ P ′ as desired.
Next, we prove that, if P | p〈p〉 |Nσ〈Mσ〉.p(x) is a closed process, P | p〈p〉 |Nσ〈Mσ〉.p(x)→⋄∗ P ′,
P ′ 6⇓p, and p /∈ fn(P ) ∪ fn(Nσ) ∪ fn(Mσ), then P →⋄∗
Nσ(Mσ)
−−−−−−→⋄→⋄∗ P ′, by induction on the length
of the trace. Since P | p〈p〉 |Nσ〈Mσ〉.p(x) ⇓p, the trace P | p〈p〉 | Nσ〈Mσ〉.p(x) →⋄∗ P ′ has at least
one step: P | p〈p〉 | Nσ〈Mσ〉.p(x) →⋄ P1 →⋄
∗ P ′. By Lemmas B.24, B.18, and C.8, the only cases
that can happen in the first step are:
• P →⋄ P ′′ and P ′′ | p〈p〉 | Nσ〈Mσ〉.p(x) ≡ P1 →⋄∗ P ′ for some closed process P ′′. As above this
trace has at least one step, so P ′′ | p〈p〉 | Nσ〈Mσ〉.p(x) →⋄∗ P ′. By Lemma C.10, we rename p
inside P ′′ so that p /∈ fn(P ′′), and we obtain the desired result by induction hypothesis.
• P
N ′(y)
−−−−→⋄ B, Nσ〈Mσ〉.p(x)
νy.N ′〈y〉
−−−−−−→⋄ B′, and P1 ≡ νy.(B | p〈p〉 | B′). By Lemma B.10, P
⋄
≡
νn˜′.(N ′(z).P2 | P3), B ≡ νn˜′.(P2{y/z} | P3), and {n˜′} ∩ fn(N ′) = ∅ for some n˜′, z, P2, and P3.
By Lemma B.18, Σ ⊢ Nσ = N ′, y /∈ fv(Nσ〈Mσ〉.p(x)), and B′ ≡ p(x) | {Mσ/y}. We rename n˜
′
so that these names do not appear in Mσ and are distinct from p. By Lemma C.10, we rename
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p inside νn˜′.(N ′(z).P2 | P3) so that p /∈ fn(νn˜′.(N ′(z).P2 | P3)), so p /∈ fn(P2) ∪ fn(P3). Hence
P1 ≡ νy.(νn˜′.(P2{y/z} | P3) | p〈p〉 | {Mσ/y} | p(x)) ≡ νn˜′.(P2{Mσ/z} | P3) | p〈p〉 | p(x). We have
P
⋄
≡ νn˜′.(N ′(z).P2 | P3)
Nσ(Mσ)
−−−−−−→⋄ νn˜′.(P2{Mσ/z} | P3). Let P4 = νn˜′.(P2{Mσ/z} | P3). We have
then P
Nσ(Mσ)
−−−−−−→⋄ P4 and P4 | p〈p〉 | p(x) ≡ P1 →⋄∗ P ′. By Lemma B.16(3), we transform P4
into a closed process that satisfies the same properties. Since P ′ 6⇓ p, this trace has at least one
step, so P4 | p〈p〉 | p(x) →⋄∗ P ′. Since p /∈ fn(P4), by the property shown above, P4
⋄
≡→⋄∗ P ′, so
P
Nσ(Mσ)
−−−−−−→⋄→⋄∗ P ′.
To sum up, we have A ≡ pnf(A) = νn˜.(σ |P ), P →⋄∗ P5
Nσ(Mσ)
−−−−−−→⋄ P6 →⋄∗ P ′, and A′ ≡ pnf(A′) ≡
νn˜.(σ | P ′). So νn˜.(σ | P )→◦∗ νn˜.(σ | P5)
N(M)
−−−−→◦ νn˜.(σ | P6)→◦∗ νn˜.(σ | P ′). Hence by Lemmas B.9
and B.13, A→∗
N(M)
−−−−→→∗ A′.
Lemma 4.14 Let A be a closed extended process. Let N be a term such that fv (N) ⊆ dom(A). Let
p and q be names that do not occur in A and N .
1. If A
νx.N〈x〉
−−−−−→ A′ and p and q do not occur in A′, then A | T p,q
νx.N〈x〉
→→ νx.(A′ | q〈x〉), νx.(A′ |
q〈x〉) 6⇓p, and x /∈ dom(A).
2. Let x be a variable such that x /∈ dom(A). If A |T p,q
νx.N〈x〉
→∗ A′′ and A′′ 6⇓p, then A→∗
νx.N〈x〉
−−−−−→
→∗ A′ and A′′ ≡ νx.(A′ | q〈x〉) for some A′.
Proof: Property 1: Let pnf(A) = νn˜.(σ | P ). By Lemma B.2, pnf(A) is closed. We rename n˜
so that these names do not occur in N , p, and q. By Lemma B.12, pnf(A)
νx.N〈x〉
−−−−−→◦ A′. By
Lemma B.19, P
νx.Nσ〈x〉
−−−−−−→⋄ A′′, A′ ≡ νn˜.(σ | A′′), and x /∈ dom(σ) for some A′′. By Lemma B.10,
P
⋄
≡ νn˜′.(Nσ〈M〉.P1 |P2), A′′ ≡ νn˜′.(P1 | {M/x} |P2), {n˜′}∩ fn(Nσ) = ∅, and x /∈ fv(Nσ〈M〉.P1 |P2))
for some n˜′, P1, P2, M . We rename n˜
′ so that p, q /∈ {n˜′} and y so that y /∈ fv(M). Hence, by
Lemmas B.1 and B.7,
A | p〈p〉 |N(x).p(y).q〈x〉 ≡ pnf(A) | p〈p〉 |N(x).p(y).q〈x〉
≡ νn˜.(σ | νn˜′.(Nσ〈M〉.P1 | P2)) | p〈p〉 |N(x).p(y).q〈x〉
≡ νn˜.(σ | νn˜′.(Nσ〈M〉.P1 | P2 | p〈p〉 |N(x).p(y).q〈x〉))
→ νn˜.(σ | νn˜′.(P1 | P2 | p〈p〉 | p(y).q〈M〉))
→ νn˜.(σ | νn˜′.(P1 | P2 | q〈M〉))
≡ νx.νn˜.(σ | νn˜′.(P1 | {
M/x} | P2 | q〈x〉))
≡ νx.(νn˜.(σ | A′′) | q〈x〉)
≡ νx.(A′ | q〈x〉)
Since p /∈ fn(νx.(A′ | q〈x〉)), we have νx.(A′ | q〈x〉) 6⇓p by Lemma C.7.
Property 2: Let pnf(A) = νn˜.(σ | P ). By Lemma B.2, pnf(A) is closed. We rename n˜ so that these
names do not occur in N , p, q. Then pnf(A |p〈p〉 |N(x).p(y).q〈x〉) = νn˜.(σ |P |p〈p〉 |Nσ(x).p(y).q〈x〉).
By Lemma B.8, pnf(A | p〈p〉 | N(x).p(y).q〈x〉) →◦∗ pnf(A′′). By Lemma B.23 applied several times,
P |p〈p〉 |Nσ(x).p(y).q〈x〉 →⋄∗ P ′′ and pnf(A′′) ≡ νn˜.(σ |P ′′) for some closed process P ′′. Since A′′ 6⇓p,
we have P ′′ 6⇓p.
We prove that, if P2 andM
′ are closed, P2 |q〈M ′〉
⋄
≡→⋄∗ P ′′, and q /∈ fn(P2), then P ′′ ≡ P3 |q〈M ′〉
and P2 →⋄∗ P3 for some closed process P3, by induction on the length of the trace P2 |q〈M ′〉
⋄
≡→⋄∗ P ′′.
If this trace has zero reduction steps, then the result holds obviously with P3 = P2. If this trace has
at least one reduction step, then P2 | q〈M ′〉 →⋄ P4 →⋄∗ P ′′, so by Lemmas B.24 and C.8, the only
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case that can happen is that P2 →⋄ P ′2 and P
′
2 | q〈M
′〉 ≡ P4 →⋄∗ P ′′ for some closed process P ′2. By
Lemma C.10, we rename q inside P ′2 so that q /∈ fn(P
′
2), and we obtain the desired result by induction
hypothesis.
Next, we prove that, if P1 andM
′ are closed, P1|p〈p〉|p(y).q〈M ′〉 →⋄∗ P ′′, P ′′ 6⇓p, and p, q /∈ fn(P1),
then P ′′ ≡ P3 | q〈M
′〉 and P1 →⋄
∗ P3 for some closed process P3, by induction on the length of the
trace. Since P1 | p〈p〉 | p(y).q〈M ′〉 ⇓ p, the trace P1 | p〈p〉 | p(y).q〈M ′〉 →⋄∗ P ′′ has at least one step:
P1 |p〈p〉 |p(y).q〈M ′〉 →⋄ P ′1 →⋄
∗ P ′′. By Lemmas B.24, B.18, and C.8, the only cases that can happen
in the first step are:
• P1 →⋄ P ′′1 and P
′′
1 | p〈p〉 | p(y).q〈M
′〉 ≡ P ′1 →⋄
∗ P ′′ for some closed process P ′′1 . As above this trace
has at least one step, so P ′′1 | p〈p〉 | p(y).q〈M
′〉 →⋄∗ P ′′. By Lemma C.10, we rename p and q inside
P ′′1 so that p, q /∈ fn(P
′′
1 ), and we obtain the desired result by induction hypothesis.
• p〈p〉
νz.N〈z〉
−−−−−→⋄ A1 ≡ {p/z}, p(y).q〈M ′〉
N(z)
−−−→⋄ A2 ≡ q〈M ′〉, P ′1 ≡ P1 | νz.(A1 | A2) ≡ P1 | νz.({
p/z} |
q〈M ′〉) ≡ P1 | q〈M ′〉 so P1 | p〈p〉 | p(y).q〈M ′〉 →⋄ P1 | q〈M ′〉
⋄
≡ P ′1 →⋄
∗ P ′′ and q /∈ fn(P1), so by the
property shown above, P ′′ ≡ P3 | q〈M
′〉 and P1 →⋄
∗ P3 for some closed process P3, as desired.
Finally, we prove that, if P and Nσ are closed, P | p〈p〉 | Nσ(x).p(y).q〈x〉 →⋄∗ P ′′, P ′′ 6⇓ p, and
p, q /∈ fn(P )∪fn(Nσ), then P →⋄∗
νx.Nσ〈x〉
−−−−−−→⋄→∗ B and P ′′ ≡ νx.(B |q〈x〉) for some B, by induction on
the length of the trace. Since P |p〈p〉 |Nσ(x).p(y).q〈x〉 ⇓p, the trace P |p〈p〉 |Nσ(x).p(y).q〈x〉 →⋄∗ P ′′
has at least one step: P | p〈p〉 |Nσ(x).p(y).q〈x〉 →⋄ P1 →⋄∗ P ′′. By Lemmas B.24, B.18, and C.8, the
only cases that can happen in the first step are:
• P →⋄ P ′ and P ′ | p〈p〉 | Nσ(x).p(y).q〈x〉 ≡ P1 →⋄∗ P ′′ for some closed process P ′. As above this
trace has at least one step, so P ′ | p〈p〉 | Nσ(x).p(y).q〈x〉 →⋄∗ P ′′. By Lemma C.10, we rename p
and q inside P ′ so that p, q /∈ fn(P ′), and we obtain the desired result by induction hypothesis.
• P
νz.N ′〈z〉
−−−−−→⋄ B′, Nσ(x).p(y).q〈x〉
N ′(z)
−−−→⋄ B′′, and P1 ≡ νz.(B′ | p〈p〉 | B′′). By Lemma B.10,
P
⋄
≡ νn˜′.(N ′〈M ′〉.P2 |P3), B′ ≡ νn˜′.(P2 | {M
′
/z} |P3), {n˜′}∩ fn(N ′) = ∅, and z /∈ fv (N ′〈M ′〉.P2 |P3).
By Lemma B.18, Σ ⊢ Nσ = N ′ and B′′ ≡ p(y).q〈z〉. Using Lemma B.16(1), we can guarantee
that N ′, M ′, P2, P3 are closed. We rename n˜
′ so that these names are distinct from p and q. By
Lemma C.10, we rename p and q inside νn˜′.(N ′〈M ′〉.P2 |P3) so that p, q /∈ fn(νn˜′.(N ′〈M ′〉.P2 |P3)).
So P1 ≡ νz.(B
′ |p〈p〉|B′′) ≡ νz.(νn˜′.(P2 |{
M ′/z}|P3)|p〈p〉|p(y).q〈z〉) ≡ νn˜
′.(P2 |P3 |p〈p〉|p(y).q〈M
′〉).
Since P1 →⋄∗ P ′′ and this trace has at least one step because P1 ⇓ p and P ′′ 6⇓ p, we have
νn˜′.(P2 | P3 | p〈p〉 | p(y).q〈M ′〉) →⋄∗ P ′′, so by Lemma B.21, P2 | P3 | p〈p〉 | p(y).q〈M ′〉 →⋄∗ P4
and P ′′ ≡ νn˜′.P4 for some P4. Since p, q /∈ fn(P2 | P3), by the previous result, P2 | P3 →⋄∗ P5 and
P4 ≡ P5 |q〈M ′〉 for some closed process P5. Therefore, we have P ′′ ≡ νn˜′.(P5 |q〈M ′〉) ≡ νx.(νn˜′.(P5 |
{M
′
/x}) | q〈x〉) and P
⋄
≡ νn˜′.(N ′〈M ′〉.P2 | P3)
νx.Nσ〈x〉
−−−−−−→⋄ νn˜
′.(P2 | {
M ′/x} | P3)→
∗ νn˜′.(P5 | {
M ′/x}).
Let B
def
= νn˜′.(P5 | {M
′
/x}). Then we have P
νx.Nσ〈x〉
−−−−−−→⋄→∗ B and P ′′ ≡ νx.(B | q〈x〉).
To sum up, we have A ≡ pnf(A) = νn˜.(σ | P ), P →⋄∗
νx.Nσ〈x〉
−−−−−−→⋄→∗ B, and P ′′ ≡ νx.(B | q〈x〉),
so A′′ ≡ pnf(A′′) ≡ νn˜.(σ | P ′′) ≡ νn˜.(σ | νx.(B | q〈x〉)) ≡ νx.(νn˜.(σ | B) | q〈x〉) since x /∈ fv (σ). Let
A′
def
= νn˜.(σ|B). So pnf(A)→◦∗
νx.N〈x〉
−−−−−→◦→∗ A′. Hence by Lemmas B.9 and B.13, A→∗
νx.N〈x〉
−−−−−→→∗ A′
and A′′ ≡ νx.(A′ | q〈x〉).
Lemma C.11 Let A and B be two closed extended processes.
• Let σ be a bijective renaming. We have A ≈ B if and only if Aσ ≈ Bσ.
• Let A′ and B′ be obtained from A and B, respectively, by replacing all variables (including their
occurrences in domains of active substitutions) with distinct variables. We have A ≈ B if and only
if A′ ≈ B′.
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Proof: To prove the first point, we define a relation R by A′ R B′ if and only if A′ = Aσ, B′ = Bσ,
and A ≈ B for some A and B. We show that R satisfies the three properties of Definition 4.1. Then
R ⊆ ≈, so if A ≈ B, then A′ = Aσ ≈ B′ = Bσ.
1. If A′ R B′ and A′ ⇓ a, then A′ →∗≡ E[a〈M〉.P ] for some evaluation context E that does not
bind a. Then, by Lemma C.4, A = A′σ−1 →∗≡ Cσ−1[aσ−1〈Mσ−1〉.Pσ−1], so A ⇓ aσ−1. By
definition of ≈, B ⇓aσ−1, so B′ ⇓a as above.
2. If A′ R B′, A′ → A′1, and A
′
1 is closed, then by Lemma C.4, A = A
′σ−1 → A′1σ
−1. We let
A′′ = A′1σ
−1, which is also closed. So by definition of ≈, B →∗ B′′ and A′′ ≈ B′′ for some B′′.
By Lemma C.4, B′ = Bσ →∗ B′′σ. We let B′1 = B
′′σ. We have A′1 R B
′
1 and B
′ →∗ B′1. So
Property 2 holds.
3. If A′ R B′, then A = A′σ−1 ≈ B′σ−1 = B, so E[A′]σ−1 = Eσ−1[A] ≈ Eσ−1[B] = E[B′]σ−1,
hence E[A′] R E[B′].
The same argument also proves the converse, via the inverse renaming.
The proof of the second point is similar.
Lemma C.12 If M is ground, fv (P ) ⊆ {x}, and a /∈ fn(P ) ∪ fn(M), then νa.(a〈M〉 | a(x).P ) ≈
P{M/x}.
Proof: By Lemma 4.12, it is enough to prove that νa.(a〈M〉 | a(x).P ) ≈l P{M/x}. Let A1 =
νa.(a〈M〉 | a(x).P ) and B1 = P{M/x}. Let R = {(A,B) | A and B are closed extended processes,
A ≡ A1 and B ≡ B1, or A ≡ B1 and B ≡ A1} ∪ {(A,B) | A and B are closed extended processes and
A ≡ B}. We show that R is a labelled bisimulation: R is symmetric and
1. We have A1 ≈s B1 since ϕ(A1) = 0 = ϕ(B1). Hence, if A R B, then A ≈s B.
2. If A1 → A′ and A′ is closed, then A′ ≡ B1. (This point can be proved in detail by using partial
normal forms.)
Hence, if A R B, A→ A′, and A′ is closed, then
• either A ≡ A1 and B ≡ B1, so A′ ≡ B1 ≡ B, hence with B′
def
= B, B →∗ B′ and A′ R B′.
• or A ≡ B1 and B ≡ A1, so B ≡ A1 → B1 ≡ A → A′, hence with B′
def
= A′, B →∗ B′ and
A′ R B′.
• or A ≡ B, so with B′
def
= A′, B ≡ A→ A′ = B′, and A′ R B′.
3. A1 does not reduce by
α
−→, for any α. (This point can be proved in detail by using partial normal
forms.) Hence, if A R B, A
α
−→ A′, and A′ is closed, then
• either A ≡ A1 and B ≡ B1, so A1
α
−→ A′. This case is impossible.
• or A ≡ B1 and B ≡ A1, so B ≡ A1 → B1 ≡ A
α
−→ A′, hence with B′
def
= A′, B →
α
−→ B′ and
A′ R B′.
• or A ≡ B, so with B′
def
= A′, B ≡ A
α
−→ A′ = B′, and A′ R B′.
Therefore, R ⊆ ≈l, so A1 ≈l B1.
Corollary C.1 If A is a closed extended process, x ∈ dom(A), fv (P ) ⊆ dom(A), and a /∈ fn(P ), then
A | νa.(a〈x〉 | a(x).P ) ≈ A | P .
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Proof: Let pnf(A) = νn˜.(σ | P ′). We rename n˜ so that {n˜} ∩ fn(P ) = ∅. Let σ′ = σ|dom(σ)\{x}. Let
a′ /∈ fn(P ) ∪ fn(σ). We have
A | νa.(a〈x〉 | a(x).P ) ≡ νn˜.(σ | P ′ | νa′.(a′〈xσ〉 | a′(x).Pσ′)
≈ νn˜.(σ | P ′ | Pσ′{xσ/x}) by Lemma C.12
= νn˜.(σ | P ′ | Pσ)
≡ A | P
Lemma 4.15 Let A and B be two closed extended processes with a same domain that contains x˜.
Let Ex˜[ ]
def
= νx˜.(
∏
x∈x˜ nx〈x〉 | ) using names nx that do not occur in A or B. If Ex˜[A] ≈ Ex˜[B], then
A ≈ B.
Proof: We rely on the following property: if A is a closed extended process with {x˜} ⊆ dom(A) and
Ex˜[A] → C
′, then A → A′ and C′ ≡ Ex˜[A
′] for some closed extended process A′, proved as follows.
Let pnf(A) = νn˜.(σ |P ). We rename n˜ so that {n˜}∩ {n˜x} = ∅. Then pnf(Ex˜[A]) = νn˜.(σ|dom(σ)\{x˜} |∏
x∈x˜ nx〈xσ〉 |P ). By Lemma B.8, pnf(Ex˜[A])→◦ pnf(C
′). By Lemma B.22,
∏
x∈x˜ nx〈xσ〉 |P →⋄ P
′
and pnf(C′) ≡ νn˜.(σ|dom(σ)\{x˜} | P
′) for some P ′. By Lemmas B.24 and C.8, since {n˜x} ∩ fn(P ) = ∅,
the only case that can happen is P →⋄ P ′′ and P ′ ≡
∏
x∈x˜ nx〈xσ〉 | P
′′ for some closed process P ′′.
Let A′ = νn˜.(σ | P ′′). Then A ≡ pnf(A) = νn˜.(σ | P ) → νn˜.(σ | P ′′) = A′ and C′ ≡ pnf(C′) ≡
νn˜.(σ|dom(σ)\{x˜} |P
′) ≡ νn˜.(σ|dom(σ)\{x˜} |
∏
x∈x˜ nx〈xσ〉 |P
′′) ≡ νx˜.(
∏
x∈x˜ nx〈x〉 | νn˜.(σ |P
′′)) ≡ Ex˜[A
′].
Let R be the relation that collects all closed extended processes A and B with a same domain
that contains x˜, such that Ex˜[A] ≈ Ex˜[B], for some x˜ and some names n˜x that do not occur in A or
B. We show that R is an observational bisimulation.
Assume A R B.
• If A → A′ and A′ is closed, then Ex˜[A] → Ex˜[A
′]. By bisimulation hypothesis, Ex˜[B] →
∗ C′ ≈
Ex˜[A
′]. By induction on the number of reductions and using partial normal forms, we build B →∗ B′
such that C′ ≡ Ex˜[B
′] for some closed extended process B′ and conclude using A′ R B′.
• We have Ex˜[A] ⇓ n if and only if n = nx for some x ∈ x˜ or A ⇓ n, and similarly for B. Hence, if
A ⇓n, then Ex˜[A] ⇓n, so Ex˜[B] ⇓n. By Lemma C.7, since A ⇓n, we have n 6= nx for all x ∈ x˜, so
B ⇓n.
• For the congruence property, we suppose that A R B, and we want to show that E[A] R E[B] for
all closing evaluation contexts E. Using Lemma C.11, we show that R is invariant by renaming of
free names and variables, so we can rename the free names and variables of E, so that the obtained
context is simple. Then by Lemma A.1, we construct a context E′ of the form νu˜.( |C′′) such that
E ≡ E′. Hence, it is sufficient to show that E′[A] R E′[B].
Let pnf(C′′) = νn˜.(σ | P ). Let u˜ = m˜z˜. We rename n˜ so that {n˜} ∩ (fn(A) ∪ fn(B)) = ∅.
Since A R B, Ex˜[A] ≈ Ex˜[B] for some x˜. Using Lemma C.11, we rename n˜x so that {n˜x} ∩
({n˜, m˜} ∪ fn(P ) ∪ fn(σ)) = ∅. Let n′x for x ∈ (x˜ ∪ dom(σ)) \ z˜ be fresh names. Let E1[ ] =
νm˜, n˜, n˜x, z˜ \ (x˜ ∪ dom(σ)).( | n˜x(x).(P |
∏
x∈x˜\z˜ n
′
x〈x〉 |
∏
y∈dom(σ)\z˜ n
′
y〈yσ〉)), where n˜x(x) stands
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for nx1(x1) . . . nxk(xk) when x˜ = x1, . . . , xk.
E(x˜∪dom(σ))\z˜ [E
′[A]]
≡ ν(x˜ ∪ dom(σ)) \ z˜.(νm˜.νz˜.(A | νn˜.(σ | P )) |
∏
x∈x˜\z˜
n′x〈x〉 |
∏
y∈dom(σ)\z˜
n′y〈y〉)
≡ νm˜, n˜, z˜ ∪ x˜ ∪ dom(σ).(A | P | σ |
∏
x∈x˜\z˜
n′x〈x〉 |
∏
y∈dom(σ)\z˜
n′y〈yσ〉)
≡ νm˜, n˜, z˜ \ (x˜ ∪ dom(σ)).νx˜.(A | P |
∏
x∈x˜\z˜
n′x〈x〉 |
∏
y∈dom(σ)\z˜
n′y〈yσ〉)
≈ νm˜, n˜, z˜ \ (x˜ ∪ dom(σ)).νx˜.
(A | νn˜x.(
∏
x∈x˜
nx〈x〉 | n˜x(x).(P |
∏
x∈x˜\z˜
n′x〈x〉 |
∏
y∈dom(σ)\z˜
n′y〈yσ〉))
by Corollary C.1 applied several times, so
E(x˜∪dom(σ))\z˜[E
′[A]]
≡ νm˜, n˜, n˜x, z˜ \ (x˜ ∪ dom(σ)).
(νx˜.(A |
∏
x∈x˜
nx〈x〉) | n˜x(x).(P |
∏
x∈x˜\z˜
n′x〈x〉 |
∏
y∈dom(σ)\z˜
n′y〈yσ〉))
≡ E1[Ex˜[A]]
By the same argument, E(x˜∪dom(σ))\z˜ [E
′[B]] ≈ E1[Ex˜[B]]. Since Ex˜[A] ≈ Ex˜[B], we also have
E1[Ex˜[A]] ≈ E1[Ex˜[B]], so by transitivity of ≈, E(x˜∪dom(σ))\z˜[E
′[A]] ≈ E(x˜∪dom(σ))\z˜ [E
′[B]]. Hence,
E′[A] R E′[B].
Since R is an observational bisimulation, R ⊆ ≈, so Ex˜[A] ≈ Ex˜[B] implies A ≈ B.
Corollary C.2 Observational equivalence and static equivalence coincide on frames.
Proof: Since frames do not reduce, static equivalence and labelled bisimilarity coincide on frames.
By Theorem 4.1, we can then conclude.
D Proof of Lemma 4.5
The image of a substitution σ = {M1/x1 , . . . ,
Mn/xn} is the set of terms {M1, . . . ,Mn}. We denote by
ρ a bijective renaming. We denote by σρ the substitution obtained by applying the renaming ρ to the
terms in the image of σ, that is, when σ = {M1/x1, . . . ,
Mn/xn}, σρ = {
M1ρ/x1 , . . . ,
Mnρ/xn}.
Lemma D.1 Let νn˜.σ and νn˜′.σ′ be two frames such that νn˜.σ ≡ νn˜′.σ′, and M and N be two terms
such that fv (M)∪ fv(N) ⊆ dom(σ) = dom(σ′) and {n˜, n˜′} ∪ (fn(M) ∪ fn(N)) = ∅. If Σ ⊢Mσ = Nσ,
then Σ ⊢Mσ′ = Nσ′.
Proof: Let us prove the following result:
Suppose νn˜.(σ | P )
◦
≡ νn˜′.(σ′ | P ′) and fv (M) ∪ fv(N) ⊆ dom(σ) = dom(σ′). Let ρ be
a bijective renaming that maps names in n˜ to names not in fn(νn˜.σ) ∪ fn(M) ∪ fn(N)
and leaves names in (fn(νn˜.σ) ∪ fn(M) ∪ fn(N)) \ {n˜} unchanged, and ρ′ be a bijective
renaming that maps names in n˜′ to names not in fn(νn˜′.σ′) ∪ fn(M) ∪ fn(N) and leaves
names in (fn(νn˜′.σ′) ∪ fn(M) ∪ fn(N)) \ {n˜′} unchanged.
We have Σ ⊢M(σρ) = N(σρ) if and only if Σ ⊢M(σ′ρ′) = N(σ′ρ′).
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This result is proved by induction on the derivation of νn˜.(σ | P )
◦
≡ νn˜′.(σ′ | P ′).
• Transitivity and symmetry: obvious.
• Reflexivity: The renamings ρ and ρ′ map names in n˜ to names not in fn(νn˜.σ)∪ fn(M)∪ fn(N) and
leave names in (fn(νn˜.σ) ∪ fn(M) ∪ fn(N)) \ {n˜} unchanged. Let ρ′′ be a bijective renaming that
maps n˜ρ to n˜ρ′ and leaves names in fn(νn˜.σ)∪ fn(M)∪ fn(N) unchanged. If Σ ⊢M(σρ) = N(σρ),
then Σ ⊢M(σρ)ρ′′ = N(σρ)ρ′′, so Σ ⊢M(σρ′) = N(σρ′). The converse is proved is the same way,
using ρ′′−1 instead of ρ′′.
• Cases Plain′′ and New-C′′: These cases are proved by the same proof as for reflexivity, since the
desired property does not depend on the process P nor on the order of n˜.
• CaseNew-Par′′: νn˜.(σ |νn′.P )
◦
≡ νn˜, n′.(σ |P ) where n′ /∈ fn(σ). Let ρ be a bijective renaming that
maps names in n˜ to names not in fn(νn˜.σ)∪ fn(M)∪ fn(N) and leaves names in (fn(νn˜.σ)∪ fn(M)∪
fn(N)) \ {n˜} unchanged, and ρ′ be a bijective renaming that maps names in n˜, n′ to names not in
fn(νn˜, n′.σ)∪ fn(M)∪ fn(N) and leaves names in (fn(νn˜, n′.σ)∪ fn(M)∪ fn(N))\{n˜, n′} unchanged.
Let ρ′′ be a bijective renaming that maps n˜ρ to n˜ρ′ and that leaves names in fn(νn˜.σ)∪fn(M)∪fn(N)
unchanged. (Since n′ /∈ fn(σ), fn(νn˜.σ) = fn(νn˜, n′.σ), so the names n˜ρ′ do not collide with
fn(νn˜.σ) ∪ fn(M) ∪ fn(N), hence ρ′′ exists.)
If Σ ⊢ M(σρ) = N(σρ), then Σ ⊢ M(σρ)ρ′′ = N(σρ)ρ′′, so Σ ⊢ M(σρ′) = N(σρ′). (We have
σρρ′′ = σρ′ because n′ /∈ fn(σ).)
The converse is proved in the same way, using ρ′′−1 instead of ρ′′.
• CaseRewrite′′: νn˜.(σ|P )
◦
≡ νn˜.(σ′|P ) where dom(σ) = dom(σ′), Σ ⊢ xσ = xσ′ for all x ∈ dom(σ),
and (fv (xσ) ∪ fv (xσ′)) ∩ dom(σ) = ∅ for all x ∈ dom(σ).
Let ρ be a bijective renaming that maps names in n˜ to names not in fn(νn˜.σ) ∪ fn(M) ∪ fn(N)
and leaves names in (fn(νn˜.σ) ∪ fn(M) ∪ fn(N)) \ {n˜} unchanged, and ρ′ be a bijective renaming
that maps names in n˜ to names not in fn(νn˜.σ′)∪ fn(M)∪ fn(N) and leaves names in (fn(νn˜.σ′)∪
fn(M) ∪ fn(N)) \ {n˜} unchanged.
Let ρ′′ be a bijective renaming that maps names in n˜ to names not in fn(νn˜.σ)∪ fn(νn˜.σ′)∪ fn(M)∪
fn(N) and leaves names in (fn(νn˜.σ) ∪ fn(νn˜.σ′) ∪ fn(M) ∪ fn(N)) \ {n˜} unchanged.
The renaming ρ′′ a fortiori maps names in n˜ to names not in fn(νn˜.σ) ∪ fn(M) ∪ fn(N) and leaves
names in (fn(νn˜.σ) ∪ fn(M) ∪ fn(N)) \ {n˜} unchanged, so by the case of reflexivity νn˜.(σ | P )
◦
≡
νn˜.(σ | P ), we have Σ ⊢M(σρ) = N(σρ) if and only if Σ ⊢M(σρ′′) = N(σρ′′).
Similarly, Σ ⊢M(σ′ρ′) = N(σ′ρ′) if and only if Σ ⊢M(σ′ρ′′) = N(σ′ρ′′).
Moreover, for all x ∈ dom(σ), Σ ⊢ xσ = xσ′, so Σ ⊢ xσρ′′ = xσ′ρ′′, hence Σ ⊢ M(σρ′) = M(σ′ρ′′)
and Σ ⊢ N(σρ′) = N(σ′ρ′′), therefore Σ ⊢M(σρ′′) = N(σρ′′) if and only if Σ ⊢M(σ′ρ′′) = N(σ′ρ′′).
We can then conclude that Σ ⊢M(σρ) = N(σρ) if and only if Σ ⊢M(σ′ρ′) = N(σ′ρ′).
The lemma is an easy consequence of this result: since νn˜.σ ≡ νn˜′.σ′, we have νn˜.(σ|0)
◦
≡ νn˜′.(σ′|0)
by Lemma B.5. We conclude by applying the previous result taking P = P ′ = 0 and the identity for
ρ and ρ′.
Lemma D.2 Let A be a closed extended process. If νs.({s/x} | A) → B′, then there exists a closed
extended process A′ such that A→ A′ and B′ ≡ νs.({s/x} |A′).
Proof: Let pnf(A) = νn˜.(σ |P ). We rename n˜ so that s /∈ {n˜}. By Lemma B.8, pnf(νs.({s/x}|A)) =
νs, n˜.({s/x} | σ | P ) →◦ pnf(B′). By Lemma B.23, P →⋄ P ′ and pnf(B′) ≡ νs, n˜.({s/x} | σ | P ′) for
some closed process P ′. Let A′ = νn˜.(σ | P ′). Hence, A ≡ νn˜.(σ | P ) → νn˜.(σ | P ′) = A′ and
B′ ≡ pnf(B′) ≡ νs, n˜.({s/x} | σ | P
′) ≡ νs.({s/x} |A
′).
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Lemma D.3 Let A be a closed extended process and α be such that fv (α) ⊆ dom(A) ∪ {x} and
s /∈ fn(α). If νs.({s/x} |A)
α
−→ B′, then there exists a closed extended process A′ such that A
α{s/x}
−−−−→ A′
and B′ ≡ νs.({s/x} |A′).
Proof: Let pnf(A) = νn˜.(σ |P ). We rename n˜ so that s /∈ {n˜} and the elements of n˜ do not occur in
α. By Lemma B.12, pnf(νs.({s/x}|A)) = νs, n˜.({
s/x}|σ |P )
α
−→◦ B
′. By Lemma B.19, P
α({s/x}|σ)
−−−−−−→⋄ B
′′
and B′ ≡ νs, n˜.({s/x} | σ |B′′) for some B′′.
Next, we show that we can choose B′′ so that it is closed. Let α′ = α({s/x} | σ). By Lemma B.10,
for some n˜′, P1, P2, B1, N , M , P
′, y, we have P
⋄
≡ νn˜′.(P1 |P2), B′′ ≡ νn˜′.(B1 |P2), {n˜′}∩ fn(α′) = ∅,
bv(α) ∩ fv(P1 | P2) = ∅, and one of the following two cases holds:
1. α′ = N(M), P1 = N(y).P
′, and B1 = P
′{M/y}; or
2. α′ = νy.N〈y〉, P1 = N〈M〉.P ′, and B1 = P ′ | {M/y}.
Let σ′ be a substitution that maps variables of fv (B′′)\dom(B′′) to distinct fresh names. We rename y
so that y /∈ fv (B′′)\dom(B′′). Since P and α′ are closed, P = Pσ′ and α′ = α′σ′. By Lemma B.16(2),
P
⋄
≡ νn˜′.(P1σ
′ | P2σ
′) and Σ ⊢ νn˜′.(P1 | P2) = νn˜
′.(P1σ
′ | P2σ
′), so Σ ⊢ P1 = P1σ
′ and Σ ⊢ P2 = P2σ
′.
By Lemma B.15, B′′σ′ ≡ νn˜′.(B1σ′ | P2σ′). Finally, one of the following two cases holds:
1. α′ = N(M), P1σ
′ = N(y).P ′σ′, and B1σ
′ = P ′σ′{M/y}; or
2. α′ = νy.N〈y〉, P1σ′ = N〈Mσ′〉.P ′σ′, and B1σ′ = P ′σ′ | {Mσ
′
/y}.
Hence, by Lemma B.10, P
α′
−→⋄ B′′σ′. Moreover, Σ ⊢ B1 = B1σ′ because Σ ⊢ P1 = P1σ′, so
Σ ⊢ νn˜′.(B1 | P2) = νn˜′.(B1σ′ | P2σ′), hence B′′σ′ ≡ νn˜′.(B1σ′ | P2σ′) ≡ νn˜′.(B1 | P2) ≡ B′′, so
B′ ≡ νs, n˜.({s/x} | σ | B′′σ′). Hence, by replacing B′′ with B′′σ′, we obtain the same properties as
above, and additionally B′′σ′ is closed.
Let A′ = νn˜.(σ |B′′σ′). Hence, A ≡ νn˜.(σ |P )
α{s/x}
−−−−→◦ A′ by definition of
α{s/x}
−−−−→◦, so A
α{s/x}
−−−−→ A′
by Lemma B.13, and B′ ≡ νs, n˜.({s/x} | σ | B′′σ′) ≡ νs.({s/x} | A′).
Lemma 4.5 (Name disclosure) Let A and B be closed extended processes and x be a variable such
that x /∈ dom(A). We have A ≈l B if and only if
νn.({n/x} | A) ≈l νn.({
n/x} | B)
Proof: The direct implication follows from context closure of ≈l. Conversely, we show that the
relation R defined by A R B if and only if A and B are closed extended processes and νs.({s/x}|A) ≈l
νs.({s/x} | B) for some x /∈ dom(A) is a labelled bisimulation.
1. The relation R is symmetric, because ≈l is.
2. We suppose that A R B and show that A ≈s B. Since A R B, we have νs.({s/x} | A) ≈l
νs.({s/x} | B) for some x /∈ dom(A), so νs.({s/x} | A) ≈s νs.({s/x} | B). We have dom(A) =
dom(νs.({s/x} | A)) \ {x} = dom(νs.({s/x} | B)) \ {x} = dom(B). Let M , N be two terms
such that fv (M) ∪ fv (N) ⊆ dom(A). Let M ′ = M{x/s} and N ′ = N{x/s}. We show that
(M = N)ϕ(A) if and only if (M ′ = N ′)ϕ(νs.({s/x} |A)).
If (M = N)ϕ(A), then ϕ(A) ≡ νn˜.σ, Σ ⊢ Mσ = Nσ, and {n˜} ∩ (fn(M) ∪ fn(N)) = ∅ for
some n˜ and σ. If s ∈ fn(M) ∪ fn(N), we know that s /∈ {n˜}. Otherwise, we rename n˜ so
that s /∈ {n˜}, while preserving the previous properties. So ϕ(νs.({s/x} | A)) ≡ νs, n˜.(σ | {s/x}),
Σ ⊢M ′(σ|{s/x}) = N ′(σ|{s/x}), and {s, n˜}∩(fn(M ′)∪fn(N ′)) = ∅, so (M ′ = N ′)ϕ(νs.({s/x}|A)).
Conversely, if (M ′ = N ′)ϕ(νs.({s/x} | A)), then ϕ(νs.({s/x} | A)) ≡ νn˜′.σ′, Σ ⊢ M ′σ′ = N ′σ′,
and {n˜′} ∩ (fn(M ′) ∪ fn(N ′)) = ∅ for some n˜′ and σ′. We have ϕ(A) ≡ νn˜.σ for some n˜ and
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σ. We rename n˜ so that ({s} ∪ fn(N) ∪ fn(M)) ∩ {n˜} = ∅, so (fn(N ′) ∪ fn(M ′)) ∩ {n˜} = ∅.
Then ϕ(νs.({s/x} | A)) ≡ νs, n˜.(σ | {s/x}), so νn˜′.σ′ ≡ νs, n˜.(σ | {s/x}). By Lemma D.1, Σ ⊢
M ′(σ | {s/x}) = N ′(σ | {s/x}), so Σ ⊢Mσ = Nσ, hence (M = N)ϕ(A).
Symmetrically, (M = N)ϕ(B) if and only if (M ′ = N ′)ϕ(νs.({s/x} | B)). Moreover, (M ′ =
N ′)ϕ(νs.({s/x}|A)) if and only if (M ′ = N ′)ϕ(νs.({s/x}|B)), because νs.({s/x}|A) ≈s νs.({s/x}|
B). Therefore, (M = N)ϕ(A) if and only if (M = N)ϕ(B), so A ≈s B.
3. We suppose that A R B, A → A′, and A′ is closed, and we show that B →∗ B′ and A′ R B′
for some B′. For some x /∈ dom(A), we have νs.({s/x} | A) ≈l νs.({s/x} | B), νs.({s/x} | A) →
νs.({s/x} |A′), and νs.({s/x} |A′) is closed, so νs.({s/x} |B)→∗ B′′ and νs.({s/x} |A′) ≈l B′′ for
some B′′.
By Lemma D.2 applied several times, B →∗ B′ and B′′ ≡ νs.({s/x}|B′) for some closed extended
process B′, so νs.({s/x} | A′) ≈l νs.({s/x} |B′), which shows that A′ R B′.
4. We suppose that A R B, A
α
−→ A′, A′ is closed, and fv(α) ⊆ dom(A), and we show that
B →∗
α
−→→∗ B′ and A′ R B′ for some B′.
For some x /∈ dom(A), we have νs.({s/x} | A) ≈l νs.({s/x} | B). First, we rename x in this
equivalence so that x /∈ bv (α), by Lemma C.5.
Let α′ = α{x/s}. By Lemma B.12, we have pnf(A)
α
−→◦ A′, so there exist n˜, σ, P , α′′, and A′′
such that pnf(A)
◦
≡ νn˜.(σ | P ), P
α′′
−−→⋄ A′′, A′ ≡ νn˜.(σ | A′′), fv (σ) ∩ bv(α′′) = ∅, Σ ⊢ ασ = α′′,
and the elements of n˜ do not occur in α. We rename n˜ so that s /∈ {n˜}. Since A is closed, pnf(A)
is closed, so by Lemma B.16(1), we can arrange that νn˜.(σ | P ) is also closed, by substituting
fresh names for its free variables.
We have νs.({s/x} |A) ≡ νs, n˜.({s/x} |σ |P ), so by Lemma B.5, pnf(νs.({s/x} |A))
◦
≡ νs, n˜.({s/x} |
σ | P ) since νs, n˜.({s/x} | σ | P ) is in partial normal form, because x /∈ fv (P ) and x /∈ fv (σ),
since νn˜.(σ | P ) is closed and x /∈ dom(A) = dom(σ). Moreover, P
α′′
−−→⋄ A
′′, νs.({s/x} | A
′) ≡
νs, n˜.({s/x}|σ|A′′), fv ({s/x}|σ)∩bv(α′′) = ∅ because x /∈ bv(α′′) = bv (α), Σ ⊢ α′({s/x}|σ) = ασ =
α′′, and the elements of s, n˜ do not occur in α′. Therefore, pnf(νs.({s/x} |A))
α′
−→◦ νs.({s/x} |A′).
So νs.({s/x}|A) ≡ pnf(νs.({s/x}|A))
α′
−→ νs.({s/x}|A′) using Lemmas B.1 and B.13, so νs.({s/x}|
A)
α′
−→ νs.({s/x} |A′) by Struct.
Since νs.({s/x}|A) ≈l νs.({s/x}|B), we have νs.({s/x}|B)→∗
α′
−→→∗ B′′ and νs.({s/x}|A′) ≈l B′′
for some B′′. By Lemma D.2 applied several times and Lemma D.3, B →∗
α
−→→∗ B′ and
B′′ ≡ νs.({s/x} | B′) for some closed extended process B′, so νs.({s/x} | A′) ≈l νs.({s/x} | B′),
which shows that A′ R B′.
Since R is a labelled bisimulation and ≈l is the largest labelled bisimulation, we have R ⊆ ≈l. If
νs.({s/x} | A) ≈l νs.({s/x} |B), then A R B, so A ≈l B.
E Proofs for Section 4.4
Lemma 4.6 The following three properties are equivalent:
1. the variables x˜ resolve to M˜ in A;
2. there exists A′ such that A ≡ {M˜/˜x} | A
′;
3. (x˜ = M˜)ϕ(A) and the substitution {M˜/˜x} is cycle-free.
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Proof: The implication from 1 to 2 is immediate, with A′ = νx˜.A. The implication from 2 to 3
is also obvious. Let us prove the implication from 3 to 1. Since (x˜ = M˜)ϕ(A), we have {x˜} ⊆
dom(ϕ(A)) = dom(A), so A ≡ νn˜.({M˜
′
/˜x} | σ | P ) for some n˜, M˜
′, σ, and P such that the variables of
dom(A) do not occur in M˜ ′, the image of σ, nor P . We rename n˜ so that these names do not occur
in M˜ . Since (x˜ = M˜)ϕ(A), we have M˜ ′ = M˜{M˜
′
/˜x}σ = M˜{
M˜/˜x}σ using that {
M˜/˜x} is cycle-free, so
A ≡ νn˜.({M˜/˜x} | σ | P ). Since the names n˜ do not occur in M˜ , A ≡ {M˜/˜x} | νn˜.(σ | P ) ≡ {M˜/˜x} | νx˜.A,
which proves 1.
Lemma 4.8 A
νx˜.N〈M〉
−−−−−−→ A′ if and only if, for some z that does not occur in any of A, A′, x˜, N , and
M , A
νz.N〈z〉
−−−−−→ νx˜.({M/z} | A
′), {x˜} ⊆ fv(M) \ fv(N), and the variables x˜ are solvable in {M/z} |A
′.
Proof: We prove the implication from left to right by induction on the derivation of A
νx˜.N〈M〉
−−−−−−→ A′.
Precisely, we prove the result for all z that do not occur in the derivation of A
νx˜.N〈M〉
−−−−−−→ A′.
• Case Out-Term. We have A = N〈M〉.P
N〈M〉
−−−−→ P = A′ and x˜ is empty. Let z /∈ fv(N〈M〉.P ). By
Out-Var, A = N〈M〉.P
νz.N〈z〉
−−−−−→ P | {M/z} ≡ {M/z} | A′, so by Struct, A
νz.N〈z〉
−−−−−→ {M/z} | A′.
• Case Open-Var. The transition A = νx˜.B
νx˜.N〈M〉
−−−−−−→ A′ is derived from B
N〈M〉
−−−−→ A′ with {x˜} ⊆
fv (M) \ fv (N) and x˜ solvable in {M/z′} | A′ for some z′ /∈ fv(A′) ∪ {x˜}. By induction hypothesis,
B
νz.N〈z〉
−−−−−→ {M/z} | A
′ for all z that do not occur in the derivation of B
N〈M〉
−−−−→ A′, so z does not
occur in A = νx˜.B
νx˜.N〈M〉
−−−−−−→ A′ since {x˜} ⊆ fv (M). By Scope, A = νx˜.B
νz.N〈z〉
−−−−−→ νx˜.({M/z} |A′),
since {x˜} ∩ fv (N) = ∅.
• Case Scope. The transition A = νu.B
N〈M〉
−−−−→ νu.B′ = A′ is derived fromB
N〈M〉
−−−−→ B′, where u does
not occur in N〈M〉. (The restriction of the rule Scope guarantees that x˜ is empty.) By induction
hypothesis, B
νz.N〈z〉
−−−−−→ {M/z} | B′ for all z that do not occur in the derivation of B
N〈M〉
−−−−→ B′.
Let z be a variable that does not occur in the derivation of A = νu.B
N〈M〉
−−−−→ νu.B′ = A′. Since
the derivation of A = νu.B
N〈M〉
−−−−→ νu.B′ = A′ includes the derivation of B
N〈M〉
−−−−→ B′, z does
not occur in the derivation of B
N〈M〉
−−−−→ B′. Hence, we have B
νz.N〈z〉
−−−−−→ {M/z} | B′, so by Scope,
A = νu.B
νz.N〈z〉
−−−−−→ νu.({M/z} |B′), since u does not occur in νz.N〈z〉. Moreover, νu.({M/z} |B′) ≡
{M/z} | νu.B′ = {M/z} | A′ since u does not occur in {M/z}. So by Struct, A
νz.N〈z〉
−−−−−→ {M/z} | A′.
• Case Par. The transition A = B | C
νx˜.N〈M〉
−−−−−−→ B′ | C = A′ is derived from B
νx˜.N〈M〉
−−−−−−→ B′, with
{x˜}∩ fv (C) = ∅. By induction hypothesis, B
νz.N〈z〉
−−−−−→ νx˜.({M/z} |B′), {x˜} ⊆ fv(M)\ fv (N), and the
variables x˜ are solvable in {M/z} | B′, for all z that do not occur in the derivation of B
N〈M〉
−−−−→ B′.
Let z be a variable that does not occur in the derivation of A = B | C
νx˜.N〈M〉
−−−−−−→ B′ | C = A′.
Since the derivation of A = B | C
νx˜.N〈M〉
−−−−−−→ B′ | C = A′ includes the derivation of B
N〈M〉
−−−−→ B′,
z does not occur in the derivation of B
N〈M〉
−−−−→ B′. Hence, we have B
νz.N〈z〉
−−−−−→ νx˜.({M/z} | B′),
so by Par, B | C
νz.N〈z〉
−−−−−→ νx˜.({M/z} | B′) | C, since z /∈ fv(C). Moreover, νx˜.({M/z} | B′) | C ≡
νx˜.({M/z}|(B′ |C)) = νx˜.({M/z}|A′) since {x˜}∩fv (C) = ∅, so by Struct, A
νz.N〈z〉
−−−−−→ νx˜.({M/z}|A′).
Moreover, the variables x˜ are solvable in {M/z} | A′: assuming that the variables x˜ resolve to M˜ in
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{M/z} | B′, we have
{M˜/˜x} | νx˜.({
M/z} | A
′) ≡ {M˜/˜x} | νx˜.({
M/z} | (B
′ | C))
≡ {M˜/˜x} | νx˜.({
M/z} | B
′) | C since {x˜} ∩ fv (C) = ∅
≡ {M/z} |B
′ | C since x˜ resolve to M˜ in {M/z} | B′
≡ {M/z} |A
′
• Case Struct. The transition A
νx˜.N〈M〉
−−−−−−→ A′ is derived from B
νx˜.N〈M〉
−−−−−−→ B′, A ≡ B and A′ ≡ B′.
By induction hypothesis, B
νz.N〈z〉
−−−−−→ νx˜.({M/z} | B′), {x˜} ⊆ fv (M) \ fv (N), and the variables x˜
are solvable in {M/z} | B′, for all z that do not occur in the derivation of B
N〈M〉
−−−−→ B′. Let z
be a variable that does not occur in the derivation of A
νx˜.N〈M〉
−−−−−−→ A′. Since the derivation of
A
νx˜.N〈M〉
−−−−−−→ A′ includes the derivation of B
N〈M〉
−−−−→ B′, z does not occur in the derivation of
B
N〈M〉
−−−−→ B′. Hence, we have B
νz.N〈z〉
−−−−−→ νx˜.({M/z} | B′) and νx˜.({M/z} | B′) ≡ νx˜.({M/z} | A′), so
by Struct, A
νz.N〈z〉
−−−−−→ νx˜.({M/z} | A′). Moreover, the variables x˜ are solvable in {M/z} | B′ and
{M/z} | B′ ≡ {M/z} | A′, so by Definition 4.5, the variables x˜ are solvable in {M/z} | A′.
Let us now prove the implication from right to left. For this proof, we use the notion of partial
normal form introduced in Appendix B. We have A
νz.N〈z〉
−−−−−→ νx˜.({M/z} |A′) where the variables x˜ are
solvable in {M/z} |A′, {x˜} ⊆ fv(M)\ fv(N), and z does not occur in A, A′, x˜, N , M . By Lemma B.12,
we have pnf(A)
νz.N〈z〉
−−−−−→◦ νx˜.({M/z} | A′). By definition of
νz.N〈z〉
−−−−−→◦, we have pnf(A) ≡ νn˜.(σ | P ),
P
νz.N ′〈z〉
−−−−−→⋄ B
′, νx˜.({M/z} | A
′) ≡ νn˜.(σ | B′), z /∈ fv (σ), Σ ⊢ Nσ = N ′, and the elements of n˜ do
not occur in N , for some n˜, σ, P , N ′, B′. By Lemma B.10, we have P
⋄
≡ νn˜′.(N ′〈M ′〉.P1 | P2),
B′ ≡ νn˜′.(P1 | {M
′
/z} | P2), {n˜′} ∩ fn(N ′) = ∅, z /∈ fv(P1 | P2) for some n˜′, P1, P2, N ′, M ′. Hence, we
have
A ≡ νn˜.(σ | νn˜′.(N ′〈M ′〉.P1 | P2))
νx˜.({M/z} | A
′) ≡ νn˜.(σ | νn˜′.(P1 | {
M ′/z} | P2))
We rename the names in n˜′ so that they do not occur in σ nor in N . Then
A ≡ νn˜, n˜′.(σ |N ′〈M ′〉.P1 | P2)
νx˜.({M/z} |A
′) ≡ νn˜, n˜′.(σ | P1 | {
M ′/z} | P2)
We instantiate the variables using σ, so that the variables of dom(σ) do not occur in the image of σ
nor in N ′,M ′, P1, P2. Furthermore, let σ
′ be a substitution that maps x˜ to distinct fresh names. By
Lemma B.5,
pnf(νx˜.({M/z} | A
′))
◦
≡ νn˜, n˜′.((σ | {M
′
/z}) | (P1 | P2))
Moreover, Σ ⊢ pnf(νx˜.({M/z}|A′)) = pnf(νx˜.({M/z}|A′))σ′ because {x˜}∩fv(pnf(νx˜.({M/z}|A′))) = ∅.
Therefore, by Lemma B.14, Σ ⊢ νn˜, n˜′.((σ | {M
′
/z}) | (P1 | P2)) = νn˜, n˜′.((σ | {M
′
/z}) | (P1 | P2))σ′, so
Σ ⊢ M ′ = M ′σ′, Σ ⊢ σ = σσ′, Σ ⊢ P1 = P1σ′, and Σ ⊢ P2 = P2σ′, so by replacing σ with σσ′, M ′
with M ′σ′, P1 with P1σ
′, and P2 with P2σ
′, we obtain
A ≡ νn˜, n˜′.(σ |N〈M ′〉.P1 | P2)
νx˜.({M/z} |A
′) ≡ νn˜, n˜′.(σ | P1 | {
M ′/z} | P2)
and the variables x˜ are not free in the right-hand sides of these equivalences.
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The variables x˜ resolve to some M˜ in {M/z} | A′, so
{M/z} | A
′ ≡ {M˜/˜x} | νx˜.({
M/z} | A
′) ≡ {M˜/˜x} | νn˜, n˜
′.(σ | P1 | {
M ′/z} | P2)
We rename the names n˜, n˜′ so that they do not occur in M˜ . Hence
{M/z} |A
′ ≡ νn˜, n˜′.(σ | {M
′
/z} | {
M˜/˜x} | P1 | P2)
A′ ≡ νz.({M/z} |A
′) ≡ νz, n˜, n˜′.(σ | {M
′
/z} | {
M˜/˜x} | P1 | P2)
By Lemma 4.6, (z = M)ϕ({M/z} | A
′), so (z = M)νn˜, n˜′.(σ | {M
′
/z} | {M˜/˜x}). We rename the names
n˜, n˜′ so that they do not occur in M . Therefore,
A ≡ νx˜, z, n˜, n˜′.(σ | {M
′
/z} | {
M˜/˜x} |N〈z〉.P1 | P2)
≡ νx˜, z, n˜, n˜′.(σ | {M
′
/z} | {
M˜/˜x} |N〈M〉.P1 | P2)
So we derive
N〈M〉.P1
N〈M〉
−−−−→ P1 by Out-Term
N〈M〉.P1 | σ | {
M ′/z} | {
M˜/˜x} | P2
N〈M〉
−−−−→ P1 | σ | {
M ′/z} | {
M˜/˜x} | P2 by Par
νz, n˜, n˜′.(N〈M〉.P1 | σ | {
M ′/z} | {
M˜/˜x} | P2)
N〈M〉
−−−−→ νz, n˜, n˜′.(P1 | σ | {
M ′/z} | {
M˜/˜x} | P2)
by Scope, since z, n˜, n˜′ do not occur in N〈M〉
νz, n˜, n˜′.(σ | {M
′
/z} | {
M˜/˜x} |N〈M〉.P1 | P2)
N〈M〉
−−−−→ A′ by Struct
νx˜, z, n˜, n˜′.(σ | {M
′
/z} | {
M˜/˜x} |N〈M〉.P1 | P2)
νx˜.N〈M〉
−−−−−−→ A′
by Open-Var, since {x˜} ⊆ fv (M) \ fv (N)
and the variables x˜ are solvable in {M/z} |A′
A
νx˜.N〈M〉
−−−−−−→ A′ by Struct
Lemma 4.9 A
νx.N〈x〉
−−−−−→ A′ in the refined semantics if and only if A
νx.N〈x〉
−−−−−→ A′ in the simple
semantics.
Proof: Suppose that A
νx.N〈x〉
−−−−−→ A′ in the refined semantics. By Lemma 4.8, for some variable z
that does not occur in this transition, we have A
νz.N〈z〉
−−−−−→ νx.({x/z}|A′) in the simple semantics. Since
x ∈ dom(A′), A′ ≡ νn˜.({M/x} | A′′) for some n˜ and some M and A′′ that do not contain x nor z, so
νx.({x/z} |A
′) ≡ νx.({x/z} | νn˜.({
M/x} | A
′′)) ≡ νn˜.({M/z} | A
′′)
Hence by Struct, A
νz.N〈z〉
−−−−−→ νn˜.({M/z} | A′′). By renaming z into x and x into z everywhere in the
derivation of this transition, we obtain A
νx.N〈x〉
−−−−−→ νn˜.({M/x} | A′′), since z and x are not free in A,
N , A′′, M . Since we have νn˜.({M/x} | A′′) ≡ A′, we obtain A
νx.N〈x〉
−−−−−→ A′ by Struct in the simple
semantics.
Conversely, suppose that A
νx.N〈x〉
−−−−−→ A′ in the simple semantics. Since x ∈ dom(A′), A′ ≡
νn˜.({M/x} | A′′) for some n˜ and some M and A′′ that do not contain x, so by Struct, A
νx.N〈x〉
−−−−−→
νn˜.({M/x} |A′′). By renaming x into a fresh variable z everywhere in the derivation of this transition,
76
A
νz.N〈z〉
−−−−−→ νn˜.({M/z} | A′′), since x is not free in A, M , A′′. Moreover, νn˜.({M/z} | A′′) ≡ νx.({x/z} |
νn˜.({M/x} | A′′)) ≡ νx.({x/z} | A′), so by Struct, we obtain A
νz.N〈z〉
−−−−−→ νx.({x/z} | A′).
The variable x resolves to z in {x/z} | A′, because
{z/x} | νx.({
x/z} |A
′) ≡ {z/x} | νx.({
x/z} | νn˜.({
M/x} |A
′′))
≡ {z/x} | νn˜.({
M/z} | A
′′)
≡ νn˜.({z/x} | {
M/z} | A
′′)
≡ νn˜.({M/x} | {
x/z} |A
′′)
≡ {x/z} | νn˜.({
M/x} |A
′′)
≡ {x/z} | A
′
Therefore, by Lemma 4.8, A
νx.N〈x〉
−−−−−→ A′ in the refined semantics.
Theorem 4.2 Let ≈L be the relation of labelled bisimilarity obtained by applying Definition 4.4 to
the refined semantics. We have ≈l = ≈L.
Proof: By Lemma 4.9, ≈L is a simple-labelled bisimulation, and thus ≈L ⊆ ≈l. Conversely, to show
that ≈l is a refined-labelled bisimulation, it suffices to prove its bisimulation property for any refined
output label.
Assume A ≈l B, A
νx˜.N〈M〉
−−−−−−→ A′, A′ is closed, and fv (νx˜.N〈M〉) ⊆ dom(A). By Lemma 4.8, we
have
A
νz.N〈z〉
−−−−−→ A◦ = νx˜.({M/z} |A
′)
for some fresh variable z, where {x˜} ⊆ fv (M) \ fv (N) and x˜ resolves to M˜ in {M/z} |A′:
{M/z} | A
′ ≡ {M˜/˜x} | νx˜.({
M/z} | A
′) ≡ {M˜/˜x} | A
◦ (19)
Let E[ ] = νz.({M˜/˜x} | ). Using the structural equivalence above and structural rearrangements,
we obtain E[A◦] ≡ νz.({M/z} | A′) ≡ A′. By labelled bisimulation hypothesis on the simple output
transition above, we have B →∗ B1
νz.N〈z〉
−−−−−→ B2 →
∗ B◦ with A◦ ≈l B
◦ for some B1, B2, B
◦. By
instantiating all variables in fv(B2) \ dom(B2) with fresh names in the derivation of this reduction,
we obtain the same property and additionally B2 is closed. By Theorem 4.1, labelled bisimilarity is
closed by application of closing contexts. Using E[ ], we obtain A′ ≈l E[B◦]. Let B′ = E[B◦].
Let us first show that B2 ≡ νx˜.({M/z} | E[B2]). By Lemma 4.6, we have (z = M)ϕ({M/z} | A′)
and by the structural equivalence (19), (x˜ = M˜)ϕ({M/z} |A
′), so (z =M{M˜/˜x})ϕ({
M/z} |A
′), so (z =
M{M˜/˜x})ϕ(νx˜.({
M/z}|A′)) since the variables x˜ do not occur inM{M˜/˜x}. Hence (z =M{
M˜/˜x})ϕ(A
◦).
Since A◦ ≈l B
◦ ≈s B2, we have A
◦ ≈s B2, so (z = M{M˜/˜x})ϕ(B2). Since z ∈ dom(B2), we have
B2 ≡ νn˜.({N/z} |B3) for some n˜, N and B3 such that z is not free in B3. We rename n˜ so that these
names do not occur in M˜ nor in M . Then E[B2] ≡ νn˜.({M˜
{N/z}/˜x} | B3), so
νx˜.({M/z} |E[B2]) ≡ νn˜.({
M{M˜{
N/z}/˜x}/z} |B3) ≡ νn˜.({
N/z} |B3) ≡ B2
because (N = M{M˜{
N/z}/˜x})ϕ(B3) since (z = M{
M˜/˜x})ϕ(B2). So we have the desired structural
equivalence B2 ≡ νx˜.({M/z} | E[B2]).
Then
B1
νz.N〈z〉
−−−−−→ νx˜.({M/z} |E[B2])
Moreover, x˜ resolves to M˜ in {M/z} | A′ and
{M/z} | A
′ ≡ {M/z} | E[A
◦] ≈l {
M/z} |E[B
◦] ≈s {
M/z} | E[B2]
77
so {M/z}|A′ ≈s {M/z}|E[B2], so by Lemma 4.7, x˜ resolves to M˜ in {M/z}|E[B2]. Hence, by Lemma 4.8,
B1
νx˜.N〈M〉
−−−−−−→ E[B2]. Hence
B →∗ B1
νx˜.N〈M〉
−−−−−−→ E[B2]→
∗ E[B◦] = B′
so we have A′ ≈l B′ and B →∗
νx˜.N〈M〉
−−−−−−→→∗ B′, which concludes the proof.
F Proofs for Section 6.2
In this appendix, we suppose that the signature Σ satisfies the assumptions of Theorem 6.1 and write
R for its convergent rewrite system. In particular, since R terminates, the left-hand sides of its rewrite
rules cannot be variables.
In preparation for the proof of Theorem 6.1, we study the effect of the translation [[ · ]] on the
semantics of terms and processes where k occurs only as mac(k, ·), relying on the partial normal forms
defined in Appendix B.
Lemma F.1 Σ ⊢M1 =M2 if and only if Σ ⊢ h(k,M1) = h(k,M2).
Proof: The implication from left to right is obvious. Conversely, suppose that Σ ⊢ h(k,M1) =
h(k,M2). Let M
′
1 and M
′
2 be the normal forms under R of M1 and M2 respectively. Hence Σ ⊢
h(k,M ′1) = h(k,M
′
2). For some n, n
′ ≥ 1, we have M ′1 = N1 :: . . . :: Nn and M
′
2 = N
′
1 :: . . . :: N
′
n′
where the root symbols of Nn and N
′
n′ are not ::. We compute the normal form of h(k,M
′
1):
• If n = 1, then h(k,M ′1) = h(k,N1) is irreducible since N1 is irreducible and the rewrite rules with
h at the root of the left-hand side apply only to terms with :: at the root.
• If n > 1 and Nn = nil, then h(k,M ′1) reduces to f(. . . (f(k,N1), . . . ), Nn−1), and this term is
irreducible since N1, . . . , Nn−1 are irreducible as subterms of an irreducible term, and no rewrite
rule contains f in its left-hand side.
• If n > 1 and Nn 6= nil, then h(k,M ′1) reduces to h(f(. . . (f(k,N1), . . . ), Nn−2), Nn−1 :: Nn) and this
term is irreducible since N1, . . . , Nn are irreducible, no rewrite rule contains f in its left-hand side,
and no rewrite rule with h at the root applies since Nn is not nil and does not contain :: at the root.
and similarly compute a normal form of h(k,M ′2). Their equality implies n = n
′ and Ni = N
′
i for all
i ≤ n, hence M ′1 =M
′
2 and Σ ⊢M1 =M2.
Lemma F.2 If M1 →R M2 and k occurs only as mac(k, ·) in M1, then [[M1]]→R [[M2]] and k occurs
only as mac(k, ·) in M2.
Proof: We haveM1 = C[M3σ] andM2 = C[M4σ] for some rewrite ruleM3 →M4 of R, term context
C, and substitution σ. Hence [[M1]] = [[C[M3σ]]]. Furthermore, mac and k do not occur in M3 and M3
is not a variable, so [[C[M3σ]]] = [[C]][M3[[σ]]]. Since k occurs only as mac(k, ·) in M1 and mac does not
occur in M3, k occurs only as mac(k, ·) in C and in the image of σ. Furthermore, k does not occur in
M4. Therefore, k occurs only as mac(k, ·) in M2 = C[M4σ] and [[M2]] = [[C[M4σ]]] = [[C]][M4[[σ]]]. We
can then conclude that [[M1]]→R [[M2]].
Lemma F.3 Suppose that k occurs only as mac(k, ·) in M1 and M2. We have Σ ⊢ M1 = M2 if and
only if Σ ⊢ [[M1]] = [[M2]].
Proof: Let us first prove the implication from left to right. If Σ ⊢M1 =M2, then M1 →∗R M
′ and
M2 →∗R M
′ for some M ′. By Lemma F.2, [[M1]]→∗R [[M
′]] and [[M2]]→∗R [[M
′]], so Σ ⊢ [[M1]] = [[M2]].
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Conversely, suppose that Σ ⊢ [[M1]] = [[M2]]. Let M ′1 and M
′
2 be the normal forms under R of
M1 and M2, respectively. By Lemma F.2, k occurs only as mac(k, ·) in M ′1 and M
′
2, [[M1]]→
∗
R [[M
′
1]],
and [[M2]] →∗R [[M
′
2]], so Σ ⊢ [[M
′
1]] = [[M
′
2]]. We show by induction on the total size of the terms M
′
1
and M ′2 that, if k occurs only as mac(k, ·) in M
′
1 and M
′
2, M
′
1 and M
′
2 are irreducible under R, and
Σ ⊢ [[M ′1]] = [[M
′
2]], then M
′
1 =M
′
2:
• First suppose that M ′1 and M
′
2 are not of the form mac(k, ·).
Since f does not occur on the left-hand sides of rewrite rules of R, if a rewrite rule of R could be
applied at the root of [[M ′1]] or [[M
′
2]], then it would match only symbols above occurrences of f(. . . )
in [[M ′1]] or [[M
′
2]], hence, only symbols above occurrences of mac(k, ·) in M
′
1 or M
′
2. Moreover, by
induction hypothesis, if subterms of [[M ′1]] or [[M
′
2]] are equal, the corresponding subterms of M
′
1 or
M ′2 are also equal. Hence, the same rewrite rule would also apply at the root of M
′
1 or M
′
2, which
is impossible since M ′1 and M
′
2 are irreducible.
Hence, the equality Σ ⊢ [[M ′1]] = [[M
′
2]] is equivalent to the equality between the immediate subterms
of [[M ′1]] and [[M
′
2]], and we conclude by induction.
• Now suppose that M ′1 = mac(k,M
′′
1 ) and M
′
2 = mac(k,M
′′
2 ). Then [[M
′
1]] = f(k, h(k, [[M
′′
1 ]])) and
[[M ′2]] = f(k, h(k, [[M
′′
2 ]])). Since Σ ⊢ [[M
′
1]] = [[M
′
2]], we have Σ ⊢ h(k, [[M
′′
1 ]]) = h(k, [[M
′′
2 ]]) since
no rewrite rule applies to f(·, ·), so by Lemma F.1, Σ ⊢ [[M ′′1 ]] = [[M
′′
2 ]]. By induction hypothesis,
M ′′1 =M
′′
2 , so M
′
1 =M
′
2.
• Finally, if M ′1 = mac(k,M
′′
1 ) and M
′
2 is not of the form mac(k, ·), then [[M
′
1]] = f(k, h(k, [[M
′′
1 ]])) and
[[M ′2]] is not of the form f(k, ·) because k occurs only as mac(k, ·) in M
′
2, so Σ ⊢ [[M
′
1]] 6= [[M
′
2]]: this
case cannot happen. Symmetrically, the caseM ′2 = mac(k,M
′′
2 ) and M
′
1 is not of the form mac(k, ·)
cannot happen.
From this result, we easily conclude that Σ ⊢M1 =M2.
Lemma F.4 Suppose that P0 is closed, α = νx.N ′〈x〉 or α = N
′(M ′) for some ground term N ′, and
k occurs only as mac(k, ·) in P0 and α.
If P0
α
−→⋄ A, then [[P0]]
[α]
−−→⋄ [[A′]] and A ≡ A′ for some A′ where k occurs only as mac(k, ·) and,
moreover,
• when α = νx.N ′〈x〉, A′ = E[{M/x}] where E is a closed plain evaluation context (with no active
substitutions and no variable restrictions) and M is a ground term;
• when α = N ′(M ′), A′ is a plain process with fv(A′) ⊆ fv (M ′).
Proof: We proceed by induction on the syntax of P0 and apply Lemma B.18 to decompose P0
α
−→⋄ A,
with the following cases:
1. P0 = P |Q and either P
α
−→⋄ A′ and A ≡ A′ |Q, or Q
α
−→⋄ A′ and A ≡ P |A′, for some P , Q, and
A′. In the first case, by induction hypothesis, [[P ]]
[α]
−−→⋄ [[A′′]] and A′ ≡ A′′ for some A′′ where k
occurs only as mac(k, ·). By Par′, since [[Q]] is closed, [[P0]] = [[P ]] | [[Q]]
[α]
−−→⋄ [[A′′]] | [[Q]] = [[A′′ |Q]]
and A′′ |Q ≡ A′ |Q ≡ A. Furthermore, k occurs only as mac(k, ·) in A′′ |Q. The second case is
symmetric.
2. P0 = νn.P , P
α
−→⋄ A′, and A ≡ νn.A′ for some P , A′, and n that does not occur in α. We
rename n so that n 6= k. By induction hypothesis, [[P ]]
[α]
−−→⋄ [[A′′]] and A′ ≡ A′′ for some
A′′ where k occurs only as mac(k, ·). By Scope′, [[P0]] = νn.[[P ]]
α
−→⋄ νn.[[A′′]] = [[νn.A′′]] and
νn.A′′ ≡ νn.A′ ≡ A. Furthermore, k occurs only as mac(k, ·) in νn.A′′.
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3. P0 = !P , P
α
−→⋄ A′, and A ≡ A′ | !P for some P and A′. By induction hypothesis, [[P ]]
[α]
−−→⋄ [[A′′]]
and A′ ≡ A′′ for some A′′ where k occurs only as mac(k, ·). We have [[P0]] = ![[P ]]
⋄
≡ [[P ]] |
![[P ]]
[α]
−−→⋄ [[A′′]] | ![[P ]] by Par
′, since ![[P ]] is closed. Hence by Struct′, [[P0]]
[α]
−−→⋄ [[A′′ | !P ]] and
A′′ | !P ≡ A′ | !P ≡ A. Furthermore, k occurs only as mac(k, ·) in A′′ | !P .
4. P0 = N(x).P , α = N
′(M ′), Σ ⊢ N = N ′, and A ≡ P{M
′
/x} for some N , x, P , N
′, and M ′. By
Lemma F.3, Σ ⊢ [[N ]] = [[N ′]], so we have [[P0]] = [[N ]](x).[[P ]]
⋄
≡ [[N ′]](x).[[P ]]
[α]
−−→⋄ [[P ]]{[M
′]/x}
by In′. Since k occurs only as mac(k, ·) in M ′, the substitution [[P ]]{[M
′]/x} does not create
new occurrences of mac with key k, so [[P ]]{[M
′]/x} = [[P{M
′
/x}]]. By Struct
′, we obtain
[[P0]]
[α]
−−→⋄ [[P{M
′
/x}]], and we have A ≡ P{M
′
/x}. Furthermore, k occurs only as mac(k, ·) in
P{M
′
/x}.
5. P0 = N〈M〉.P , α = νx.N ′〈x〉, Σ ⊢ N = N ′, x /∈ fv(P0), and A ≡ P | {M/x} for some N ,
M , P , x, and N ′. By Lemma F.3, Σ ⊢ [[N ]] = [[N ′]], so we have [[P0]] = [[N ]]〈[[M ]]〉.[[P ]]
⋄
≡
[[N ′]]〈[[M ]]〉.[[P ]]
[α]
−−→⋄ [[P ]]|{[M ]/x} = [[P |{M/x}]] byOut-Var
′. By Struct′, we obtain [[P0]]
[α]
−−→⋄
[[P | {M/x}]], and we have A ≡ P | {M/x}. Furthermore, k occurs only as mac(k, ·) in P | {M/x}.
Lemma F.5 If P0 →⋄ R for some closed process P0 where k occurs only as mac(k, ·), then [[P0]] →⋄
[[R′]] and R′ ≡ R for some closed process R′ where k occurs only as mac(k, ·).
Proof: We define the size of processes by induction on the syntax, such that size(!P ) = 1+2×size(P )
and, when P is not a replication, size(P ) is one plus the size of the immediate subprocesses of P . We
proceed by induction on the size of P0. By Lemma B.21, we decompose P0 →⋄ R, with the following
cases:
1. P0 = P |Q for some P and Q, and one of the following cases holds:
(a) P →⋄ P ′ and R ≡ P ′ |Q for some P ′,
(b) P
N(x)
−−−→⋄ A, Q
νx.N〈x〉
−−−−−→⋄ B, and R ≡ νx.(A |B) for some A, B, x, and ground term N ,
and two symmetric cases obtained by swapping P and Q.
In case (a), by induction hypothesis, [[P ]] →⋄ [[P ′′]] and P ′′ ≡ P ′ for some closed process P ′′
where k occurs only as mac(k, ·). Hence [[P0]] = [[P ]] | [[Q]] →⋄ [[P ′′]] | [[Q]] = [[P ′′ | Q]] and
P ′′ |Q ≡ P ′ |Q ≡ R. Furthermore, k occurs only as mac(k, ·) in P ′′ |Q.
In case (b), by Lemma F.4, [[P ]]
[N ](x)
−−−−→⋄ [[P1]] and A ≡ P1 for some P1 where k occurs only as
mac(k, ·) and fv(P1) ⊆ {x}; and [[Q]]
νx.[N ]〈x〉
−−−−−−→⋄ [[B′]] for some B′ = E2[{M2/x}] such that B ≡ B′,
k occurs only as mac(k, ·) in B′, E2 is a closed plain evaluation context andM2 is a ground term.
By Lemma B.20, [[P0]] = [[P ]] | [[Q]] →⋄ R
′ and R′ ≡ νx.([[P1]] | [[B
′]]) = νx.([[P1]] | [[E2]][{
[M2]/x}])
for some R′. We rename the bound names of E2 so that they do not occur in P1. Let R
′′ =
E2[P1{M2/x}]. The process R′′ is closed and such that k occurs only as mac(k, ·). We have
R′ ≡ [[R′′]], so [[P0]] →⋄ [[R′′]] and R′′ ≡ νx.(P1 | B′) ≡ νx.(A | B) ≡ R. The last two cases are
symmetric.
2. P0 = νn.P , P →⋄ Q′, and R ≡ νn.Q′ for some n, P , and Q′. We rename n so that n 6= k. By
induction hypothesis, [[P ]] →⋄ [[Q′′]] and Q′ ≡ Q′′ for some closed process Q′′ where k occurs
only as mac(k, ·). Hence [[P0]] = νn.[[P ]] →⋄ νn.[[Q′′]] = [[νn.Q′′]] and νn.Q′′ ≡ νn.Q′ ≡ R.
Furthermore, k occurs only as mac(k, ·) in νn.Q′′.
3. P0 = !P , P | P →⋄ Q′, and R ≡ Q′ | !P for some P and Q′. By induction hypothesis, [[P |
P ]] →⋄ [[Q′′]] and Q′ ≡ Q′′ for some closed process Q′′ where k occurs only as mac(k, ·). Hence
[[P0]] = ![[P ]]
⋄
≡ [[P ]] | [[P ]] | ![[P ]]→⋄ [[Q′′]] | ![[P ]] = [[Q′′ | !P ]] and Q′′ | !P ≡ Q′ | !P ≡ R. Furthermore,
k occurs only as mac(k, ·) in Q′′ | !P .
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4. P0 = if M = N then P else Q and either Σ ⊢M = N and R ≡ P , or Σ ⊢M 6= N and R ≡ Q,
for some M , N , P , and Q.
In the first case, by Lemma F.3, Σ ⊢ [[M ]] = [[N ]], so [[P0]] = if [[M ]] = [[N ]] then [[P ]] else
[[Q]] →⋄ [[P ]] and we know that P ≡ R and k occurs only as mac(k, ·) in P . In the second case,
by Lemma F.3, Σ ⊢ [[M ]] 6= [[N ]], so [[P0]] = if [[M ]] = [[N ]] then [[P ]] else [[Q]] →⋄ [[Q]] and we
know that Q ≡ R and k occurs only as mac(k, ·) in Q.
Lemma F.6 Suppose that P0 is closed, α = νx.N ′〈x〉 or α = N ′(M ′) for some ground term N ′, and
k occurs only as mac(k, ·) in P0 and α.
If [[P0]]
[α]
−−→⋄ A, then P0
α
−→⋄ A′ and A ≡ [[A′]] for some A′ where k occurs only as mac(k, ·).
Furthermore, when α = νx.N ′〈x〉, A′ = E[{M/x}] where E is a closed plain evaluation context and M
is a ground term, and when α = N ′(M ′), A′ is a plain process with fv (A′) ⊆ fv (M ′).
Proof: We proceed by structural induction on P0, with the following cases:
• P0 = P | Q. Then [[P0]] = [[P ]] | [[Q]], so by Lemma B.18, either [[P ]]
[α]
−−→⋄ A′ and A ≡ A′ | [[Q]], or
[[Q]]
[α]
−−→⋄ A′ and A ≡ [[P ]] | A′, for some A′. In the first case, by induction hypothesis, P
α
−→⋄ A′′
and A′ ≡ [[A′′]] for some A′′ where k occurs only as mac(k, ·). By Par′, since Q is closed, we have
P0 = P | Q
α
−→⋄ A′′ | Q and [[A′′ | Q]] ≡ A′ | [[Q]] ≡ A. Furthermore, k occurs only as mac(k, ·) in
A′′ |Q. The second case is symmetric.
• P0 = νn.P . We rename n so that n 6= k and n does not occur in α. Then [[P0]] = νn.[[P ]], so by
Lemma B.18, we have [[P ]]
[α]
−−→⋄ A′ and A ≡ νn.A′ for some A′. By induction hypothesis, P
α
−→⋄ A′′
and A′ ≡ [[A′′]] for some A′′ where k occurs only as mac(k, ·). By Scope′, P0 = νn.P
α
−→⋄ νn.A′′
and [[νn.A′′]] = νn.[[A′′]] ≡ νn.A′ ≡ A. Furthermore, k occurs only as mac(k, ·) in νn.A′′.
• P0 = !P . Then [[P0]] = ![[P ]], so by Lemma B.18, we have [[P ]]
[α]
−−→⋄ A′, and A ≡ A′ | ![[P ]] for
some A′. By induction hypothesis, P
α
−→⋄ A′′ and A′ ≡ [[A′′]] for some A′′ where k occurs only as
mac(k, ·). We have P0 = !P
⋄
≡ P | !P
α
−→⋄ A′′ | !P by Par
′, since !P is closed. Hence by Struct′,
P0
α
−→⋄ A
′′ | !P and [[A′′ | !P ]] ≡ A′ | ![[P ]] ≡ A. Furthermore, k occurs only as mac(k, ·) in A′′ | !P .
• P0 = N(x).P . Then [[P0]] = [[N ]](x).[[P ]], so by Lemma B.18, we have [[α]] = N ′(M ′), Σ ⊢ [[N ]] = N ′,
and A ≡ [[P ]]{M
′
/x} for some N
′ and M ′. Hence α = N ′′(M ′′), N ′ = [[N ′′]], and M ′ = [[M ′′]]
for some N ′′ and M ′′. We have Σ ⊢ [[N ]] = [[N ′′]], so by Lemma F.3, Σ ⊢ N = N ′′, so we have
P0 = N(x).P
⋄
≡ N ′′(x).P
α
−→⋄ P{M
′′
/x} by In
′. By Struct′, we obtain P0
α
−→⋄ P{M
′′
/x}. The name
k occurs only as mac(k, ·) inM ′′, so the substitution [[P ]]{[M
′′ ]/x} does not create new occurrences of
mac(k, ·), so [[P{M
′′
/x}]] = [[P ]]{[M
′′]/x} = [[P ]]{M
′
/x} ≡ A. Furthermore, k occurs only as mac(k, ·)
in P{M
′′
/x}.
• P0 = N〈M〉.P . Then [[P0]] = [[N ]]〈[[M ]]〉.[[P ]], so by Lemma B.18, [[α]] = νx.N ′〈x〉, Σ ⊢ [[N ]] = N ′,
x /∈ fv ([[P0]]) = fv(P0), and A ≡ [[P ]] | {
[M ]/x} for some x and N
′. Hence α = νx.N ′′〈x〉 and
N ′ = [[N ′′]] for some N ′′. We have Σ ⊢ [[N ]] = [[N ′′]], so by Lemma F.3, Σ ⊢ N = N ′′, so we
have P0 = N〈M〉.P
⋄
≡ N ′′〈M〉.P
α
−→⋄ P | {
M/x} by Out-Var
′. Hence by Struct′, we obtain
P0
α
−→⋄ P | {M/x}, and we have [[P | {M/x}]] = [[P ]] | {[M ]/x} ≡ A. Furthermore, k occurs only as
mac(k, ·) in P | {M/x}.
• P0 is neither 0 nor a conditional, because by Lemma B.18, [[P0]] would not have a labelled transition.
Lemma F.7 Suppose that P0 is a closed process where k occurs only as mac(k, ·). If [[P0]]
α
−→⋄ A with
α = νx.N ′〈x〉 or α = N ′(M ′), then Σ ⊢ N ′ = [[N ]] for some ground term N where k occurs only as
mac(k, ·).
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Proof: We proceed by structural induction on P0, with the following cases:
• P0 = P | Q. Then [[P0]] = [[P ]] | [[Q]], so by Lemma B.18, either [[P ]]
α
−→⋄ A′ and A ≡ A′ | [[Q]], or
[[Q]]
α
−→⋄ A
′ and A ≡ [[P ]] | A′, for some A′. In both cases, the result follows immediately from the
induction hypothesis.
• P0 = νn.P . We rename n so that n 6= k and n does not occur in α. Then [[P0]] = νn.[[P ]], so by
Lemma B.18, [[P ]]
α
−→⋄ A′, and A ≡ νn.A′ for some A′. The result follows immediately from the
induction hypothesis.
• P0 = !P . Then [[P0]] = ![[P ]], so by Lemma B.18, [[P ]]
α
−→⋄ A′, and A ≡ A′ | ![[P ]] for some A′. The
result follows immediately from the induction hypothesis.
• P0 = N(x).P . Then [[P0]] = [[N ]](x).[[P ]], so by Lemma B.18, α = N
′(M ′), Σ ⊢ [[N ]] = N ′, and
A ≡ [[P ]]{M
′
/x} for some N ′ and M ′. Moreover, since N occurs in P0, N is ground and k occurs
only as mac(k, ·) in N , so the result holds.
• P0 = N〈M〉.P . Then [[P0]] = [[N ]]〈[[M ]]〉.[[P ]], so by Lemma B.18, α = νx.N ′〈x〉, Σ ⊢ [[N ]] = N ′,
x /∈ fv ([[P0]]) = fv(P0), and A ≡ [[P ]] | {[M ]/x} for some x and N ′. Moreover, since N occurs in P0,
N is ground and k occurs only as mac(k, ·) in N , so the result holds.
• P0 is neither 0 nor a conditional, because by Lemma B.18, [[P0]] would not have a labelled transition.
Lemma F.8 If P
α
−→⋄ A and Σ ⊢ α = α
′, then P
α′
−→⋄ A.
Proof: We proceed by induction on the derivation of P
α
−→⋄ A.
• Case In′. We have P = N(x).P ′, α = N(M), and A = P ′{M/x} for some N , M , x, and P ′. Since
Σ ⊢ α = α′, we have α′ = N ′(M ′), Σ ⊢ N ′ = N , and Σ ⊢ M ′ = M for some N ′ and M ′. Hence
P
⋄
≡ N ′(x).P ′
α′
−→⋄ P ′{M
′
/x} ≡ A by In
′, so P
α′
−→⋄ A by Struct
′.
• Case Out-Var′. We have P = N〈M〉.P ′, α = νx.N 〈x〉, and A = P | {M/x} for some N , M ,
x, and P ′. Since Σ ⊢ α = α′, we have α′ = νx.N ′〈x〉 and Σ ⊢ N ′ = N for some N ′. Hence
P
⋄
≡ N ′〈M〉.P ′
α′
−→⋄ P | {M/x} by Out-Var
′, so P
α′
−→⋄ A by Struct
′.
• The other cases follow easily from the induction hypothesis. In the case Scope′, we rename the
bound name n so that it does not occur in α. In the case Par′, we use that bv(α′) = bv (α).
Lemma F.9 Suppose that P0 is a closed process where k occurs only as mac(k, ·). If [[P0]]→⋄ R, then
P0 →⋄ R′ and R ≡ [[R′]] for some closed process R′ where k occurs only as mac(k, ·).
Proof: We proceed by induction on the size of P0, with the same definition of size as in the proof
of Lemma F.5. The following cases may occur:
1. P0 = P |Q. Then [[P0]] = [[P ]] | [[Q]], so by Lemma B.21, one of the following cases holds:
(a) [[P ]]→⋄ P ′ and R ≡ P ′ | [[Q]] for some P ′,
(b) [[P ]]
N(x)
−−−→⋄ A, [[Q]]
νx.N〈x〉
−−−−−→⋄ B, and R ≡ νx.(A |B) for some A, B, x, and ground term N ,
and two symmetric cases obtained by swapping P and Q. In the first case, by induction hy-
pothesis, P →⋄ P ′′ and [[P ′′]] ≡ P ′ for some closed process P ′′ where k occurs only as mac(k, ·).
Hence P0 = P |Q→⋄ P ′′ |Q and [[P ′′ |Q]] = [[P ′′]] |[[Q]] ≡ P ′ |[[Q]] ≡ R. Furthermore, k occurs only
as mac(k, ·) in P ′′ |Q. In the second case, by Lemma F.7, Σ ⊢ N = [[N ′]] for some ground term
N ′ where k occurs only as mac(k, ·). By Lemma F.8, [[P ]]
[N ′](x)
−−−−−→⋄ A and [[Q]]
νx.[N ′]〈x〉
−−−−−−−→⋄ B.
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By Lemma F.6, P
N(x)
−−−→⋄ P1 and A ≡ [[P1]] for some P1 where k occurs only as mac(k, ·) and
fv(P1) ⊆ {x}; and Q
νx.N〈x〉
−−−−−→⋄ B′ and B ≡ [[B′]] for some B′ = E2[{M2/x}] where k occurs
only as mac(k, ·) in B′, E2 is a closed plain evaluation context, and M2 is a ground term. By
Lemma B.20, P0 = P |Q →⋄ R′ and R′ ≡ νx.(P1 | B′) = νx.(P1 | E2[{M2/x}]) for some R′. We
rename the bound names of E2 so that they do not occur in P1. Let R
′′ = E2[P1{M2/x}]. The
process R′′ is closed and k occurs only as mac(k, ·) in R′′. We have R′ ≡ R′′, so P0 →⋄ R′′ and
[[R′′]] ≡ [[νx.(P1 | B′)]] ≡ νx.(A | B) ≡ R. The last two cases are symmetric.
2. P0 = νn.P . We rename n so that n 6= k. Then [[P0]] = νn.[[P ]], so by Lemma B.21, [[P ]]→⋄ Q′,
and R ≡ νn.Q′ for some Q′. By induction hypothesis, P →⋄ Q′′ and Q′ ≡ [[Q′′]] for some
closed process Q′′ where k occurs only as mac(k, ·). Hence P0 = νn.P →⋄ νn.Q′′ and [[νn.Q′′]] =
νn.[[Q′′]] ≡ νn.Q′ ≡ R. Furthermore, k occurs only as mac(k, ·) in νn.Q′′.
3. P0 = !P . Then [[P0]] = ![[P ]], so by Lemma B.21, [[P | P ]] = [[P ]] | [[P ]] →⋄ Q′, and R ≡ Q′ | ![[P ]]
for some Q′. By induction hypothesis, P | P →⋄ Q′′ and Q′ ≡ [[Q′′]] for some closed process
Q′′ where k occurs only as mac(k, ·). Hence P0 = !P
⋄
≡ P | P | !P →⋄ Q′′ | !P and [[Q′′ | !P ]] =
[[Q′′]] | ![[P ]] ≡ Q′ | ![[P ]] ≡ R. Furthermore, k occurs only as mac(k, ·) in Q′′ | !P .
4. P0 = if M = N then P else Q. Then [[P0]] = if [[M ]] = [[N ]] then [[P ]] else [[Q]], so by
Lemma B.21, either Σ ⊢ [[M ]] = [[N ]] and R ≡ [[P ]], or Σ ⊢ [[M ]] 6= [[N ]] and R ≡ [[Q]]. In the first
case, by Lemma F.3, Σ ⊢ M = N , so P0 = if M = N then P else Q →⋄ P and we know that
[[P ]] ≡ R and k occurs only as mac(k, ·) in P . In the second case, by Lemma F.3, Σ ⊢M 6= N , so
P0 = if M = N then P else Q→⋄ Q and we know that [[Q]] ≡ R and k occurs only as mac(k, ·)
in Q.
5. P0 is not 0, an input, or an output, because by Lemma B.21, [[P0]] would not reduce.
Theorem 6.1 Suppose that the signature Σ is equipped with an equational theory generated by a
convergent rewrite system such that mac and f do not occur in the left-hand sides of rewrite rules; the
only rewrite rules with h at the root of the left-hand side are those of (10) and (11) oriented from left
to right; there are no rewrite rules with :: nor nil at the root of the left-hand side; and names do not
occur in rewrite rules. Suppose that C is closed and the name k appears only as first argument of mac
in C. Then νk.C ≈ νk.[[C]].
Proof: Let R relate all closed extended processes A and B such that A ≡ νk.C and B ≡ νk.[[C]] for
some closed normal process C where k occurs only as mac(k, ·).
We show that R ∪ R−1 is a labelled bisimulation. It is symmetric by construction. Assume that
A R B for some C = νn˜.(σ | P ) where k occurs only as mac(k, ·). In particular, k does not occur in
n˜, A and B are closed, A ≡ νk.C, and B ≡ νk.[[C]].
1. We show that A ≈s B.
Let M and N be two terms such that fv (M)∪ fv (N) ⊆ dom(A) = dom(B) = dom(σ). We have
ϕ(A) ≡ νk, n˜.σ and ϕ(B) ≡ νk, n˜.[[σ]]. We rename k and n˜ so that these names do not occur in
M and N . Then
(M = N)ϕ(A)⇔ Σ ⊢Mσ = Nσ
⇔ Σ ⊢ [[Mσ]] = [[Nσ]] by Lemma F.3
⇔ Σ ⊢M [[σ]] = N [[σ]]
since k does not occur in M and N and k occurs only as mac(k, ·) in σ, so
(M = N)ϕ(A)⇔ (M = N)ϕ(B)
Therefore, A ≈s B.
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2. We first show that, if A
α
−→ A′, A′ is closed, and fv (α) ⊆ dom(A), then B →∗
α
−→→∗ B′ and
A′ R B′ for some B′.
We have νk, n˜.(σ | P )
α
−→ A′, so by Lemma B.12, νk, n˜.(σ | P )
α
−→◦ A′. We rename k and n˜
so that these names do not occur in α. By Lemma B.19, P
ασ
−−→⋄ A′1, A
′ ≡ νk, n˜.(σ | A′1),
and bv (α) ∩ dom(σ) = ∅ for some A′1. By Lemma F.4, [[P ]]
[ασ]
−−−→⋄ [[A
′′
1 ]] and A
′
1 ≡ A
′′
1 for
some A′′1 where k occurs only as mac(k, ·). Furthermore, when ασ = νx.N
′〈x〉, A′′1 = E[{
M/x}]
where E is a closed plain evaluation context and M is a ground term, and when ασ = N ′(M ′),
A′′1 is a plain process with fv(A
′′
1 ) ⊆ fv(M
′) = ∅, so A′′1 is a closed plain process. Since k
does not occur in α and k occurs only as mac(k, ·) in σ, we have [[ασ]] = α[[σ]]. Therefore,
B ≡ νk.[[C]] ≡ νk, n˜.([[σ]] | [[P ]])
α
−→◦ νk, n˜.([[σ]] | [[A′′1 ]]). Let C
′ = pnf(νn˜.(σ | A′′1 )). The process
C′ is a closed normal process where k occurs only as mac(k, ·) We have νk.C′ ≡ νk, n˜.(σ |A′′1 ) ≡
νk, n˜.(σ | A′1) ≡ A
′. Let B′ = νk.[[C′]]. We have A′ R B′. Given the form of A′′1 , we can show
that [[C′]] ≡ νn˜.([[σ]] | [[A′′1 ]]), so B
α
−→ B′.
Next, we show that, if B
α
−→ B′, B′ is closed, and fv (α) ⊆ dom(B), then A →∗
α
−→→∗ A′ and
A′ R B′ for some A′.
We have νk, n˜.([[σ]] | [[P ]])
α
−→ B′, so by Lemma B.12, νk, n˜.([[σ]] | [[P ]])
α
−→◦ B′. We rename k and n˜
so that these names do not occur in α. By Lemma B.19, [[P ]]
α[σ]
−−−→⋄ B′1, B
′ ≡ νk, n˜.([[σ]]|B′1), and
bv(α) ∩ dom([[σ]]) = bv(α) ∩ dom(σ) = ∅ for some B′1. Since k does not occur in α and k occurs
only as mac(k, ·) in σ, we have [[ασ]] = α[[σ]]. By Lemma F.6, P
ασ
−−→⋄ A′1 and B
′
1 ≡ [[A
′
1]] for
some A′1 where k occurs only as mac(k, ·). Furthermore, when ασ = νx.N
′〈x〉, A′1 = E[{
M/x}]
where E is a closed plain evaluation context and M is a ground term, and when ασ = N ′(M ′),
A′1 is a plain process with fv (A
′
1) ⊆ fv (M
′) = ∅, so A′1 is a closed plain process. Therefore,
A ≡ νk.C ≡ νk, n˜.(σ | P )
α
−→◦ νk, n˜.(σ | A′1). Let C
′ = pnf(νn˜.(σ | A′1)). The process C
′ is a
closed normal process where k occurs only as mac(k, ·). Given the form of A′1, we can show that
νk.[[C′]] ≡ νk, n˜.([[σ]] | [[A′1]]) ≡ νk, n˜.([[σ]] | B
′
1) ≡ B
′. Let A′ = νk.C′. We have A′ R B′ and
νk, n˜.(σ |A′1) ≡ νk.C
′ = A′ so A
α
−→ A′.
3. We first show that, if A→ A′ for some closed A′, then B →∗ B′ and A′ R B′ for some B′.
We have νk, n˜.(σ | P ) → A′, so by Lemma B.8, νk, n˜.(σ | P ) →◦ pnf(A
′). By Lemma B.22,
P →⋄ P ′ and pnf(A′) ≡ νk, n˜.(σ | P ′) for some P ′. By Lemma F.5, [[P ]]→⋄ [[P ′′]] and P ′ ≡ P ′′
for some closed process P ′′ where k occurs only as mac(k, ·). Let C′ = νn˜.(σ | P ′′). The process
C′ is a closed normal process where k occurs only as mac(k, ·). We have νk.C′ ≡ νk, n˜.(σ |P ′′) ≡
pnf(A′) ≡ A′. Let B′ = νk.[[C′]]. We have A′ R B′ and B ≡ νk.[[C]] ≡ νk, n˜.([[σ]] | [[P ]]) →◦
νk, n˜.([[σ]] | [[P ′′]]) = νk.[[C′]] = B′, so B → B′.
Next, we show that, if B → B′ for some closed B′, then A→∗ A′ and A′ R B′ for some A′.
We have νk, n˜.([[σ]] | [[P ]])→ B′, so by Lemma B.8, νk, n˜.([[σ]] | [[P ]])→◦ pnf(B′). By Lemma B.22,
[[P ]]→⋄ P ′ and pnf(B′) ≡ νk, n˜.([[σ]] |P ′) for some P ′. By Lemma F.9, P →⋄ P ′′ and P ′ ≡ [[P ′′]]
for some closed process P ′′ where k occurs only as mac(k, ·). Let C′ = νn˜.(σ | P ′′). The
process C′ is a closed normal process where k occurs only as mac(k, ·). We have νk.[[C′]] ≡
νk, n˜.([[σ]] | [[P ′′]]) ≡ νk, n˜.([[σ]] | P ′) ≡ pnf(B′) ≡ B′. Let A′ = νk.C′. We have A′ R B′ and
A ≡ νk.C ≡ νk, n˜.(σ | P )→◦ νk, n˜.(σ | P ′′) = νk.C′ = A′, so A→ A′.
Therefore, R ⊆ ≈l and, by Theorem 4.1, R ⊆ ≈.
Finally, when C is a closed extended process where k occurs only as mac(k, ·), we have νk.C R
νk.[[C]] because pnf(C) is a closed normal process where k occurs only as mac(k, ·) such that pnf(C) ≡
C. We thus obtain νk.C ≈ νk.[[C]].
Corollary 6.1 Suppose that the signature Σ is equipped with the equational theory defined by the
equations (1), (2), (3), (4), (10), and (11). Suppose that C is closed and the name k appears only as
first argument of mac in C. Then νk.C ≈ νk.[[C]].
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Proof: We define the rewrite system R by orienting the equations (1), (2), (3), (4), (10), and (11)
from left to right:
fst((x, y)) → x (20)
snd((x, y)) → y (21)
hd(x :: y) → x (22)
tl(x :: y) → y (23)
nil++ x → x :: nil (24)
(x :: y) ++ z → x :: (y ++ z) (25)
h(x, y0 :: y1 :: z) → h(f(x, y0), y1 :: z) (26)
h(x, y :: nil) → f(x, y) (27)
In order to prove that R terminates, we order terms M lexicographically, using:
1. the size of M ; then
2. the number of occurrences of the ++ symbol in M ; then
3. the number of occurrences of the :: symbol in M ; then
4. the sum, over all occurrences of ++ inM , of the lengths of the first arguments of ++, computed as
follows: length(N1 :: N2) = 1+length(N2), length(N1++N2) = 1+length(N1), and length(N) = 0
for all other terms.
This ordering is well-founded. Rules (20), (21), (22), (23), and (27) decrease the size. Rule (24)
preserves the size and decreases the number of occurrences of ++. Rule (25) preserves the size and the
numbers of occurrences of ++ and :: but it decreases the sum above, because the length of the first
argument decreases for the occurrence of ++ modified by rule (25) (length(N) < length(M :: N)) and
is unchanged for all other occurrences of ++ in the term. Rule (26) preserves the size and the number
of occurrences of ++; it decreases the number of occurrences of ::. Therefore, if M reduces to M ′ by
any of these rules, we have M ′ < M . This property shows that R terminates. (The termination of R
can also be proved using well-known techniques. For instance, it can be proved using a lexicographic
path ordering, provided the second argument of h, which decreases by (26), is considered before the
first one, which increases, in the lexicographic ordering.)
The rewrite system R is confluent because there are no critical pairs between the rules. Hence R is
convergent. Since R generates the equational theory under consideration, we conclude by Theorem 6.1.
G Proofs for Section 6.3
In Lemma G.1 and Corollary G.1, we suppose that the signature Σ is equipped with an equational
theory generated by a convergent rewrite system R. Since R terminates, the left-hand side of its
rewrite rules cannot be variables. We suppose that the rewrite rules of R do not contain names. We
denote by θ a substitution and by ρ a variable renaming. We first study active substitutions from
variables to hash computations, that is, terms whose root symbols range over functions that do not
occur on the left-hand side of R.
Lemma G.1 Suppose Σ is equipped with an equational theory generated by a convergent rewrite
system R. Let θ be a closed substitution that ranges over pairwise distinct terms modulo Σ, each of
the form f(k,M) where f does not occur on the left-hand side of the rules of R. Let σ map the same
variables to pairwise distinct names a˜. We have νk.θ ≈s νa˜.σ.
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Proof: More explicitly, let θ = {(Mi/xi)i=1..n}, σ = {(
ai/xi)i=1..n}, and a˜ = a1, . . . , an.
We first prove the property
SubstInj: if, moreover, θ ranges over syntactically pairwise distinct terms, then N1θ =
N2θ and k /∈ fn(N1) ∪ fn(N2) implies N1 = N2.
Let N ′1 be obtained from N1 by replacing the occurrences of x1, . . . , xn with pairwise distinct variables
y1, . . . , yn′ , and let (ij)j=1..n′ and ρ = {(
xij/yj )j=1..n′} be such that N1 = N
′
1ρ. We have N
′
1ρθ = N2θ.
Since k does not occur in N2 or N
′
1, and k occurs as first argument of the root function symbol of Mi
for i = 1..n andMij for j = 1..n
′, the terms N2 and N
′
1 are equal up to some variable renaming. Since
each variable yj occurs once in N
′
1, we have N2 = N
′
1ρ
′ for some (i′j)j=1..n′ and ρ
′ = {(
xi′
j/yj)j=1..n′}.
We have N ′1ρ
′θ = N ′1ρθ, so for all j = 1..n
′ we have yjρ
′θ = yjρθ, so Mi′j = Mij . Since M1, . . . ,Mn
are pairwise distinct, we have i′j = ij , so ρ
′ = ρ. Hence N1 = N
′
1ρ = N
′
1ρ
′ = N2.
Let us now prove the lemma itself. We first reduce M1, . . . ,Mn into irreducible form under R. By
Lemma 4.1, it is enough to prove static equivalence on these reduced terms. Moreover, they are still
of the form f(k,M) with the same condition on f . (Indeed, the left-hand sides of rewrite rules do not
contain f , so the rewrite rules apply to strict subterms of f(k,M); and k is irreducible, so the rewrite
rules apply only to the terms M within f(k,M).)
LetN1, N2 be two terms with fv (N1)∪fv (N2) ⊆ {x1, . . . , xn}. We need to show that (N1 = N2)νk.θ
if and only if (N1 = N2)νa˜.σ. We rename k, a˜ so that (fn(N1) ∪ fn(N2)) ∩ {k, a˜} = ∅. We have
(N1 = N2)νk.θ if and only if Σ ⊢ N1θ = N2θ, and (N1 = N2)σ if and only if Σ ⊢ N1σ = N2σ. We
show that Σ ⊢ N1θ = N2θ if and only if Σ ⊢ N1 = N2 if and only if Σ ⊢ N1σ = N2σ.
Since the equational theory is closed under substitution of terms for variables and names, we
have that Σ ⊢ N1 = N2 implies Σ ⊢ N1θ = N2θ, Σ ⊢ N1 = N2 implies Σ ⊢ N1σ = N2σ, and
Σ ⊢ N1σ = N2σ implies Σ ⊢ N1 = N2 (by substituting xi for ai for i = 1..n). Hence, we just have to
show that Σ ⊢ N1θ = N2θ implies Σ ⊢ N1 = N2. We can restrict our attention to the case in which
N1 and N2 are irreducible under R, since the equality of the initial terms is equivalent to the equality
of their reduced forms.
Suppose that Σ ⊢ N1θ = N2θ, with N1, N2,M1, . . . ,Mn irreducible under R. We first show that
N1θ is irreducible under R. In order to derive a contradiction, suppose that N1θ is reducible by a
rewrite rule N3 → N4 of R. Then there exists a term context C and a substitution σ such that
C[N3σ] = N1θ. Let N
′
1 be obtained from N1 by renaming the occurrences of x1, . . . , xn into pairwise
distinct variables y1, . . . , yn′ , and let (ij)j=1..n′ and ρ = {(
xij/yj)j=1..n′} such that N1 = N
′
1ρ. We have
C[N3σ] = N
′
1ρθ. The position of the hole of C cannot be inside Mij , since otherwise Mij would be
reducible by N3 → N4. Hence, the position of the hole of C is inside N ′1, so N3σ = N
′′
1 ρθ, C = C
′ρθ,
and N ′1 = C
′[N ′′1 ] for some subterm N
′′
1 of N
′
1 and term context C
′.
Let ρ′ be a variable renaming such that N ′3ρ
′ = N3 and all variable occurrences in N
′
3 are fresh and
pairwise distinct. We have N ′3ρ
′σ = N ′′1 ρθ. Since the function symbols f at the root of Mij do not
occur in N3, all occurrences of Mij are in zρ
′σ for some z ∈ fv (N ′3). Hence, for all z ∈ fv (N
′
3), there
exists a subterm Nz of N
′′
1 such that zρ
′σ = Nzρθ and N
′′
1 = N
′
3{(
Nz/z)z∈fv(N ′3)}. Furthermore, when
z and z′ are distinct variables of N ′3 such that zρ
′ = z′ρ′, we have zρ′σ = z′ρ′σ, so Nzρθ = Nz′ρθ
and, by SubstInj, Nzρ = Nz′ρ.
For each variable y of N3, let us choose one variable zy of N
′
3 such that zyρ
′ = y. Let us define σ′
by yσ′ = Nzyρ. Since for all z, z
′ ∈ fv (N ′3), we have zρ
′ = z′ρ′ implies Nzρ = Nz′ρ, we have for all
z ∈ fv(N ′3), zρ
′σ′ = Nzρ. Let C
′′ = C′ρ. We have
C′′[N3σ
′] = C′′[N ′3ρ
′σ′] = C′′[N ′3{(
Nz/z)z∈fv(N ′3)}ρ] = C
′′[N ′′1 ρ] = C
′[N ′′1 ]ρ = N
′
1ρ = N1
Hence N1 would be reducible by N3 → N4, which is a contradiction. Therefore, N1θ is irreducible.
Similarly, N2θ is irreducible. Hence Σ ⊢ N1θ = N2θ implies N1θ = N2θ. By SubstInj, N1 = N2, so
a fortiori Σ ⊢ N1 = N2.
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Corollary G.1 Suppose Σ is equipped with an equational theory generated by a convergent rewrite
system R. Let θ be a closed substitution that ranges over terms of the form f(k,M) where each f does
not occur on the left-hand side of the rules of R. Let σ map the same variables to names a˜ such that,
for all x, y ∈ dom(θ), we have xσ = yσ if and only if Σ ⊢ xθ = yθ. We have νk.θ ≈s νa˜.σ.
Proof: We factor θ and σ into ρθ′ and ρσ′ where θ′ and σ′ range over pairwise distinct terms modulo
Σ and ρ is a variable renaming. We apply Lemma G.1 and conclude by Lemma 4.1.
Our next lemma confirms that, with the equations (12), all terms are pairs.
Lemma G.2 Suppose Σ is equipped with an equational theory that contains the equations (12). We
have νa1, a2.{(a1,a2)/x} ≈s νa.{a/x}.
Proof: Let M and N be two terms such that fv(M) ∪ fv (N) ⊆ {x}. We rename a, a1, a2 so that
{a, a1, a2} ∩ (fn(M) ∪ fn(N)) = ∅.
If (M = N)νa1, a2.{(a1,a2)/x}, then Σ ⊢ M{(a1,a2)/x} = N{(a1,a2)/x}. Since the equational theory
is closed under substitution of any term for names, we have Σ ⊢ M{(a1,a2)/x}{fst(a)/a1 ,
snd(a)/a2} =
N{(a1,a2)/x}{fst(a)/a1 ,
snd(a)/a2}, that is, Σ ⊢ M{
(fst(a),snd(a))/x} = N{(fst(a),snd(a))/x}, so Σ ⊢ M{a/x} =
N{a/x} by the equation (fst(x), snd(x)) = x. Hence (M = N)νa.{a/x}.
Conversely, suppose that (M = N)νa.{a/x}. Hence Σ ⊢ M{a/x} = N{a/x}. Since the equa-
tional theory is closed under substitution of any term for names, we have Σ ⊢ M{a/x}{(a1,a2)/a} =
N{a/x}{(a1,a2)/a}, that is, Σ ⊢M{(a1,a2)/x} = N{(a1,a2)/x}, so (M = N)νa1, a2.{(a1,a2)/x}.
Therefore, (M = N)νa1, a2.{
(a1,a2)/x} if and only if (M = N)νa.{
a/x}, so νa1, a2.{
(a1,a2)/x} ≈s
νa.{a/x}.
Lemma G.3 The equational theory defined by equations (3), (4), (12), (13), (14), (15), and (16) is
generated by a convergent rewrite system R.
Proof: We define R by orienting all equations from left to right, as follows:
hd(x :: y) → x (28)
tl(x :: y) → y (29)
nil++ x → x :: nil (30)
(x :: y) ++ z → x :: (y ++ z) (31)
ne list(x :: y :: z) → ne list(y :: z) (32)
ne list(x :: nil) → true (33)
fst((x, y)) → x (34)
snd((x, y)) → y (35)
(fst(x), snd(x)) → x (36)
h(k, z) → h2(k, (0, 0), z) (37)
h2(k, x, nil) → fst(x) (38)
h2(k, x, y :: z) → h2(k, f(k, (x, y)), z) (39)
To prove that R terminates, we order terms M lexicographically, as follows:
1. by hval (M), where hval is defined by
hval(h2(M1,M2,M3)) = hval(M2) + hval (M3) + length(M3)
hval(h(M1,M2)) = hval(M2) + length(M2) + 1
hval (f(M1, . . . ,Mn)) = hval(M1) + · · ·+ hval(Mn)
for all other functions
hval (M) = 0 when M is a variable or a name
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and the length of a term is defined by
length(M :: N) = 1 + length(N)
when the symbol :: has sort Block× BlockList→ BlockList
length(M ++N) = 1 + length(M)
length(f(M1, . . . ,Mn)) = max(length(M1), . . . , length(Mn))
where f is a function symbol other than
:: : Block× BlockList→ BlockList
++ : BlockList× Block→ BlockList
such that the sort of the result of f may contain BlockList, that is,
this sort is BlockList, Block2Blocks, Block2Blocks List, or one of the
sorts of pairs used in the syntactic sugar for ℓ(x, t, s) and ℓ〈x, t, s〉.
length(M) = 0 for all other terms M ;
2. then by the size of M ;
3. then by the number of occurrences of the ++ symbol in M ;
4. then by the sum of the lengths of the first arguments of ++ in M .
This ordering is well-founded. By induction on C, we show that, for all term contexts C,
• if length(M ′) ≤ length(M), then length(C[M ′]) ≤ length(C[M ]);
• if hval (M ′) ≤ hval (M) and length(M ′) ≤ length(M), then hval (C[M ′]) ≤ hval (C[M ]);
• if hval (M ′) < hval (M) and length(M ′) ≤ length(M), then hval (C[M ′]) < hval (C[M ]).
We notice that terms of sorts Bool, Block, Block2, and Block3 have length 0. For all rewrite rules
M →M ′ above and all substitutions σ, we show that length(M ′σ) ≤ length(Mσ) by inspecting each
rule. For all rules except (37), (38), and (39) and all substitutions σ, we have hval (M ′σ) ≤ hval(Mσ)
because
hval (Mσ) =
∑
x∈fv(M)
hval (xσ) × (number of occurrences of x in M)
and similarly for M ′, and all variables x occur at least as many times in M as in M ′. We have
hval (h(M1,M2)) = hval (M2)+ length(M2)+1 and hval(h2(M1, (0, 0),M2)) = hval (M2)+ length(M2),
so rule (37) decreases hval . We have hval (h2(M1,M2, nil)) = hval (M2), so rule (38) preserves hval .
We have hval (h2(M1,M2,M3 ::M4)) = hval (M2) + hval (M3) + hval (M4) + length(M4) + 1 and
hval (h2(M1, f(M1, (M2,M3)),M4))
= hval (f(M1, (M2,M3))) + hval (M4) + length(M4)
= hval (M1) + hval (M2) + hval (M3) + hval (M4) + length(M4)
= hval (M2) + hval (M3) + hval (M4) + length(M4)
since hval (M1) = 0 because M1 is a variable or a name since no function returns sort Key. Hence
rule (39) decreases hval . Therefore, we have:
• Rules (28), (29), (32), (33), (34), (35), (36), (38) do not increase hval and decrease the size.
• Rule (30) does not increase hval , preserves the size and decreases the number of occurrences of ++.
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• Rule (31) does not increase hval , preserves the size and the number of occurrences of ++, and
decreases the sum because the length of the first argument decreases for the occurrence of ++
modified by rule (31) (length(N) < length(M :: N)) and is unchanged for all other occurrences of
++ in the term.
• Rules (37) and (39) decrease hval .
Therefore, if M reduces to M ′ by any of these rules, then M ′ is smaller than M in a well-founded
lexicographic ordering, and thus R terminates. (The termination of R can also be proved using well-
known techniques. For instance, it can be proved using a lexicographic path ordering, provided the
third argument of h2, which decreases by (39), is considered before the second one, which increases,
in the lexicographic ordering.)
The only critical pairs between these rules are:
• between rules (34) and (36): fst((fst(x), snd(x))) reduces to fst(x) by both rules, and (fst((x, y)),
snd((x, y))) reduces to (x, y) by (36) or by (34) and (35), so these two critical pairs are joinable.
• between rules (35) and (36), symmetrically.
Since all critical pairs are joinable, R is confluent, so it is convergent.
Lemma G.4 Suppose that Σ is equipped with the equational theory of Lemma G.3. If Σ ⊢ f(k, (. . . f(k,
((0, 0),M1)) . . . ,Mn)) = f(k, (. . . f(k, ((0, 0),M
′
1)) . . . ,M
′
n′)), then n = n
′ and Σ ⊢ Mi = M ′i for all
i = 1..n.
Proof: We proceed by induction on n.
• If n = n′ = 0, the result holds trivially.
• If n = 0 and n′ > 0, then Σ ⊢ (0, 0) = f(k,M) for some term M and, after reducing under R
of Lemma G.3, (0, 0) = f(k,M ′) for some term M ′. This equality does not hold, so this case is
excluded. By symmetry, the case n > 0 and n′ = 0 is also excluded.
• If n > 0 and n′ > 0, then Σ ⊢ f(k, (. . . f(k, ((0, 0),M1)) . . . ,Mn)) = f(k, (. . . f(k, ((0, 0),M ′1)) . . . ,
M ′n′)) implies Σ ⊢ f(k, (. . . f(k, ((0, 0),M1)) . . . ,Mn−1)) = f(k, (. . . f(k, ((0, 0),M
′
1)) . . . ,M
′
n′−1)) and
Σ ⊢Mn =M ′n′ . By induction hypothesis, n = n
′ and Σ ⊢Mi =M ′i for all i ≤ n− 1.
Theorem 6.2 νk.(A0h | A
0
f ) ≈ νk.(A
1
h | A
1
f ).
Proof: In this proof, we use uppercase lettersX,Y, Z, S, . . . for terms substituted for variables named
with the corresponding lowercase letters x, y, z, s, . . . during execution. We first extend the notations
of Section 6.3 with intermediate processes parametrized by terms, which we will use to define our
candidate bisimulation.
A0hi(Y ) = if ne list(Y ) = true then c
′
h〈h(k, Y )〉
A1hi(Y ) = if ne list(Y ) = true then c
′
h〈h
′(k, Y )〉
A1f (S) = νℓ, cs.(!cs(s).cf (x).ℓ〈x, s, s〉 | !Q | cs〈S〉)
A1fi(X,S) = νℓ, cs.(!cs(s).cf (x).ℓ〈x, s, s〉 | !Q | ℓ〈X,S, S〉)
Hence, for hash requests we have A0h
ch(Y )
−−−−→ A0h | A
0
hi and A
1
h
ch(Y )
−−−−→ A1h | A
1
hi ; and for compression
requests we have A1f (S) →
cf (X)
−−−−→ A1fi(X,S) →
∗ A1f (S
′) | c′f 〈X
′〉 for some S′ and X ′ with, initially,
A1f = A
1
f (((0, 0), nil) :: nil).
Consider traces that interleave inputs cf (Xi) for i ∈ I, outputs νxi.c′f 〈xi〉 for i ∈ Idone ⊆ I, inputs
ch(Yi) for i ∈ J , and outputs νhi.c′h〈hi〉 for i ∈ Jdone ⊆ J , for some disjoint index sets I and J , such
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that variables xj or hj may occur in Xi or Yi only when j < i. We let R be the smallest relation
closed by reductions within A1f (S) or A
1
fi (Xi0 , S), but not in A
0
his or A
1
his , such that
νk, x˜.(A0h |A
0
his |A
0
f | σ
0 | O) R νk, x˜.(A1h | A
1
his |A
1
f (S) | σ
1 |O)
and νk, x˜.(A0h |A
0
his |A
0
f | σ
0 | O) R νk, x˜.(A1h | A
1
his |A
1
fi(Xi0 , S) | σ
1 | O′)
where the following conditions hold:
• J = Jdone ⊎ Jout ⊎ Jfail ⊎ Jtest, I = Idone ⊎ Iout = I ′h ⊎ I
′
alt and, in the second case of the definition
of R, i0 ∈ Iout is the greatest index in J and I.
Intuitively, J collects the indices of all hash requests processed so far, partitioned into Jtest, for
requests before the test ne list(Yi) = true; Jfail, for requests after failing the test; Jout, for requests
after passing the test but before the output; and Jdone, for requests after passing the test and
performing the output. And I collects the indices of all compression requests processed so far,
partitioned into Iout, for requests before the output and Idone, for requests after the output; and
also into I ′h, for requests that must be made consistent with the hash function, and I
′
alt, for unrelated
requests; i0 is the index of the current compression request.
• A0his =
∏
i∈Jtest
A0hi(Yi) and A
1
his =
∏
i∈Jtest
A1hi(Yi).
These processes represent requests before the test ne list(Yi) = true.
• x˜ = {xi | i ∈ Iout}∪{hi | i ∈ Jout} are pairwise distinct variables, and the name k and the variables
x˜ do not occur in any (Xi)i∈I or (Yi)i∈J .
• ne list(Yi) = true for i ∈ Jdone ∪ Jout, and ne list(Yi) 6= true for i ∈ Jfail.
• O =
∏
i∈Iout
c′f 〈xi〉 |
∏
i∈Jout
c′h〈hi〉 and
O′ =
∏
i∈Iout\{i0}
c′f 〈xi〉 |
∏
i∈Jout
c′h〈hi〉.
These parallel compositions represent pending request outputs, and each output transition consists
of removing one message from O and one restriction on the corresponding variable in x˜.
• S is (any list representation of) a finite map from pairs of blocks to lists of blocks that maps (0, 0)
to nil and (h′(k,M), fc(k,M)) to M for some lists M =M1 :: . . . :: Mn :: nil with n > 0. The range
of S is prefix-closed, that is, if S maps a pair to M ++M ′, then it also maps a pair to M .
The variables xi and hi do not occur in S.
For every i ∈ I, S maps fst(Xiσ1) to some list M if and only if i ∈ I ′h; then S also maps xiσ
1 to
M ++ snd(Xiσ
1), except when i = i0 in the second case in the definition of R.
• σ0 = σ0h | σ
0
f | σ
0
fo and σ
1 = σ1h | σ
1
f | σ
1
fo , where
σ0h = {(
h(k,Yi)/hi)i∈Jdone∪Jout} and σ
1
h = {(
h′(k,Yi)/hi)i∈Jdone∪Jout},
σ0f = {(
f(k,Xi)/xi)i∈I′h} and σ
1
f = {(
(h′(k,Z′i),fc(k,Z
′
i))/xi)i∈I′h} where S maps fst(Xiσ
1) to Zi and Z
′
i is
Zi ++ snd(Xi),
σ0fo = {(
f(k,Xi)/xi)i∈I′alt} and σ
1
fo = {(
f′(k,Xi)/xi)i∈I′alt}.
With σ1 defined in the second case of R, for instance, we have
A1fi(Xi0σ
1, S)→∗ A1f ((xi0σ
1,M ++ snd(Xi0σ
1)) :: S) | c′f 〈xi0σ
1〉
when S maps fst(Xi0σ
1) to M , and A1fi(Xi0σ
1, S)→∗ A1f (S) | c
′
f 〈xi0σ
1〉 otherwise. Hence, the second
case of the definition of R reduces to the first one. However, the first case is useful for the initial case,
and the second case is useful after inputs cf (Xi). Taking S = ((0, 0), nil) :: nil and I = J = ∅, the first
case yields νk.(A0h |A
0
f ) R νk.(A
1
h |A
1
f ), so R includes our target observational equivalence. We show
that R ∪ R−1 is a labelled bisimulation.
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1. We show that, if A R B, then A ≈s B. To this end, we prove the two properties below by
induction on the number of variables in the domain of σ0 and σ1.
P1. νk.σ0 ≈s νk.σ
1 and
P2. if M =M1 :: . . . ::Mn :: nil for some n ≥ 1 contains neither k nor the variable with greatest
index in dom(σ0) = dom(σ1), then for all i ∈ I we have Σ ⊢ fst(xiσ0) = h(k,Mσ0) ⇐⇒
Σ ⊢ fst(xiσ
1) = h′(k,Mσ1).
For all i ∈ I, xiσ0 = f(k,Xiσ0) and for all i ∈ Jdone ∪ Jout, hiσ0 = fst(f(k,M)) for some term
M . Hence, by Corollary G.1,
νk.σ0 ≈s νa˜.{(
xiσ0/xi)i∈I , (
fst(hiσ0)/hi)i∈Jdone∪Jout}
where the following conditions hold:
• xiσ0 for i ∈ I and hiσ0 for i ∈ Jdone ∪ Jout are names in a˜.
• For all i, j ∈ I, xiσ0 = xjσ0 if and only if Σ ⊢ f(k,Xiσ0) = f(k,Xjσ0), that is, Σ ⊢ Xiσ0 =
Xjσ
0.
• For all i, j ∈ Jdone ∪ Jout, hiσ0 = hjσ0 if and only if Σ ⊢ f(k, (. . . f(k, ((0, 0),M1)) . . . ,
Mn)) = f(k, (. . . f(k, ((0, 0),M
′
1)) . . . ,M
′
n′)) where Yiσ
0 = M1 :: . . . :: Mn :: nil and Yjσ
0 =
M ′1 :: . . . ::M
′
n :: nil, that is, Σ ⊢ Yiσ
0 = Yjσ
0, by Lemma G.4.
• For all i ∈ I and j ∈ Jdone ∪ Jout, xiσ0 = hjσ0 if and only if Σ ⊢ f(k,Xiσ0) = f(k,
(. . . f(k, ((0, 0),M1)) . . . ,Mn)) where Yjσ
0 = M1 :: . . . ::Mn :: nil. In this case, we have
Σ ⊢ fst(xiσ0) = fst(f(k,Xiσ0)) = fst(f(k, (. . . f(k, ((0, 0),M1)) . . . ,Mn))) = h(k, Yjσ0). Con-
versely, if Σ ⊢ fst(xiσ
0) = h(k, Yjσ
0), then Σ ⊢ fst(f(k,Xiσ
0)) = fst(f(k, (. . . f(k, ((0, 0),
M1)) . . . ,Mn))). Since these terms do not reduce at the root under the rewrite system R
of Lemma G.3, we have Σ ⊢ f(k,Xiσ0) = f(k, (. . . f(k, ((0, 0),M1)) . . . ,Mn)). Therefore,
xiσ0 = hjσ0 if and only if Σ ⊢ fst(xiσ0) = h(k, Yjσ0).
By Lemma G.2, we can replace the names xiσ0 and hiσ0 with pairs (xiσ1, xiσ2) and (hiσ1, hiσ2)
respectively. Thus
νk.σ0 ≈s νa˜
′.{((xiσ1,xiσ2)/xi)i∈I , (
hiσ1/hi)i∈Jdone∪Jout}
where the following conditions hold:
• xiσ1, xiσ2 for i ∈ I and hiσ1 for i ∈ Jdone ∪ Jout are names in a˜
′.
• For all i, j ∈ I, xiσ1 6= xjσ2.
• For all i ∈ I and j ∈ Jdone ∪ Jout, xiσ2 6= hjσ1.
• For all i, j ∈ I, xiσ1 = xjσ1 ⇐⇒ xiσ2 = xjσ2 ⇐⇒ Σ ⊢ Xiσ0 = Xjσ0.
• For all i, j ∈ Jdone ∪ Jout, hiσ1 = hjσ1 ⇐⇒ Σ ⊢ Yiσ0 = Yjσ0.
• For all i ∈ I and j ∈ Jdone ∪ Jout, xiσ1 = hjσ1 ⇐⇒ Σ ⊢ fst(xiσ0) = h(k, Yjσ0).
For all i ∈ I ′alt, xiσ
1 = f′(k,Xiσ
1), for all i ∈ I ′h, xiσ
1 = (h′(k, Z ′iσ
1), fc(k, Z
′
iσ
1)), and for all
i ∈ Jdone ∪ Jout, hiσ1 = h′(k, Yiσ1). Hence, by Corollary G.1,
νk.σ1 ≈s νa˜.{(
xiσ3/xi)i∈I′alt , (
(xiσ4,xiσ5)/xi)i∈I′h , (
hiσ4/hi)i∈Jdone∪Jout}
where the following conditions hold:
• xiσ3 for i ∈ I ′alt, xiσ4 and xiσ5 for i ∈ I
′
h, and hiσ4 for i ∈ Jdone ∪ Jout are names in a˜.
• For all i, j ∈ I ′h, xiσ4 6= xjσ5.
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• For all i ∈ I ′alt and j ∈ I
′
h, xiσ3 6= xjσ4 and xiσ3 6= xjσ5.
• For all i ∈ I ′alt and j ∈ Jdone ∪ Jout, xiσ3 6= hjσ4.
• For all i ∈ I ′h and j ∈ Jdone ∪ Jout, xiσ5 6= hjσ4.
• For all i, j ∈ I ′alt, xiσ3 = xjσ3 ⇐⇒ Σ ⊢ f
′(k,Xiσ
1) = f′(k,Xjσ
1)⇐⇒ Σ ⊢ Xiσ1 = Xjσ1.
• For all i, j ∈ Jdone ∪ Jout, hiσ4 = hjσ4 ⇐⇒ Σ ⊢ Yiσ1 = Yjσ1.
• For all i ∈ I ′h and j ∈ Jdone ∪ Jout, xiσ4 = hjσ4 ⇐⇒ Σ ⊢ fst(xiσ
1) = h′(k, Yjσ
1).
• For all i, j ∈ I ′h, xiσ4 = xjσ4 ⇐⇒ xiσ5 = xjσ5 ⇐⇒ Σ ⊢ Z
′
iσ
1 = Z ′jσ
1. In this case, by
definition of Z ′i, Σ ⊢ Ziσ
1 = Zjσ
1 and Σ ⊢ snd(Xiσ1) = snd(Xjσ1). Since S maps fst(Xiσ1)
to Zi and fst(Xjσ
1) to Zj , we have Zi = Ziσ
1 and Zj = Zjσ
1, so either Σ ⊢ Zi = Zj =
nil and Σ ⊢ fst(Xiσ1) = (0, 0) = fst(Xjσ1) or Σ ⊢ Zi = Zj 6= nil and Σ ⊢ fst(Xiσ1) =
(h′(k, Zi), fc(k, Zi)) = (h
′(k, Zj), fc(k, Zj)) = fst(Xjσ
1). So in both cases, Σ ⊢ Xiσ
1 = Xjσ
1.
Conversely, if Σ ⊢ Xiσ1 = Xjσ1, then Σ ⊢ Z ′iσ
1 = Z ′jσ
1, since Z ′i is computed from Xi.
Therefore, for all i, j ∈ I ′h, xiσ4 = xjσ4 ⇐⇒ xiσ5 = xjσ5 ⇐⇒ Σ ⊢ Xiσ
1 = Xjσ
1.
By Lemma G.2, we can replace the names xiσ3 for i ∈ I ′alt with pairs (xiσ4, xiσ5). Thus
νk.σ1 ≈s νa˜′.{((xiσ4,xiσ5)/xi)i∈I , (
hiσ4/hi)i∈Jdone∪Jout} where the following conditions hold:
• xiσ4 and xiσ5 for i ∈ I, and hiσ4 for i ∈ Jdone ∪ Jout are names in a˜′.
• For all i, j ∈ I, xiσ4 6= xjσ5.
• For all i ∈ I and j ∈ Jdone ∪ Jout, xiσ5 6= hjσ4.
• For all i, j ∈ I, xiσ4 = xjσ4 ⇐⇒ xiσ5 = xjσ5 ⇐⇒ Σ ⊢ Xiσ1 = Xjσ1. Indeed, when i ∈ I ′h
and j ∈ I ′alt, we have xiσ4 6= xjσ4, xiσ5 6= xjσ5, and Σ ⊢ Xiσ
1 6= Xjσ
1 since fst(Xiσ
1) and
fst(Xjσ
1) are not mapped to the same value by S. When i and j are both in I ′h or both in
I ′alt, the result comes from the equivalences shown above.
• For all i, j ∈ Jdone ∪ Jout, hiσ4 = hjσ4 ⇐⇒ Σ ⊢ Yiσ1 = Yjσ1.
• For all i ∈ I and j ∈ Jdone ∪ Jout, xiσ4 = hjσ4 ⇐⇒ Σ ⊢ fst(xiσ1) = h′(k, Yjσ1). Indeed, if
i ∈ I ′alt, we have xiσ4 6= hjσ4 and Σ ⊢ fst(xiσ
1) 6= h′(k, Yjσ1). When i ∈ I ′h, the result comes
from an equivalence shown above.
Since Xi and Yi contain variables xj and hj only with j < i, the variable of dom(σ
0) with the
greatest index does not occur in Xi and Yi, so by induction hypothesis, we have Σ ⊢ Xiσ0 =
Xjσ
0 ⇐⇒ Σ ⊢ Xiσ1 = Xjσ1 and Σ ⊢ Yiσ0 = Yjσ0 ⇐⇒ Σ ⊢ Yiσ1 = Yjσ1, so it suffices to show
property P2 to obtain νk.σ0 ≈s νk.σ1.
Let us now show property P2, by induction on n. Let M =M1 :: . . . ::Mn :: nil be a term that
does not contain k nor the variable with greatest index in dom(σ0) = dom(σ1), n ≥ 1, and i ∈ I.
Suppose that Σ ⊢ fst(xiσ0) = h(k,Mσ0). We have
fst(xiσ
0) = fst(f(k,Xiσ
0))
h(k,Mσ0) = fst(f(k, (. . . f(k, ((0, 0),M1)) . . . ,Mn)))σ
0
so
Σ ⊢ Xiσ
0 = (. . . f(k, ((0, 0),M1)) . . . ,Mn)σ
0
If n = 1, we have Σ ⊢ Xiσ
0 = ((0, 0),Mnσ
0). Since Xi and Mn do not contain the variable of
dom(σ0) with the greatest index, we have Σ ⊢ Xiσ1 = ((0, 0),Mnσ1) by induction hypothesis,
so S maps fst(Xiσ
1) = (0, 0) to Zi = nil, hence Z
′
i = Zi++snd(Xi), so Σ ⊢ Z
′
iσ
1 = nil++Mnσ
1 =
Mnσ
1 :: nil =Mσ1 and Σ ⊢ fst(xiσ1) = h′(k, Z ′iσ
1) = h′(k,Mσ1).
If n > 1, let M ′ = M1 :: . . . ::Mn−1 :: nil and H = f(k, (. . . f(k, ((0, 0),M1)) . . . ,Mn−1)).
We have Σ ⊢ Xiσ0 = (H,Mn)σ0. Since k does not occur in Xi and Xiσ0 is of the form
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(Hσ0,Mnσ
0) = (f(k, ·), ·), there exists j0 ∈ I such that Σ ⊢ Hσ0 = xj0σ
0 and xj0 occurs in Xi,
so j0 < i. Thus Σ ⊢ fst(xj0σ
0) = fst(Hσ0) = h(k,M ′σ0), so by induction hypothesis,
Σ ⊢ fst(xj0σ
1) = h′(k,M ′σ1)
By construction of σ1, we have
Σ ⊢ snd(xj0σ
1) = fc(k,M
′σ1)
Moreover, we have Σ ⊢ Xiσ0 = (xj0 ,Mn)σ
0 and Xi, xj0 , and Mn do not contain the variable of
dom(σ0) with the greatest index, so we have Σ ⊢ Xiσ1 = (xj0 ,Mn)σ
1 by induction hypothesis.
Hence Σ ⊢ fst(Xiσ1) = xj0σ
1 = (h′(k,M ′σ1), fc(k,M
′σ1)). Hence S maps fst(Xiσ
1) to Zi such
that Σ ⊢ Zi = M ′σ1, so Σ ⊢ Z ′iσ
1 = Zi ++ snd(Xi)σ
1 = Mσ1, so Σ ⊢ fst(xiσ1) = h′(k, Z ′iσ
1) =
h′(k,Mσ1).
Conversely, suppose that Σ ⊢ fst(xiσ1) = h′(k,Mσ1). Thus i ∈ I ′h and Σ ⊢ Z
′
iσ
1 = Mσ1. So S
maps fst(Xiσ
1) to some Zi.
If Zi = nil, then Σ ⊢ fst(Xiσ1) = (0, 0). Since Xi does not contain the variable of dom(σ0)
with the greatest index, we have Σ ⊢ fst(Xiσ0) = (0, 0) by induction hypothesis. Moreover Z ′i =
Zi++snd(Xi), so Σ ⊢Mσ1 = Z ′iσ
1 = snd(Xiσ
1) :: nil. SinceM andXi do not contain the variable
of dom(σ0) with the greatest index, we have Σ ⊢Mσ0 = snd(Xiσ0) :: nil by induction hypothesis.
We obtain Σ ⊢ h(k,Mσ0) = fst(f(k, ((0, 0), snd(Xiσ0))) = fst(f(k,Xiσ0)) = fst(xiσ0).
If Zi 6= nil, then Σ ⊢ fst(Xiσ1) = (h′(k, Zi), fc(k, Zi)) and Z ′i = Zi ++ snd(Xi). Since Σ ⊢ Z
′
iσ
1 =
Mσ1, we have
Σ ⊢ Zi = (M1 :: . . . :: Mn−1 :: nil)σ
1
Σ ⊢ snd(Xiσ
1) =Mnσ
1
Since k does not occur in Xi, there exists j0 ∈ I such that Σ ⊢ xj0σ
1 = (h′(k, Zi), fc(k, Zi)) =
fst(Xiσ
1). Hence
Σ ⊢ fst(xj0σ
1) = h′(k, Zi) = h
′(k, (M1 :: . . . :: Mn−1 :: nil)σ
1)
By induction hypothesis,
Σ ⊢ fst(xj0σ
0) = h(k, (M1 :: . . . :: Mn−1 :: nil)σ
0)
= fst(f(k, (. . . f(k, ((0, 0),M1)) . . . ,Mn−1))σ
0)
Since xj0σ
0 is of the form f(k, ·), we obtain
Σ ⊢ xj0σ
0 = f(k, (. . . f(k, ((0, 0),M1)) . . . ,Mn−1))σ
0
We have Σ ⊢ fst(Xiσ1) = xj0σ
1 and Σ ⊢ snd(Xiσ1) = Mnσ1, so Σ ⊢ Xiσ1 = (xj0σ
1,Mnσ
1)
Since Xi, xj0 , and Mn do not contain the variable of dom(σ
0) with the greatest index, we have
Σ ⊢ Xiσ0 = (xj0σ
0,Mnσ
0) by induction hypothesis. So Σ ⊢ fst(xiσ0) = fst(f(k,Xiσ0)) =
fst(f(k, (xj0σ
0,Mnσ
0))) = h(k,Mσ0).
2. We first show that, if A R B, A
α
−→ A′, A′ is closed, and fv (α) ⊆ dom(A), then B →∗
α
−→→∗ B′
and A′ R B′ for some B′. The only possible labelled transitions in A are as follows:
• A0h performs an input with label α = ch(Yi), with fv(Yi) ⊆ dom(σ
0) \ {x˜}, creating a process
A0hi(Yi). The process A
1
h can perform the same input, creating a processA
1
hi(Yi). The resulting
extended processes are still in R, by adding to Jtest an index i greater than those already in
I and J .
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• A0f performs an input with label α = cf (Xi), with fv (Xi) ⊆ dom(σ
0)\ {x˜}, creating a process
c′f 〈f(k,Xi)〉 ≡ νxi.(c
′
f 〈xi〉 | {
f(k,Xi)/xi}). A reduced form of A
1
f (S) or A
1
fi(Xi0 , S) can perform
the same input (possibly after internal reductions). We keep performing internal reductions
after the input, until the output on c′f is enabled. Hence a new process
c′f 〈f
′(k,Xi)〉 ≡ νxi.(c′f 〈xi〉 | {
f′(k,Xi)/xi})
or
c′f 〈(h
′(k, Z ′i), fc(k, Z
′
i))〉 ≡ νxi.(c
′
f 〈xi〉 | {
(h′(k,Z′i),fc(k,Z
′
i))/xi})
appears, depending on whether S maps fst(Xi) to some Zi or not, and for Z
′
i given in the
definition of R. The resulting extended processes are still in R, by adding to Iout an index
greater than those already in I and J .
• O performs an output with label α = νhi.c′h〈hi〉. (We arrange that the bound variable of α
has the same name as the variable used internally by the output that we perform.) In this
case, hi is removed from x˜ and c′h〈hi〉 is removed from O. The process O can perform the
same output on the right-hand side, hence we remain in R by moving the index i from Jout
to Jdone.
• O performs an output with label α = νxi.c′f 〈xi〉. In this case, xi is removed from x˜ and c
′
f 〈xi〉
is removed from O. If we are in the second case of the definition of R with i = i0, we first
reduce A1fi(Xi0 , S) until we arrive at the first case of the definition of R. The process O can
then perform the same output on the right-hand side, hence we remain in R by moving the
index i from Iout to Idone.
A detailed proof that these are the only possible labelled transitions of A uses the partial normal
forms introduced in Appendix B and the decomposition lemmas proved in Appendix B.4. This
comment also applies to other case distinctions below in the proof of Theorem 6.2.
Conversely, we show that, if A R B, B
α
−→ B′, B′ is closed, and fv (α) ⊆ dom(B), then
A →∗
α
−→→∗ A′ and A′ R B′ for some A′. The only possible labelled transitions in B are
as follows:
• A1h performs an input with label α = ch(Yi), with fv(Yi) ⊆ dom(σ
1) \ {x˜}. The process A1h
can perform the same input, and we remain in R by adding to Jtest an index i greater than
those already in I and J .
• (A reduced form of) A1f (S) performs an input with label α = cf (Xi), with fv (Yi) ⊆ dom(σ
1)\
{x˜}. After the input, A1f (S) is transformed into the process A
1
fi(Xi, S). The process A
0
f can
perform the same input. A new process c′f 〈f(k,Xi)〉 ≡ νxi.(c
′
f 〈xi〉 | {
f(k,Xi)/xi}) appears on
left-hand side. We remain in R by adding to Iout an index i0 greater than those already in
I ∪ J . (On the right-hand side, the variable xi0 is defined but not used.)
When a reduced form of A1fi(Xi0 , S) performs an input with label α = cf (Xi), A
1
fi(Xi0 , S) has
first been reduced so that the configuration is in the first case of the definition of R, with the
considered input in A1f (S), so this case is already treated above.
• O performs an output with label α = νhi.c′h〈hi〉. The process O performs the same output
on the left-hand side and we remain in R by moving the index i from Jout to Jdone.
• O performs an output with label α = νxi.c′f 〈xi〉. The process O performs the same output
on the left-hand side, and we remain in R, by moving the index i from Iout to Idone.
When a reduced form of A1fi(Xi0 , S) performs an output with label α = νxi.c
′
f 〈xi〉, A
1
fi(Xi0 , S)
has first been reduced so that the configuration is in the first case of the definition of R, with
the considered output included in O, so this case is already treated above.
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3. We first show that, if A R B, A→ A′, and A′ is closed, then B →∗ B′ and A′ R B′ for some B′.
The only processes that can be reduced in A are processes A0hi(Yi) inside A
0
his . If ne list(Yi) =
true, then A0hi(Yi) reduces to
c′h〈h(k, Yi)〉 ≡ νhi.(c
′
h〈hi〉 | {
h(k,Yi)/hi})
and similarly A1hi(Yi) reduces to
c′h〈h
′(k, Yi)〉 ≡ νhi.(c′h〈hi〉 | {
h′(k,Yi)/hi})
and we remain in R by moving i from Jtest to Jout. (The value of ne list(Yi) remains unchanged
when we instantiate Yi with σ
0 or σ1 because the image of these substitutions does not contain
lists.) If ne list(Yi) 6= true, then A0hi(Yi) reduces to 0 and similarly A
1
hi(Yi) reduces to 0, and we
remain in R by moving i from Jtest to Jfail.
Conversely, we show that, if A R B, B → B′, and B′ is closed, then A→∗ A′ and A′ R B′ for
some A′.
The only reductions in B are due to processes A1hi(Yi) within A
1
his , and A
1
f (S) or A
1
fi(Xi0 , S).
The first case can be handled similarly to the case in which A0hi(Yi) reduces. In the second case,
we remain in R with A′ = A.
Therefore, R ⊆ ≈l. By Theorem 4.1, R ⊆ ≈. So νk.(A0h |A
0
f ) ≈ νk.(A
1
h |A
1
f ).
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